

SC

THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

NEW SERIES VOLUME III NUMBERS 3, 4

(Vol. XLVII of the continuous series)

July—October 1953

PROPERTY OF
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

DEC 17 1953

RECEIVED

OXFORD : AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE

GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE : OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Price for single numbers, 7s. 3d. net (7s. 5d. post free); for double numbers, 14s. 6d. net (14s. 10d. post free).
Yearly subscription, 24s. post free. Combined yearly subscription for THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY and
THE CLASSICAL REVIEW, 40s. post free.

THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

Editors G. E. F. CHILVER, M.A., D.PHIL., The Queen's College, Oxford
D. W. LUCAS, M.A., King's College, Cambridge

BOARD OF MANAGEMENT

Professor E. H. Warmington, M.A. (Chairman)
Professor R. G. Austin, M.A. (Hon. Treas.)
F. H. Sandbach, M.A.
Professor F. W. Walbank, M.A., F.B.A.
Professor W. S. Watt, M.A.
N. G. L. Hammond, M.A., representing the Cambridge Philological Society
M. Platnauer, B.LITT., M.A., representing the Oxford Philological Society

*Representing the
Council of the
Classical Association*

With the co-operation of

Professor B. D. Meritt, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton,
Professor J. A. FitzHerbert, University of Adelaide, and
Professor Homer A. Thompson, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

CONTENTS

Thucydides' Description of the Great Plague at Athens	D. L. PAGE	97
Num in Direct Questions: A Rule Restated	D. N. SHACKLETON BAILEY	120
Plato's <i>Parmenides</i> : Some Suggestions for its Interpretation	A. L. PECK	126
Alexander and His 'So-Called' Father	J. R. HAMILTON	151
Some Questions About Historical Writing in the Second Century B.C.	J. P. V. D. BALSDON	158
The <i>Nea 'ΕΚΔΟΣΙΣ</i> of Eunapius' Histories	WALTER R. CHALMERS	165
An Identification in Suidas	A. F. NORMAN	171
Martial Again	ALAN KER	173
Notes on Statius (<i>continued</i>)	ALAN KER	175
Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum		183

ord

y

1

97

120

126

151

158

165

171

173

175

183

A
to
We

39

390
380

*
F

The m
are de
Co
Repub
Imperi
to Dic
and B
Roman
side an

publ



The Loeb Classical Library

Edited by

† T. E. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D. † W. H. D. ROUSE, LITT.D.

† E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D.

L. A. POST, M.A. E. H. WARMINGTON, M.A., F.R.HIST.SOC.

Founded by JAMES LOEB

Each volume Foolscape 8vo, 400-700 pages. Clear type. Cloth, 15s. net

A series of Greek and Latin Texts with English Translations on the opposite page. The series is to contain all that is best in Greek and Latin Literature, from the time of Homer to the end of the Western Empire.

'We shall never be independent of our Loeb.'—*Times Literary Supplement*.

NEW VOLUMES, 1953

LATIN

398 PRUDENTIUS. Two volumes. Vol. II. H. J. Thomson.

GREEK

390 DIODORUS SICULUS. Twelve volumes. Vol. X. R. M. Geer.

380, 401, PHILO. Supplementary volumes. Translated from an ancient Armenian Text by Ralph Marcus.

Vol. I. Questions and Answers on Genesis.

Vol. II. Questions and Answers on Exodus.

WILLIAM HEINEMANN, LTD.

Windmill Press, Kingswood, Tadworth, Surrey

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.

★ JUST PUBLISHED ★

ROMAN GAUL

by

OLWEN BROGAN
F.S.A.

The main features of Roman Gaul are described concisely.

CONTENTS: I, Gaul and the Republic; II, The Framework of Imperial Gaul; III, From Tiberius to Diocletian; IV, Town Planning and Buildings; V, Some Gallo-Roman Towns; VI, The Countryside and Natural Resources of Gaul;



VII, Industries and Commerce; VIII, Art; IX, Religion; X, Gaul in the Later Empire.

16 pages of photographs. 35 figures.
Folding map. 270 pages. 21s. net

published by G. BELL AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON

[i front]



NELSON'S MEDIEVAL TEXTS

edited by V. H. GALBRAITH and R. A. B. MYNORS

The Regularis Concordia

edited by DOM THOMAS SYMONS, O.S.B., The *Regularis Concordia* was drawn up by St. Ethelwold of Winchester about the year 970. It provided for the newly revived English monasteries a code of monastic law and liturgy in conformity with the best continental models. 15s

Gesta Stephani

and The Historia Novella of William of Malmesbury

edited by K. R. POTTER, M.C., M.A., Lecturer in Latin, University of Edinburgh. In these two works the story of the Civil war between Stephen and Matilda is told from both sides. English translation faces the Latin original. Copious notes. *Forthcoming.* 15s

A prospectus of the complete series will be sent on request to the publishers, Nelsons, 3 Henrietta Street, W.C. 2, and Parkside Works, Edinburgh 9

A History of Medieval Philosophy

VOLUME TWO

MAURICE DE WULF, *translated by E. C. Messenger*. The fourth and definitive English edition of De Wulf's famous treatise, now considered a standard authority on its subject. Based on the sixth French edition, it has been completely revised. Volume Two deals with the thirteenth century, and Volume Three, not hitherto published in English, will cover the period after the thirteenth century. Volume One dealt with the beginnings to the end of the twelfth century. 21s

THUCYDIDES' DESCRIPTION OF THE GREAT PLAGUE AT ATHENS

THE nature of the Plague described by Thucydides in Book 2, chapter 49, has long been discussed both by medical and by classical scholars.¹ Of numerous suggested identifications none has found general approval; and it is doubtful whether any opinion is more prevalent today than that the problem is insoluble. The classical scholar is handicapped by his ignorance of medical science; his medical colleague has often been led astray by translations deficient in exactitude if not disfigured by error. The difficulties are great enough: but there is one indispensable preliminary task which can be undertaken with some prospect of success. If Thucydides' description is to be compared with modern records, it is necessary first to determine what the Greek words mean; and that can only be done by determining how far the Greek is expressed in the technical terms of contemporary medical science. It is obvious that Thucydides required a special vocabulary for this part of his work; and in fact over forty words in chapters 49 and 50 are unexampled elsewhere in his *History*, and a dozen more are used in meanings unexampled elsewhere. It is certain that a number of medical treatises were in circulation in Thucydides' lifetime, and that a more or less standard vocabulary had been or was being established. Now if it can be shown that the great majority of the terms employed by Thucydides in ch. 49 recur, apparently with the same meanings, as standard terms in the contemporary doctors, our second task—the comparison of Thucydides' description with modern records—will become a more rational undertaking than it was before, no longer the doubtful speculation which many of the modern doctors suppose it to be, thinking as they do that they have to deal with a layman's generalities expressed in literary language.

I have not been able to discover that this foundation has yet been laid, though much valuable material was assembled by Ehlert on pp. 98–124 of the dissertation quoted in my first footnote. There a selection of the Thucydidean

¹ To compile even a select bibliography of writings on this topic for the last hundred years would take much more time and trouble than I am prepared to spend on it. The subject is beyond the scope of the standard bibliographical publications: it is hard to discover what has been written; and then it is often still harder to obtain the books. It was by mere chance that I found one of the two treatises which proved most useful—*Die Krankheit zu Athen nach Thucydides*, by Dr. H. Brandeis, Kais.-russ. Hof-rath, a pamphlet published at Stuttgart in 1845; it is not mentioned by any other work which I have seen on this subject. Gleanings from the last forty years of Bursian are small and generally unfruitful. Schmid-Staelin, I. v, p. 75, n. 3, refers to two useful works: B. von Hagen, 'Die sogenannte Pest des Thuk.', *Gymnasium*, xlxi, 1938, pp. 120 ff. (I am obliged to the University Librarian

at Cambridge for providing me with microfilms of this elusive article); and J. Ehlert, *de verborum copia Thuc.*, diss. Berlin, 1910. Clasen-Steup mention only the agnostic W. Ebstein, *Die Pest des Thuk.*, Stuttgart, 1899, and 'Nochmals die Pest des Thuk.', *Deutsche Mediz. Wochenschr.* xxxvi, 1899, pp. 594 ff. Valuable notes and comments, such as those of Finley, *Thucydides*, 1942, p. 158, n. 2, and Sir Clifford Allbutt, *Greek Medicine in Rome*, 1921, pp. 340 f., are to be found in numerous places, likely and unlikely. Useful introductions to the medical literature are provided most recently by J. F. D. Shrewsbury, *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, xxiv, 1950, pp. 1 ff. (mostly British and American), and by B. von Hagen, op. cit. (mostly German). I have read a great deal: but I expect and hope that my attention will be drawn to serious omissions.

terms, especially of the verbs, is copiously illustrated from the Hippocratic Corpus; I was able to supplement my own collection from his, and his from mine.¹

PART I

Before we begin the task, it is proper to observe that the omens are favourable. It will be generally admitted that Thucydides is a keen observer, a clear thinker, and an accurate writer. He was himself afflicted by the Plague; and his purpose was to leave to posterity a description by which it could be recognized if it should ever recur. Further, it is highly probable that he was familiar with the writings of the contemporary Hippocratic school; and a good case has been stated for the conclusion that his conception of historical method and principles is closely related to the doctrines of that school.²

The general resemblance between Thucydides' description of the Plague and the plan of the *Epidemics* has often been noticed. Thucydides begins by describing (with the greatest brevity) what Hippocrates called the *καράκτας*, the general conditions prevailing at the time of the outbreak. He then narrates the observed facts without comment, and without mention of such treatment as may have been applied; he names the days—the 7th and 9th—on which the 'crisis' was to be expected; and concludes with an account of the complications which ensued in cases where the patients survived the 'crisis'. The similarity of principles is still more patent than that of method. It was characteristic of the Hippocratic doctors that they exalted *prognosis* above diagnosis, above the study of causes, and above the classification of diseases. The physician's task, according to this school, was not to theorize about origins, or to differentiate diseases by classifying particular groups of symptoms; nor yet to provide specific remedies for symptoms in isolation. The object of accurate observation and recording was *prognosis*, the understanding in advance of the course which the symptoms would follow, the foreknowledge of the development of the disease from the beginning to the end. Only thus could the physician ascertain which maladies might be regarded as curable; when the 'crisis' of each might be expected; what relief could be given to the patient day by day—not with a view to obstructing the progress of the disease as a whole (that progress was usually regarded as irremediable) but in order to strengthen the patient's resistance to foreseen developments. Many readers have noticed the resemblance between Thucydides' statement of his aim and several passages in the Hippocratic treatises, particularly the beginning of *Prognosticon*:

‘The first duty of the physician is to practise forecasting. If he foreknows and foretells at the sick-bed the present, the past, and the future, and describes in detail what the sick man has omitted from his own account, he will create confidence that he understands what is the matter with his patients, who will then take heart and entrust themselves to his care. Moreover, the value of his treatment depends on his ability to foretell the future from the present symptoms.’

In the same spirit Thucydides declares that his object is not to inquire into causes, but to provide the factual evidence necessary for *prognosis*, so that the

¹ W. Nestlé in *Hermes*, lxxiii, 1938, pp. 28 ff., gives some Hippocratic examples of a few Thucydidean terms; such *obiter dicta* on this difficult subject are misleading, and

Ehler had already rendered them superfluous.

² C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History*, 1929.

physician may in future know in advance the course which the Plague will follow from start to finish:

'Each individual, whether doctor or layman, is free to relate his personal opinion about the origin of the Plague, and the causes of this unprecedented disturbance, if he can find any powerful enough to account for it. *For my part, I shall describe it just as it was, and provide evidence in the light of which the student may have some knowledge in advance, and so have the best chance of recognizing it if it should ever recur.*'¹

Finally, it might be presumed from the start that Thucydides was familiar with the doctors' terminology. When he says of the evacuations of bile that they were 'of every kind for which the doctors have a name', *πάσαι ὅσαι ὑπὸ ἱατρῶν ὠνομασμέναι εἰσίν*, it is to be presumed that he was familiar with those names, and that he was not ignorant of less recondite medical terms.²

But *prima facie* probabilities and presumptions are not enough. We need exact knowledge. The facts are easily ascertainable: and this will be the first part of our task—to determine how far Thucydides' description of the Plague is expressed in the standard terms of contemporary medical science.³

First, the Thucydidean terms for parts of the human body:⁴ these are *αἰδοῖα*, *τάκρωτήρα*, *γλῶσσα*, *τὰ ἐντός*,⁵ **καρδία*, *κεφαλή*, **κοιλία*, **όφθαλμοί*,⁶ *πόδες*, **στήθη*, **φάρυγξ*, *χείρες*, **χολή*.

¹ Thuc. 2. 48. 3. Cf. *Epid.*¹ 11 (i. 164 J., i. 189-90 K.) *λέγειν τὰ προγενόμενα, γινώσκειν τὰ παρεόντα, προλέγειν τὰ ἔσμενα· μελετᾶν ταῦτα.*

² I suppose that Thuc. refers especially to the numerous shades of colour named by the doctors in this connexion: cf. *Prog.* 13. 4 (ii. 28 J., i. p. 91 K.) *εἰ δὲ εἴη τὸ ἐμείνενον πρασεόδες η̄ πελεύνον η̄ μέλαν κτλ. . . . εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα τὰ χρώματα ο̄ αὐτὸς ἀδρόποτος έμένοι κτλ.*

³ For the purpose of what follows, I have admitted evidence from schools other than the Hippocratic, but seldom unless there appeared to be no reason to doubt that the terminology in question was more or less uniform. I have further admitted the evidence of treatises written probably in the fourth century B.C., on the ground that a high proportion of the terms standard in that era were probably established in medical parlance long before. The dating of the treatises opens a wide field for research: differences and resemblances in thought and style between one work and another are often obvious to the most casual inspection; and very different levels of medical science are represented. Perusal of Gossen, *RE* viii. 1802 ff., and Edelstein, *RE* suppl. vi. 1290 ff., suggests that a great deal remains to be done. The confident dating of a large number of the treatises to the second half of the fifth century B.C. surprises me: but I see no reason to dispute it in some cases (esp. *Prog.*, *V.M.*, *Epid.*^{1,8}, *Aēr.*, *Acut.*, and a few

others; of these I have made most use), or to doubt that the majority of the remainder were composed before the end of the fourth century.

⁴ In the sequel, an asterisk signifies that the word occurs nowhere else in Thuc., a dagger that it does not recur with the same meaning. In quoting from the *Hippocratica*, I have thought to serve the reader's convenience by adopting the following tedious procedure: The excellent text of Dr. W. H. S. Jones in the Loeb Series is quoted first (by chapter and line, followed by number of volume and page + 'J.') for all treatises included in it. If these treatises are found also in the Teubner text of H. Kuehlewein (vol. i, 1894; vol. ii, 1902) or in the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* (i. i, ed. I. L. Heiberg, 1927), references to these works (by volume and page + 'K.' for Kuehlewein, by page + 'H.' for Heiberg) are added to the Jones-references. (The only treatises in K. and H. which are not in Jones are *Liqu.* and *Medic.* 2-end, both in H. only.) Treatises which are not included in Jones's edition are quoted (by chapter, followed by volume and page + 'L.') from the great work of Littre (Paris, 1839-61). Abbreviated treatise-titles conform throughout to the list in LSJ.

⁵ *τὰ ἐντός* *Loc. Hom.* 45 (vi. 340 L.): *τὰ ἔνδον* is much commoner in the doctors.

⁶ Thuc. uses *έμματα* in 2. 11. 7; *όφθ.* is much commoner than *όμμα*. throughout the doctors.

Most, but not quite all, of these terms are common in Attic prose: all without exception are common in the doctors. It is seldom possible to determine precisely the limits of their meanings; the most we can say is that the broad meanings which they bear in the medical treatises are without exception applicable to their interpretation in Thucydides. If we now inquire whether any of these terms indicates familiarity with medical parlance—terms common in the doctors but abnormal in other prose—the following come under consideration:

(i) **καρδία**. It is generally held that Thuc. uses *καρδία* here in an unusual sense. According to Galen (v. 275 Kühn, cf. Schol. Thuc. ad loc.), *καρδία* in this passage means 'the cardiac orifice of the stomach', *τὸ στόμα τῆς γαστρός*. This piece of erudition has long been enshrined in our translations, commentaries, and lexica: I am not particularly concerned to dispute it, but I offer two observations:

First, that there is no proof that *καρδία* here means anything but 'heart'. It is possible that the verb *ἀνέστρεψε* (of which more later) and the following mention of the vomiting of gall were thought by Galen to suggest that *καρδία* referred to the stomach: but there is no reason to suppose that Thucydides could not use the verb *ἀναστρέψειν* of a general disturbance of the heart, or that he could not write of a disturbance of the heart in one clause and of the vomiting of gall in the next. Secondly, that the normal meaning of *καρδίη* in the doctors is 'heart', not 'stomach'. In the treatise *περὶ καρδίης*, for example, the subject is the *heart*. I am not competent to decide whether there is good reason to believe that the doctors occasionally use the word in some sense other than 'heart'. It is certainly hard for the layman to understand why Littré's index quotes *Prorrh.* 1, 72 (v. 528 L.) and *Aff.* 14, 15 (vi. 222, 224 L.); or why Nestlé should add *Epid.*² 2, 1 (v. 84 L.), or the Loeb editor *Epid.*¹, cases iv, v (i. 192 ff. J., i. 205 f. K.) and *Epid.*³, case xii (i. 236 J., i. 223 K.), as examples of *καρδίη* in the sense 'stomach'. In all these places the translation 'heart' appears to present no special difficulty.

For our purpose it is enough to know that the normal medical sense of this word, 'heart', is applicable to Thucydides; if a case can be made for a much rarer and more recondite medical meaning in Thucydides, so much the better; but I have not yet seen it made.

(ii) **ἀκρωτήρια**. This word, in the sense 'extremities of the body', is common in the doctors (e.g. *Acut.* 42, 7 (ii. 98 J., i. 130 K.), 59, 12 (ii. 114 J., i. 140 K.), *Aph.* 7, 1, 26 (iv. 192, 196 J.), *Flat.* 8, 11 (ii. 236 J., p. 95 H.), *Morb.*¹ 29 (vi. 198 L.), 33 (vi. 203 L.), 34 (vi. 204 L.)), apparently synonymous with the common *ἄκρεα, ἄκρα*. It is very rare in Attic prose; but, since it does occur (*Lysias* 5, 26), Thucydides' indebtedness to medical terminology cannot be proved.

The Thucydidean terms for affections of the body are a little more suggestive. The general terms *νόσος* and *νόσημα* are the commonest words for 'disease' in the doctors. *νόσος* is, as a rule, a more general term than *νόσημα*, which is most often used when a particular malady is under consideration. It is noticeable that the word **νόσημα* occurs in Thucydides only with reference to the Plague.

Of eighteen particular terms, fifteen occur in Thucydides nowhere else. With one exception, all these terms are normally used by the doctors to describe, so far as we can tell, the same things. For most of them there was probably no other term available; but the following may be thought to indicate familiarity with medical parlance:

(i) **τόνος**, of physical pain: *κατέβαινεν ἐς τὰ στήθη ὁ πόνος*. *πόνος* and *όδύνη* are the two standard general terms for the 'trouble' and 'pain' of disease (see Jones, i, Introd., p. lx).

(ii) The plural ***θέρμαι**, 'feverishness': *τῆς κεφαλῆς θέρμαι*. Common in medical writings, and almost wholly confined to them (*Salubr.* 5. 9 (iv. 50 J.), *Epid.*⁴ 42 (v. 184 L.), *Epid.*⁵ 55 (v. 238 L.), 59 (v. 240 L.)).¹

(iii) **έρυθρια**, 'reddening' or 'redness': *τῶν ὅφθαλμῶν ἔρυθρηματα*. This word is not attested earlier than Thucydides; it is common in the doctors (*Prog.* 17. 7 (ii. 34 J., i. 96 K.), 23. 12, 17, 23, 24 (ii. 46 ff. J., i. 63 f. K.), and often).

(iv) **ἔλκωσις**, 'lesion', creation of sores, ulcers, and the like, as a rule on the soft parts of the body, whether internally or externally: *ἔλκωσεως τε αὐτῆς* (sc. *τῆς κοιλίας*) *ἰσχυρᾶς ἐγγυηνομένης*. This noun, apparently not found elsewhere in fifth-century Greek, is common in the doctors (especially in *Fract.*, but also, for example, *Aph.* 3. 21 (iv. 128 J.), 4. 75 (iv. 154 J.), 81 (iv. 156 J.), *Alim.* 16 (i. 346 J., p. 80 H.), *Int.* 16 (vii. 204 L.)).

The remainder call for brief comment. Most of them are so common in the doctors that quotation of examples is wholly superfluous:

***ἀγρυπνία** is the standard medical term for *sleeplessness*; **ἀπορία** for general *helplessness*, being at a loss; ***βήξ** for *cough* (masculine in Thuc.: elsewhere always feminine so far as I know; see too the Dindorf's Lexicon s.v.); ***βράγχος** for *hoarseness*; ***διάρροια** for *diarrhoea*; **δίψα** for *thirst* (elsewhere in Thuc., MSS. vary between *δύψα* and *δύψος*, 4. 35. 4, 7. 87. 2; *δύψα* is much the commoner in the doctors). ***ἔλκος** is a term of general reference, most commonly signifying a lesion of the soft parts of the body (the context must decide whether 'sore', 'ulcer', 'wound', or what else is intended). ***καῦμα**, of a *burning sensation*, is a standard term. ***Λήθη**, *loss of memory*, occurs seldom but seems to be the standard word where it is required (*Epid.*³ *catast.* 3. 6. 10 (i. 244 J., i. 227 K.) *λήθη καὶ ἀφεσίς καὶ ἀφωνία*; case 13 (i. 278 J., i. 242 K.) *λήθη πάντων ὃ τι λέγοις*; *Epid.*⁷ 3 (v. 370 L.) *λήθη δέ τις τοιαύτη κτλ.*; *Coac.* 1. 6 (v. 588 L.) *μετά ρύγεος ἄγρια κακόν, κακὸν δὲ καὶ λήθη*). ***λύγξ** (*λυγγώδης*) and **λυγμός** (*λυγμώδης*) are both common in the doctors: the translation *hiccoughs* is misleading unless it is enlarged to include *retching*, the motion without the product of vomiting (so also Brandeis, op. cit., p. 21, n. 21). **τυνέμα** is the doctors' normal word for both *breath* and *breathing*: this may be the meaning in Thucydides, though I cannot disprove Brandeis's suggestion that the word here refers not to the breathing of the patient but to the exhalation given off by the infected tongue and throat.² ***πταρμός**, *sneezing*, and ***επασμός**, *convulsion*, are standard medical terms. ***φλύκτανα** (*φλυκτής, φλυκτανή, -ίδιον*) is the standard term for an exanthem of the blister-type (*V.M.* 16. 35 (i. 44 J., i. 19 K., p. 48 H.) *φλύκτανα ἀνίστανται ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀπὸ πυρὸς κατακεκαμένοις*, *Epid.*² 1 (v. 72 L.) *φλυκτανίδες ὥσπερ πυρίκαντος ἐπανίσταντο*). ***φλόγωσις**, the only Thucydidean term which appears to be missing from the Hippocratic vocabulary, is usually rendered 'inflammation'. But the common Hippocratic term for 'inflammation'

¹ Dr. Jones, *Malaria*, pp. 21 ff., points out that Thuc. does not use the common word for a fever, *πυρεός*: there is great probability in his inference that since 'in popular speech . . . there is a tendency to limit *πυρεότ* to definite fevers, namely, to those exhibiting a certain periodicity', Thuc. deliberately excludes this term from his

description of a wholly unfamiliar disease.

² Brandeis aptly compares Dion. *Hal. arch.* 10. 53 (on the plague at Rome, written with many conscious imitations of Thuc.) *ἐκκιμανομέναν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων βαρεῖα καὶ δυσώδης προσπίπτουσα καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ ἐρρωμένοις ἡ τοῦ πενίματος ἀποφορὰ ταχείας ἐφέρε τοῖς σώμασι τὰς τροπάς*.

is φλεγμονή; it may be that instead of speaking generally of 'inflammation' here, Thucydides has referred specifically to two factors which together constitute the inflammation—έριθημα, the redness, and φλόγωσις, the burning¹ (much the same thing as φλογμός in *V.M.* 19. 6 (i. 48 J., i. 22 K., p. 49 H.)). It is, however, to be noticed that φλόγωσις is a common equivalent to φλεγμονή in Galen and later doctors.

I add to this list of symptoms and affections the sentence in which Thucydides says that the patients 'could not endure the laying-on of even the lightest wraps and linens', μήτε τῶν πάννων λεπτῶν ἴματίων καὶ αὐδόνων τὰς ἐπιβόλας . . . ἀνέχεσθαι: the phraseology is similar to that of the doctors (*morb.*³ 13 (vii. 134 L.) ἴματια λεπτά ἐπιβάλλειν, *Fract.* 10. 7 (iii. 120 J., ii. 62 K.) περιβόλας ὅθουνται), and the fact is often recorded in them (*Int.* 36 (vii. 356 L.) τὸ ἴματιον πρὸς τὸν εώματι προσκείμενον οὐκ ἀνέχεται, *Epid.*⁷ 11 (v. 382 L.) τὸ ἴματιον ἔστιν τὸ ἀπερρίπτει, 84 (v. 442 L.) τὸ ἴματιον αἱρεῖται ἀπὸ τῶν επιθέων ἀπεώθει, *Acut.* 42. 12 (ii. 98 J., i. 130 K.) ἴματίων ἀπορρίψεις ἀπὸ τοῦ επίθεος).

Thucydides reveals his familiarity with medical parlance more in his choice of adjectives than in his terms for parts and affections of the body. The following six are specially noticeable:

(i) **ἰχυρός**. The doctors notoriously overwork this adjective to describe a *severe*, *violent* pain, fever, headache, insomnia, and the like. There are few, if any, commoner epithets in the Hippocratic Corpus. Thucydides employs it four times in a small space—θέρμαι ἰχυρά, βηχός ἰχυροῦ, επασμὸν ἰχυρόν, ἐλάκωσεως ἰχυράτ. The doctors provide abundant examples of similar excess, e.g. *Aēr.* 4. 25 (i. 78 J., i. 37 K., p. 58 H.) ὀφθαλμίας ἰχυράς, αἴμορροίας ἰχυράς, νοεύματα ἰχυρά, within a few lines.

(ii) ***ἀκρατος**: διαρροίας ἀμά ἀκράτου ἐπιπιπούσης. This word makes an important contribution to our inquiry into the nature of the Plague. It is a standard technical epithet for διάρροια in the doctors, meaning 'marked by absence of κράτος', 'uncompounded', 'uniformly fluid'.² It is never, so far as I can find out, applied to the stools of *dysentery*. If the noun and adjective in Thucydides are to be understood in their medical senses, we shall draw the very important inference that *dysentery* is not mentioned in Thucydides' description of the Plague; and we shall therefore be unable to acquiesce in the identification of the Plague with any disease of which *dysentery*³ is a signal characteristic.

The distinction between διάρροια and δυσεντερίη is clearly defined and studiously observed by the doctors. In *Vict.*³ 74. (iv. 394 ff. J.) διάρροια is said to be the name given to the disorder so long as only the waste products of food pass, 'but when the bowel is scraped and ulcerated, and blood passes, it is called *dysentery*, a difficult and dangerous ailment'; cf. especially *Aff.* 23 and 24 (vi. 234 seqq. L.), *Aph.* 7. 23 and 76 (iv. 196, 214 J.). The term δυσεντερίη in the doctors normally refers to dysenteric stools, which may be ὥφαιμα, χολώδεα, μυξώδεα, πυώδεα, φλεγματώδεα—anything but the waste products of food;

¹ So Brandeis, *op. cit.*

² The truth is not to be found in either LSJ or the Dindorfs' Lexicon. Nor yet in Galen (xviii. 1. 122 Kühn), who defines ἄκρητος (stools) thus: ἀμικτος ὑγρότητος ἰδατώδοντς, αὐτὸν μόνον ἔχουσα εἰδικων κάτω ὑπερχύμενον χυμόν, εἴτε τὸν τῆς ξανθῆς χολῆς, εἴτε τὸν τῆς μελανῆς: this definition is much

too narrow for many places in the *Hippocratica* (e.g. in *Epid.*^{1, 2}) where χολώδης is regularly added to ἄκρητος where appropriate.

³ In what follows I have consistently used 'dysentery' in its Greek sense, referring to stools of blood, mucus, pus, and the like.

*Epid.*⁵ 90 (v. 254 L.), *Epid.*⁷ 3 (v. 368 L.), *Coac.* 453 (v. 686 L.), 455 (*ibid.*), *Aff.* 23 (vi. 234 L.). *δυσεντερίη* is by nature always *ἀκρητός*: the adjective would be utterly superfluous, and is never applied to it (at least I have noticed no example, and have further checked the 56 references to *δυσεντερίη* in Littré's index without finding one). *διάρροια*, on the contrary, may be of varying degrees of compoundedness, and the adjective *ἀκρητός* serves to signify that particular state which is one of uniform fluidity. Only a writer who was grossly ignorant of the simplest distinctions of contemporary medical science could use the term *διάρροια* to signify, or to include, dysentery; only one to whom the medical writings were closed books could then take the further step of attaching to *διάρροια* the epithet *ἀκρατος*, which is a standard term for diarrhoea and never applied to dysentery. The weight of evidence will indicate clearly enough that so ludicrous a blunder is not to be attributed to Thucydides.

(iii) **αίματώδης*: *τὰ ἐντός, ἡ τε φάρυγξ καὶ ἡ γλώσσα, εὐθὺς αίματώδη ἦν*. This adjective, normally meaning not 'bloody' but 'blood-red' or more generally 'looking like blood', is very common in the doctors, elsewhere found only in Aristotle and his school (according to LSJ and the Dindorfs' Lexicon). With Thucydides' phrase compare *Aph.* 7 append. (iv. 218 J.) *φοβερώτερον γάρ ἔστιν ἡ γλώσσα . . . αίματώδης*.

(iv) **δυσάδης*: *πνεῦμα ἄτοπον καὶ δυσάδες ἥφιει*. Another very common adjective in the doctors, uncommon elsewhere (but *Hdt.* 2. 94, *S. Phil.* 1032). I have not noticed its application to the noun *πνεῦμα*, but cf. *Aff.* 20 (6. 228 L.) *δυσάδες ἐκ τοῦ στόματος*.

(v) When Thucydides describes the body as *οὐτε ἄγαν *θερμὸν . . . οὐτε χλωρόν, ἀλλ' *ὑπέρυθρον, *πελιδνόν*, he uses three of the commonest colour-terms in the medical vocabulary. Examples of *ὑπέρυθρον* and *πελιδνόν* may be counted by the scores, perhaps by the hundreds; both are very rare elsewhere. For the juxtaposition of *χλωρόν*, *ὑπέρυθρον*, *πελιδνόν*, cf. *Morb.*² 46 (vii. 64 L.) *χλωρὰ . . . πελιδνὰ . . . ύπέρυθρον*, *Prog.* 24. 64 (ii. 52 J., i. 107 K.) *χλωρὸν ἡ πελιδνόν ἡ ἐρυθρόν*, *Art.* 86. 17 (iii. 394 J., ii. 243 K.). The meaning of *χλωρόν* is fairly obvious in *Morb.*² 39 (vii. 54 L.), 'yellowish', of the colour of the skin in jaundice.

(vi) **ἐναταῖοι καὶ ἐβδομαῖοι*: this type of adjective, applied to the patient, with the meaning 'on the ninth or seventh day' of his illness, is exceedingly common in the doctors. Cf. *Prog.* 15. 33 (ii. 32 J., i. 94 K.) *ἀπόλοιτ' ἀν . . . ἐναταῖος ἡ ἐνδεκαταῖος*; see further Ehlert, *op. cit.*, p. 106, n. 19.

The above-mentioned adjectives are specially at home in medical writings. Three others deserve a mention:

(i) **ἀνοσον*. When Thucydides writes *ἦτος . . . ἀνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύγχανεν ὄν*, we are at once reminded of the doctors' manner of speech: *Epid.* 14. 5 (i. 166 J., i. 191 K.) *τὰ τε ἄλλα διετέλεον ἀνοσοι*, *Epid.* 1. 29 (i. 148 J., i. 181 K.) *τὰ δ' ἄλλα . . . ἀνόσως διῆγον*.

(ii) *ἄτοπον*: *πνεῦμα ἄτοπον καὶ δυσάδες ἥφιει*. *ἄτοπος, ἄτοπια*, are apparently first attested in Thucydides and his contemporaries. They become relatively common only from the later years of the fifth century onwards. It is therefore worth noticing that they are not absent from the doctors' vocabulary: *Aph.* 4. 52 (iv. 148 J.) *όκοσοις . . . κατὰ προαιρεσιν οἱ ὄφθαλμοι δακρύουσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ὀκόσοις δὲ μη̄ κατὰ προαιρεσιν, ἄτοπώτερον*. This is the only example which I have noticed in the doctors. Ehlert omits this, and quotes *Int.* 21 (vii. 218 L.),

a false reference which I have not succeeded in correcting. There is a manifest imitation of Thuc. in Dion. Hal. *Arch.* x. 53.

(iii) **κενή**: λύγξ ἐνέπιπτε κενή, an *empty, unproductive* retching. I have not noticed an exact parallel to this use of the adjective in the doctors, but *Epid.*⁷ 11 (v. 386 L.) ἐξαναστάσεις . . . δὰ κενῆς (of tenesmus) comes very close to it. The scholia on Thucydides refer to a passage in *Aph.*, which is obviously irrelevant (6. 39 (iv. 188 J.)) *επασμοὶ γίνονται ὑπὸ πληρώσιος ἡ κενώσιος, οὗτοι δὲ καὶ λυγμός*.

When we turn to Thucydides' verbs, we find that the majority of them are standard terms in the doctors. Many of them are common also in other kinds of writing. A few are almost if not wholly confined to medical treatises.

When Thucydides writes (in ch. 50) that there was no remedy ὁ τι χρῆν προσφέροντας ὠφελεῖν· τὸ γάρ των ξυνενεγκόν ἄλλον τοῦτο ἔβλαπτεν, he is using common verbs which any writer might have employed in those senses. But it is nevertheless proper to observe that what others *might* use, the doctors regularly *did* use, in a given context. *προσφέρειν* is the standard term for *administering a diet or remedy*; *ξυνενεγκεῖν* is a standard term for *doing good to the patient*; *ὠφελεῖν* and *βλάπτειν* are the standard terms for *relieving and aggravating the patient's condition*.

Into this category fall most of the verbs used by Thucydides to signify the access, progress, and activity of the Plague and its symptoms, and the actions, reactions, and sufferings of the patients.

Of the access of disease or part thereof: the following are too common in the doctors to require particular illustration:

λαμβάνειν (and ἐπλαμβάνειν, ch. 51. 6), *φλόγωσις ἐλάμβανε*; **ἄρχεσθαι**, *ἄνωθεν ἀρέαμενον*; **ἐγγίγνεσθαι**, *ἐλκώσεως ἐγγίγνομένης*; **ἐπιγίγνεσθαι**, *πταρμὸς καὶ βράχος ἐπεγίγνετο*; **ἐπίειν**, *ἀποκαθάρευεις χολῆς ἐπήισαν*; **ἐμπίπτειν**, *λύγξ ἐνέπιπτει κενή*; **ἐπιπίπτειν**, *διαρροὰς ἐπιπίπτουση*.

Admitted, but seldom, by the doctors are **ἐπικεῖσθαι** (*ἀγρυπνία ἐπέκειτο*, cf. *Vict.*³ 73. 10 (iv. 392 J.) *κύδνοις ἐπίκεινται κακοί*; Ehlert omits this, and quotes *Prorrh.* 2. 23 (ix. 52 L.), where—as in *Morb.*⁴ 57 (vii. 612 L.)—the meaning is quite different); and ***κατασκῆπται** (*κατέσκηψητε γάρ ἐς αἰδοῖα*, cf. *Epid.*³ *catast.* 8. 8 (i. 248 J., i. 228 K.) *πολλοῖσι . . . αὐτὸ τὸ νόσημα ἐς τοῦτο κατέσκηψεν*).

Of the progress of disease through the body:

καταβαίνειν: *κατέβανεν ἐς τὰ στήθη ὁ πόνος*. This is quite common in the doctors, e.g. *Prog.* 11. 42 (ii. 24 J., i. 89 K.) *ὑποκαταβὰς ἐς τὰ κάτω χωρία*, *Acut.* 20. 6 (ii. 78 J., i. 119 K.) *ὅταν δὲ ἡ θέρητη καταβῇ ἐς τὸν πόδας*, *Aph.* 6. 22 (iv. 184 J.) *ρήγματα ἐκ τοῦ νότου ἐς τὸν ἄγκωνας καταβαίνει*, *Flat.* 12. 6 (ii. 246 J., p. 98 H.) *οἰδήματα ἐς τὰς κνήμας καταβαίνει*; see further Ehlert, *op. cit.*, p. 105, n. 15.

***ἐπικατείναι**: *ἐπικατόντος τοῦ νοσήματος ἐς τὴν κοιλίαν*. This is a very rare compound, hardly to be found outside the doctors: *morb. sacr.* 10. 9 (ii. 158 J.) *φλέγμα ἐπικατελθόν* ἐς τὰς φλέβας, *nat. puer.* 30 (vii. 534 L.) *ἐπέρων ἐπικατελθόντων . . . ἐς τὰς μήτρας*.

διεξίναι: *διεξίνεις γάρ δὰ παντὸς τοῦ εώματος*. Cf. *V.M.* 16. 43 (i. 44 J., i. 19 K., p. 48 H.) *πυρετὸς διεξιών δὰ παντὸς*, *Aff.* 26 (vi. 238 L.) *αἴματος διεξιώντος*, *Epid.*⁵ 20 (v. 220 L.) *χολὴ . . . διεξίνει*, *morb.*³ 14 (vii. 134 L.) *τὰς τροφὰς . . . διεξίνειν*.

ἰδρύεθαι: τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ πρώτον ἰδρυθὲν κακόν, of the settlement of an ailment in part of the body. Cf. *Coac.* 309 (v. 652 L.) πόνος ἐς στῆθος ἰδρυθεῖς, *Prorrh.* 1. 70 (v. 576 L.) δόνη ἐς στῆθος ἰδρυθεῖσα, *Epid.*⁶ 7. 1 (v. 334 L.) τὰ νυκταλωπικὰ ὕδρυτο; contrast (i) *Aph.* 4. 11 (iv. 136 J.) εἰς ὕδρωπα ἔηρον ὕδρυτο, the disease 'settled down into a dropsy'; (ii) *Epid.*⁹ case xv (i. 282 J., i. 244 K.) πάλιν ἰδρύθη, the patient 'settled down again', cf. *Epid.*⁴ 13 (v. 150 L.), *Epid.*⁶ 2. 6 (v. 280 L.), *Prorrh.* 1. 20 (v. 516 L.); (iii) *Epid.*⁴ 14 (v. 152 L.) ἰδρύμενον, of urine, sim. *Epid.*⁵ 64 (v. 242 L.), of stools.

Of the waxing and waning of disease:

ἀκμάζειν: ὁσονπερ χρόνον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἀκμάζοι. Cf. *Prog.* 3. 23 (ii. 12 J., i. 82 K.) τῆς νούσου ἀκμαζούσης, *Acut.* 35. 6 (ii. 90 J., i. 125 K.) ἀκμαζόντων τῶν νοημάτων, *Aph.* 1. 8 (iv. 102 J.) ὅταν ἀκμάζῃ τὸ νόσημα.

λωφᾶν: μετὰ ταῦτα λωφήσαντα. Rare in the doctors; I have noticed only *Aff.* 29 (vi. 240 L.) ὅταν δὲ λωφήσῃ ἡ δόνη, and *Int.* 49 (vii. 290 L.) δόνη . . . λωφᾶ.

Of the actions, reactions, and sufferings of the patients:

προκάμψειν: εἰ δέ τις προύκαμψε τι . . . κάρων, 'to be ill', is a standard term in the doctors. With *προύκαψειν* compare *Epid.*⁴ 31 (v. 174 L.) προέκαμψεν, *Epid.*⁵ 24 (v. 224 L.) προησθένει, 7 (v. 148) προηγηκότι, *Aph.* 4. 33 (iv. 142 J.) προπεπονηκώς.

ἀφένειν: πνεῦμα . . . ἡφίει. Not uncommon, e.g. *Epid.*⁶ 4. 22 (v. 314 L.) φυχρὸν πνεῦμα ἀφίησιν, *morb.*⁴ 57 (vii. 610 L.) τὸ πνεῦμα πυκνὸν ἡφίει, *morb.* *sacr.* 4. 29, 7. 6 (ii. 146, 154 J.).

καίεσθαι: τά τε ἐντὸς οὐτῶς ἐκάετο, of sensations of burning. Very common in the doctors; with Thucydides' phrase compare *morb.*¹ 29 (vi. 198 L.) τὰ μὲν ἔνδον καίονται, *Aph.* 4. 48 (iv. 148 J.) τὰ δὲ ἔνδον καίγονται, 7. 73 (iv. 212 J.) τὰ δὲ ἔσω καίγονται, *morb.*² 41 (vii. 58 L.) ἔσωθεν δὲ καίεται.

ἀνέχεσθαι: μήτε . . . ἰματίαν . . . ἐπιβολὰς . . . ἀνέχεσθαι. A standard term.

ἀμελεῖσθαι: τῶν ἡμελημένων ἀνθρώπων. Of lack of nursing attendance, a standard term.

ευέχεσθαι: τῇ δύῃ ἀπαίστω ἔνυχόμενοι. Of being in the grip of pain, disease, etc., ἔχεσθαι is a standard term.

ἡγυχάζειν: ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἡγυχάζειν. The standard term for *restfulness* in the doctors is ἀτρεμεῖν, -έειν, but ἡγυχάζειν occurs quite often, e.g. *Int.* 8 (vii. 186 L.), 10 (vii. 192 L.), *morb.*³ 16 (vii. 148 L.), *nat. mul.* 12 (vii. 328 L.), *Art.* 87. 8 (iii. 396 J., ii. 244 K.).

*μαραίνεσθαι: τὸ κῶμα οὐκ ἐμαραίνετο. Of the decay of physical strength or diminution of bulk, quite common, e.g. *nat. hom.* 12. 37 (iv. 36 J.), *Vict.*¹ 35 (iv. 282 J.), *morb.*¹ 6 (vi. 204 L.).

ἀντέχειν: ἀντεῖχε παρὰ δόξαν τῇ ταλαιπωρίᾳ. Of resistance to disease, very rare in the doctors; *V.M.* 3. 31 (i. 18 J., i. 4 K., p. 38 H.) πλείω χρόνον ἀντέχειν.

διαφθείρεσθαι, of the decease of the patient. Thucydides uses this verb several times in this context. As a general rule the doctors reserve it to denote the corruption or deterioration of the body or part thereof, but it is freely used in the Thucydidean sense by the authors of *morb.*¹ and *Aff.*, sporadically elsewhere, e.g. *Art.* 11. 5 (iii. 222 J., ii. 127 K.), *Int.* 8 (vii. 186 L.), 48 (vii. 288 L.).

διαφύγειν: εἰς διαφύγοντες, of escape from disease. A standard term.

περιγενέσθαι: εἴ τις ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων περιγένεντο, of survival. A standard term.

στερίκεσθαι: στερίκομενοι τούτων διέφενγον, of loss of eyes, limbs, sim. I have not noticed this verb in the doctors, but such expressions as *στερήσεις*

σφθαλμῶν (*Epid.*¹ 12 fin. (i. 164 J., i. 190 K.)), σφθαλμῶν στέρησις (*Coac.* 288 (v. 648 L.)) show that Thucydides is not diverging far from the medical norm.

ἀναστῆναι, of patients rising from bed. A standard term. With Thucydides' phrase, παραυτίκα ἀναστάντας, compare, for example, *Hum.* 7 (iv. 78 J.) ἀνασταμένοις ἐκ τῶν νούσων αὐτίκα. . . .

ἀγνοεῖν: ἡγνόντας εφάς τε αὐτούς κτλ., of failure to recognize, through loss of memory, delirium, sim. Common in the doctors.

All the above-mentioned verbs except *στρίκεσθαι* are either standard terms in the doctors or at least admitted by them. Most of them are common in other kinds of writing also. There remain a few which require special attention.

First, verbs which are apparently unexampled, at least in these senses, in the *Hippocratica*:

(i) ἐνδιδόναι: λύγξ σπασμὸν ἐνδιδόντας ἰσχυρόν, apparently 'inducing', 'exciting'. The verb is commonly used in this sense by medical writers of a much later era (Dindorf's Lexicon s.v., col. 1032); but I have not noticed an example in the Hippocratic Corpus, where ἐνδιδόναι is normally used intransitively, in the sense 'get better'.

(ii) ἀναστρέφειν: (ό πόνος) ἀνέστρεψε (τὴν καρδίαν). The exact meaning is elusive. Galen's comment (xviii. 2. 286 Kuhn), τὸ ἀναστρέψειν ἐπὶ τῇ πρὸς ἔμετον ὄρμῆς εἰπε, shows how he understood it, but not necessarily what Thucydides intended. I have not noticed the verb in the doctors except at *cord.* 1 (vi. 80 L.), where, however, καρδία ἀναστρέψεται means 'the heart dwells in . . .'. The noun ἀναστροφή in *Praec.* 4 (i. 316 J., p. 31 H.) seems to me to throw no light on the problem. If καρδία in Thucydides means 'cardiac orifice of the stomach', we should readily understand the verb to mean 'upset', 'caused a disturbance in'; if it means 'heart', there is no special difficulty in the same interpretation, 'caused turmoil and disorder' in the heart (exactly as in Alciphron, *Letters* 4. 17, 8 (Bennier) ή καρδία μου ἀνέστραπται).

Secondly, verbs which are used by Thucydides in senses more or less confined to medical writings:

(i) **στριζεῖν*, intransitive, with ἐς+accusative: ὅπότε ἐς τὴν καρδίαν στριζεῖν (ό πόνος), of an ailment settling in a part of the body. This is fairly common in the doctors and (so far as I can discover) unexampled elsewhere. Cf. *Aff.* 29 (vi. 240 L.) καθ' ὄκοιον ἀν τυγχάντι τοῦ σκέλεος στριζουσα ή ὀδύνη, *Aph.* 4. 33 (iv. 142 J.) ἐντῦθα στριζεῖ ή νοῦσος, *Aff.* 17 (vi. 216 L.) ἐς ὅ τι ἀν καταστριζεῖ τὸ φλέγμα; see further Ehlert, op. cit., p. 122.

(ii) **ἐπισημαίνειν*: τῶν γε ἀκρωτηρίων ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ ἐπεισημαίνειν, 'seizure of the extremities showed itself, appeared as a symptom'. This intransitive usage of *ἐπισημαίνειν*, with an ailment or symptom for subject, and with the meaning 'show upon' (a person, limb, etc., this remoter object being in the dative case when expressed), is perhaps confined elsewhere to the doctors and to Aristotle and his school. Cf. *Epid.*³ 5. 4 (i. 244 J., i. 226 K.) φωναί τε πολλοῖς ἐπεισημανον κακούμεναι, 'voices showed in many cases as being impaired', *Hum.* 18 (iv. 92 J.) ὅσαι ἐφ' οἷοις ὕδασιν η ἀνέμοις νοῦσοι ἐπισημαίνονται, 'what diseases show themselves in conjunction with the various rains and winds', *Art.* 67. 21 (iii. 358 J., ii. 220 K.) τεταρταῖς γὰρ ἔντα ἐπισημαίνει τῆς παλιγκοτίης μάλιστα, 'in cases of exacerbation, symptoms appear principally on the fourth day'. Sometimes it is uncertain whether the usage is impersonal, or a subject should be supplied from the context: *Epid.*⁷ 46 (v. 414 L.) ἐπεισημαίνει τῇ

γλάσσῃ, 'symptoms appeared on the tongue' or '[the disease] showed itself on the tongue', *Epid.*¹ 18. 6 (i. 172 J., i. 194 K.) *τοῖς κανεῖσιν ἀρχομένοις ἐπεσήμανεν*, 'in cases of fever, symptoms appeared from the beginning' or '[signs of death] showed themselves from the beginning'. Further examples in Ehler, op. cit., p. 112.

(iii) *ἔξανθειν: *σώμα . . . φλυκταίνεις μικραῖς καὶ ἐλκεις ἐξηνθηκός*, of the efflorescence of blisters and lesions on the body. Similar uses of the verb are to be found in poetry of the fifth century B.C.; but here in Thucydides the medical background is unmistakable. *ἔξανθημα* is a standard and very common term in the doctors, applied to a variety of swellings and rashes and eruptions between which we should differentiate. For example, in *Epid.*⁵ 93 (v. 254 L.) *ἔξανθήματα* are likened to mosquito-bites, *ολα τὰ τῶν κανάπων δῆματα* (sim. *Coac.* 553 (v. 710 L.), *Epid.*⁷ 104 (v. 454 L.)); in *Epid.*⁷ 43 (v. 410 L.) they are compared to burn-blister, *ἔξανθήματα . . . ὥσπερ πυρίκαντα*; in *Epid.*⁵ 2. 15 (v. 284 L.) they are 'broad' or 'flat', *πλατέα ἔξανθήματα*; in *Coac.* 238 (v. 636 L.) a reddening of the skin is compared to 'exanthemata', *χράς ἐρυθράνεται οἷον ἔξανθήματα*; in *Epid.*² 7 (v. 78 L.) they are classed with lesions, *ἐλκος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔξανθήματα*; in *Coac.* 435 (v. 682 L.), *ἔξανθήματα* are described as 'scratch-like', *ἀμυχάδεα*. Here in Thucydides the verb describes the appearance of blisters (*φλυκταῖναι*) and open sores or lesions (*ἐλκη*): cf. *morb. sacr.* 8. 18 (ii. 156 J.) *ἔξανθει ἐλκεα*, *Aph.* 3. 20 (iv. 128 J.) *ἔξανθήμεις ἐλκώδεις*, *Epid.*² 3. 1 (v. 102 L.) *τρηχύσματα . . . ἔξανθήματα*; *de Arte* 9. 8 (ii. 206 J., p. 15 H.) *τὰ ἔξανθεῦτα*. Galen's description of the great plague of which he was an eye-witness borrows the Thucydidean terms, *ἔξηνθησεν ἐλκεις οἷον τὸ σώμα* (quoted by Littre, v. 65).

(iv) *τὰποκριθῆναι*: *εἰ δέ τις καὶ προύκαμνε τι, ἐε τοῦτο πάντα ἀπεκρίθη*, 'all previous ailments were separated off into the Plague', 'in hunc morbum secreta concesserunt' (Poppo-Stahl). This verb is a standard technical term in the doctors, especially signifying the secession of an element from a compound, of a unit from a plural: *V.M.* 14. 37 (i. 38 J., i. 16 K., p. 46 H.) *ὅταν τι τούτων* (sc. salt, sweet, bitter, sim.) *ἀποκριθῇ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἔωτρον γένηται*, 'when one of those is separated off and stands alone'; *morb. sacr.* 13. 23 (ii. 166 J.) *οὕτως ἀπεκρίθῃ καὶ ἐπικατερρύτῃ τὸ φλέμα*, 'the phlegm separates off and flows down'; *Vict.*⁴ 89. 87 (iv. 432 J.) *τὰ ἐε τὴν κολιὰν ἀποκριθόμενα*, 'what separates itself off into the belly'; *Prog.* 23. 31 (ii. 48 J., i. 104 K.) *οὐκόταν δὲ ἀποκριθῆι ηδη δὴ σταφύλην καλέοντι*, 'when what they call the *grape* [a swelling at the end of the uvula] is separated off', i.e. when a general swelling determines into this particular shape and place. I do not think that Thucydides has used this verb exactly as the doctors use it: he means that a variety of diseases determined into one particular disease, the Plague; that is not exactly the same as the meaning in *Prog.*, loc. cit., though it is similar (a general swelling determines into one particular swelling). *Vict.*¹ 28. 10 (iv. 266 J.) is identical in construction, *ἐε ἄρενα τὰ σώματα ἀποκριθέντα*, 'bodies separated off into the category of males', though the context there demands a different meaning for the verb. I have not found an exact parallel to Thucydides' usage; but it is at least clear that the best illustrations are provided by the medical writers.

In summary: 30 out of 39 verbs are standard or at least quite common terms in the doctors, including a few more or less confined to them. Of the

remaining nine, six are found, though not often, in the doctors; only three are apparently missing from the medical vocabulary.

It remains to comment briefly on a few terms which fall outside the foregoing categories:

(i) ***ἀπαυτος**: *τῇ δύνῃ ἀπαύεται ξυνεχόμενοι*. It may be by inadvertence that I have not noted this adjective in the doctors.

(ii) **πρόφασις**: *ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως*. This is the standard term in the doctors for the 'exciting cause' of a disease. Here, as elsewhere in Thucydides, it is used in its medical sense: 'This word, which in Homer, Herodotus, and later writers, unquestionably means "formulated reason" or "pretext", . . . is uniformly used by Hippocrates in the sense of "exciting cause", and has been taken over directly by Thucydides in his attempt to apply the methods of medicine to history'.¹

(iii) ***ποτόν**: *τό τε πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον ποτόν*. This is the normal word (much commoner than *πόσις*, *πόμα*) for 'a drink' in the doctors.

(iv) **δύναμις**: *ἔτι ἔχοντές τι δυνάμεως*, of the physical strength of the patient. The standard noun in the doctors is *ἰσχύς* (*Epid.*⁵ 26 (v. 224 L.) *ἔως* *ἔτι* *ἰσχύν τινα εἰχεν*): *δύναμις* in this sense is very rare (*Prog.* 1. 20 (ii. 8 J., i. 79 K.) *τὴν δύναμιν . . . τῶν σωμάτων*), though the opposite is commonly described by *ἀδύναμή*, *ἀδύνατος*, *-εῖν*; *δύναμις* is generally reserved for the meaning 'property', 'function', 'force', of cold, heat, humours, sim.

(v) **ἀντιληψις**: *τῶν ἀκρωτηρίων ἀντιληψις*, of seizure by disease of parts of the body. This noun occurs in *Off.* 9. 20 (iii. 66 J., ii. 36 K.), of the grip of a bandage on a limb; I have not noticed it elsewhere in the doctors.

(vi) ***ἀποκαθάρεσις**: *ἀποκαθάρεσις χολῆς . . . ἐπῆμα*, of the purgation brought about by vomiting. *κάθαρεις* is a standard term in the doctors in this sense; I have not noticed the compound noun, but the verb *ἀποκαθαίρεσθαι* is very common.

The patient may be 'purged' either *ἄνω* (by vomiting) or *κάτω* (by stool). Ehlert, op. cit., pp. 107 f., alleges that Thucydides here writes contrary to the medical idiom, in which *ἀποκαθαίρεσθαι* is confined to purgations *κάτω* (the same point had been made, but more cautiously, by Brandeis, p. 20, n. 19). It is relevant to quote a few examples, assembled without special search, which bluntly contradict this allegation: *Epid.*⁷ 93 (v. 450 L.) *ἀπεκαθάρθη*, of a *φαρμακὸν* *ἄνω*; *morb.*¹ 12 (vi. 160 L.) *οὐδ' ἔτι ἀποκαθαίρεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἄνω οὐδέν*; *morb.*³ 9 (vii. 128 L.) *ἀποκαθαίρειν* *ἄνω*; presumably also *morb.*² 27 (vii. 44 L.).

The chapters neighbouring 49 include many words and phrases which are standard or common terms in the doctors: for example, 48. 2 (*νόσος*) *ῆψατο τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, 50. 1 *προσέπιπτεν*, 51. 1 *οὐδέν τῶν εἰωθότων, ἐς τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα*, 51. 2 ***ταμα**, 51. 3 *σῶμα αὐταρκές* (cf. *Liqu.* 5 (vi. 128 L., p. 88 H.)), *νόσος πάντα τξυνήμει*, *τὰ πάσης διαιτῆς θεραπευόμενα*, 51. 4 *τὸ ἀνέλπιτον*, 51. 5 *φθορὸν τοῦτο ἐνεποίει*, *τῶν ἀπογιγνομένων*, 51. 6 *κτείνειν* (of disease), 52. 1 *ἐπιεικεῖ*, 54. 5 ***ἐπενείματο** (cf. *Epid.*³ *catast.* iv. 7 (i. 240 J., i. 225 K.)). Most of these are illustrated by Ehlert, op. cit.; I select a few for special mention:

(i) 50. 1 *τὸ εἴδος τῆς νόσου*, 51. 1 *τὸ νόσημα . . . τοιοῦτον ἦν πᾶν τὴν ιδέαν*: *νόσου* (*-ῆματος*) *εἴδος*, *ιδέα*, are very common terms in the doctors.

¹ Cochrane, op. cit., p. 17. Ehlert observes that in 29 out of 43 examples of the singular number in the doctors, *πρόφασις* occurs in the genitive case governed by a preposition, as in Thuc.

(ii) 50. 1 τῶν *ξυντρόφων τι, of *familiar diseases*: a medical term, cf. *Aēr.* 7. 24 (i. 84 J., i. 41 K., p. 60 H.) τὸ νόσημα αὐτοῖς ξύντροφόν ἔστι, *morb. sacr.* 13. 36 (ii. 168 J.) ἦν μὴ ἐκ παιδίου ξύντροφος ἦτι, *Epid.*⁶ 5. 3 (v. 316 L.) νοῦς οἱ ξύντροφοι ἐν γήραι καὶ διὰ πεπασμὸν λείπουσι.

(iii) 51. 4 ἀθυμία, of depression, low spirits: quite common, cf. *Coac.* 6 (v. 598 L.), *Epid.*³ case 2 (i. 262 J., i. 235 K.), *Epid.*⁵ 84 (v. 252 L.), *Epid.*⁷ 89 (v. 446 L.); δυσθυμίη is commoner, indeed the standard term in some treatises.

There remain two terms, both nouns of broad meaning, of which it may be said that Thucydides' usage is in conflict with medical parlance:

(i) 49. 1 ἔτος . . . ἀνονού ἐτ τὰς ἀλλας ἀσθενείας: ἀσθενεία here means 'illnesses'; it is worth noticing that the doctors regularly distinguish between the noun and the verb—ἀσθενεῖν means 'to be ill', but ἀσθενεῖα means 'lack of physical strength', not 'illness'. From many examples I select *V.M.* 12. 4 (i. 32 J., i. 12 f. K., p. 43 H.) ἐγγύταρα . . . τοῦ ἀσθενεοτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀσθενής, 'a weak body is one step removed from a sick one'; cf. *Acut.* 43. 2 (ii. 98 J., i. 130 K.). In Thuc. 49. 7 the noun recurs, this time in the medical sense, 'feebleness'.

(ii) 49. 3 μετὰ ταλαιπωρίας μεγάλης, 49. 6 ἀντεῖχε . . . τῇ ταλαιπωρίᾳ: in both places *ταλαιπωρία* denotes the general *distress* of the malady. This noun and its cognates in the doctors are reserved for the meanings 'physical exercise' and 'physical effort'. From numerous examples I select *Acut.* 47. 8 (ii. 102 J., i. 133 K.), where *ταλαιπωρία* is contrasted with *χολή*; and *nat. hom.* 9. 6 (iv. 24 J.), where it is contrasted with *ἀργίη*. I have not noted an example of the Thucydidean sense in the doctors.

The conclusions of this part of the inquiry may be summarized as follows:

(i) The great majority of the nouns, adjectives, and verbs in chapter 49 recur as standard terms, apparently for the most part with the same meanings, in medical writings of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. This may fairly be said of some 77 out of 94 terms considered; about half the Thucydidean *ἀπαξειρημένα* in chapter 49 recur in the short treatise *Prognosticon* alone.

(ii) All except half a dozen of the Thucydidean terms are exemplified in the doctors; and of those half-dozen, several are closely related to the standard terminology.

(iii) Some of Thucydides' terms are seldom, and a few never, found elsewhere except in medical and similar scientific treatises; others, though found elsewhere, are specially characteristic of medical writers.

(iv) None of Thucydides' technical terms, and only two of his general terms (*ταλαιπωρία*, *ἀσθενεία*), are in conflict with medical usage.¹

In the light of the foregoing investigation I translate the chapter in question thus:

'It was generally agreed that in respect of other ailments no season had ever been so healthy. Previous diseases all turned off into the plague; and

¹ I ought perhaps to have said something somewhere about Lucretius' imitation of Thuc. in 6. 1138 ff. The position is apparently quite simple: from 1138 to 1181 and again from 1197 onwards Lucre. follows Thuc. closely, with a few additions and embellishments (1150, 1202-3) and one or two mistakes (esp. 1209 *ferro*: I am not convinced by Maas's explanation in Bailey's *Lucretius*, p. 1758). In the midst of all this he inter-

polates a passage (1182-96) based on well-known Hippocratic sources which have nothing whatever to do with the Athenian Plague. It is an extraordinary procedure for a scientific writer; but the only point of importance at present is that there is no reason to believe that Lucre. knew anything about the Plague beyond what he found in Thuc., or that he read Thuc. in any other form than what we possess today.

the rest of the people were attacked without exciting cause, and without warning, in perfect health. It began with violent sensations of heat in the head, and redness and burning in the eyes; internally, the throat and tongue were blood-red from the start, emitting an abnormal and malodorous breath. These symptoms developed into sneezing and hoarseness, and before long the trouble descended into the chest, attended by violent coughing. Whenever it settled in the heart, it upset it, and evacuations of bile ensued, of every kind for which the doctors have a name; these also together with great distress. Most patients suffered an attack of empty retching, inducing violent convulsions, in some cases soon after the abatement of the previous symptoms, in others much later. The body was neither unduly hot externally to the touch, nor yellowish in colour, but flushed and livid, with an efflorescence of small blisters and sores. Internally, the heat was so intense that the victims could not endure the laying-on of even the lightest wraps and linens; indeed nothing would suffice but they must go naked, and a plunge into cold water would give the greatest relief. Many who were left unattended actually did this, jumping into wells, so unquenchable was the thirst which possessed them; but it was all the same, whether they drank much or little. The victims were attacked throughout by inability to rest and by sleeplessness. Throughout the height of the disease the body would not waste away but would hold out against the distress beyond all expectation. The majority succumbed to the internal heat before their strength was entirely exhausted, on the seventh or ninth day. Or else, if they survived, the plague would descend to the bowels, where severe lesions would form, together with an attack of uniformly fluid diarrhoea which in most cases ended in death through exhaustion. Thus the malady which first settled in the head passed through the whole body, starting at the top. And if the patient recovered from the worst effects, symptoms appeared in the form of a seizure of the extremities: the privy parts and the tips of the fingers and toes were attacked, and many survived with the loss of these, others with the loss of their eyes. Some rose from their beds with a total and immediate loss of memory, unable to recall their own names or to recognize their next of kin.'

PART II. *The Nature of the Plague*

The layman who expresses opinions about matters within the province of medical science must not complain if he finds himself the target of criticism or even abuse. It is very improbable that such opinions should be of the least value to anybody; and I shall be careful to express none, or very few. What follows is confined (so I believe and intend) to observations of alleged fact. The claims of reasonable brevity demand that my phraseology should be in this respect misleading: when I say (for example) that loss of memory is a common sequel to typhus fever, or any such statement of apparent fact, I mean not that I know this to be so but that this statement will be found in modern medical textbooks and treatises on the subject in question. If it should happen to be an incorrect statement, I have no defence; neither have the medical textbooks.

I must further make it clear that my aim is directed at a single target, a matter of fact, not of opinion: viz. that among modern descriptions of comparable length and scope there is one which so closely resembles the Thucy-

didean description that the question must be asked whether the two are identical. Let medical writers, if they can and will, assure us that the two are, despite the obvious resemblance, not the same: that will be a further stage of the inquiry, in which the layman is not qualified to participate. I am only asking the question; not (except for the sake of argument) answering it. My position is that I do not see how further progress can be made until the medical scientist informs us (if he can) in what respects (if any) the obvious resemblance is misleading.

With these provisos (prompted by the desire to avoid the grosser misunderstandings) I proceed to consider the identification of the Plague, starting with a few observations arising out of Part I.

It is now established that Thucydides has studied his theme carefully; that he suffered the Plague himself; and that he has recorded his observations with the highest degree of technical accuracy which the time and circumstances permitted. There follows a point of the highest importance, constantly overlooked—that obviously significant phenomena, which could have been observed, but which are not mentioned by Thucydides, did not occur. To those who know the manner and method of Thucydides, this inference will appear self-evident. It is quite out of the question that he should have omitted to mention matters so obvious and important as those which follow, if they did in fact occur. The most conspicuous absentes are:

(i) Physical prostration at an early stage. This symptom is excluded not negatively but positively. Thucydides says that patients, if left unattended, would throw themselves into cold water or wells: such patients were thus capable of unassisted walking or at least crawling, and indeed of a considerable physical effort. Thucydides adds explicitly that the majority died on the seventh or ninth day 'before their strength was exhausted', and stresses the observation that the body did not lose its power at the height of the disease, but resisted to an unexpected extent.

(ii) Dysentery. Thucydides uses the term, together with its standard adjective, by which the doctors distinguished diarrhoea from dysentery. He not only does not mention dysentery, but positively uses terms incompatible with it.

(iii) Mental disorder. The Greek doctors have a remarkably extensive vocabulary, descriptive of a wide variety of types, to denote the forms of mental derangement which were commonly associated with certain familiar diseases. Thucydides says nothing whatever about delirium, or coma, or indeed about any other effect on the mind except depression (*ἀθυμία*) and, in some cases, loss of memory in the convalescent stages.¹

We shall therefore not acquiesce in the identification of Thucydides' Plague with any disease of which physical prostration in the early stages, dysentery, or mental disturbance is a signal characteristic.

If we now turn to the positive features of the description, we shall observe that four principal periods are distinguished:

(1) The period of incubation. There was no gradual sickening, no apparent

¹ Those who try to identify Thuc.'s Plague with a disease of which some sort of mental disorder is characteristic either fail to notice that this feature is wanting in his account or adopt the doubtful expedient of

arguing that the patients *must* have been mentally deranged or they would not have thrown themselves into wells; as if Thuc. had not explicitly given an entirely different (and sufficient) reason for this action.

exciting cause; the outbreak was sudden, and the patient passed from health to sickness in a moment.

(2) A period of seven or nine days, during which the Plague ran its full fatal course with the majority. This part of the description falls into two sections:

(a) The order in which the principal symptoms appeared: *First* (*πρῶτον*) a feverish sensation in the head; inflammation of the eyes; redness of throat and tongue; unnatural and offensive breath. *Then* (*ἔπειτα*) sneezing and hoarseness. *Soon afterwards* (*ἐν οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ*) invasion of the chest, violent coughing; invasion of the heart; vomiting of bile; general distress; unproductive retching; convulsions.

(b) Phenomena observable generally throughout this period: flushed and livid skin; an efflorescence of blisters and sores; absence of heat to the touch, strong sensation of heat internally; unquenchable thirst; restlessness and sleeplessness; depression.

(3) A period following the seventh or ninth day, in cases of survival. The patient suffered lesions of the intestines, diarrhoea, and weakness ending in death.

(4) A period of further complications, in cases where the patient survived the preceding period. There ensued gangrene of the extremities; loss of sight; in some cases, loss of memory.

From the adjacent chapters we learn a few more general facts: that the Plague was infectious (47. 4; 50. 1; 51. 4); that it was a disease unknown to the physicians (47. 4; 51. 1 f.; this fact is implied throughout); that carrion-birds and beasts abstained from infected corpses (50. 2); and that the Plague did not attack the same person twice, at least not with fatal effect (51. 6).

Some defects have been justly charged against this description:¹ but they are slight blemishes on a lucid, systematic, and detailed narrative expressed with a high degree of technical accuracy. The evidence, both negative and positive, should be sufficient for identification.² Thucydides has described an

¹ Among the defects alleged by modern medical writers the only one of any importance, which must be acknowledged, is the inadequate description of the exanthem. At what stage did it first appear? Did both the *φλύκτανας* and the *ἄλει* exist side by side, or did the former develop into the latter? What size and shape were they? How long did they last? What was the process of the disappearance in cases of survival—did they peel, or flake, or what? Other charges of inadequacy are less appropriate: (i) Thuc. does not mention the pulse: true, but the significance of the pulse in relation to health was not, so far as we know, appreciated by the doctors until after the lifetime of Thuc. (ii) He does not refer to the condition of the urine: but that may be because there was nothing significant to record; I notice that standard modern accounts of the disease with which we shall shortly identify Thuc.'s Plague include no reference to the urine. (iii) Thuc. gives too little detail about the

development and duration of individual symptoms, and does not distinguish systematically enough between the various stages in the progress of the Plague: I think it a fair comment that descriptions of such diseases in modern medical textbooks are not much superior in these respects. (iv) Brandeis (p. 62) complains that Thuc. does not distinguish between invariable and occasional phenomena: this is plainly unjust; Thuc. states explicitly (51. 1) that he describes the invariable phenomena, omitting individual deviations from the norm.

² At least we must continue to try until failure is proven; which is not yet. And ultimate failure need not mean that Thuc.'s description is at fault, for (1) his Plague might be a disease now apparently extinct, like the English 'sweating-sickness', 1485-1552, 'sueur des Picards', 1718-1870; (2) there is no proof that the characteristics of a disease remain sufficiently constant over so long a period of time.

acute exanthematous disease beginning with fever and a disorder of the upper respiratory passages, and ending in death or in complications including especially intestinal lesions, gangrene of the extremities, and loss of eyesight. A curious feature of the description is the statement that the patients suffered so severely from 'internal heat' that many, left unattended, would throw themselves into cold water.

Now Thucydides makes it clear enough that this was a 'new' disease. We have to reckon with the impact of an acute infectious disease on a society which had not been exposed to it before. When we look for its modern counterpart, we must make allowance for the possibility that a society which has been exposed to a particular disease for a long period of time may suffer, both in the individual and in the community, much less severely than a society which has not been exposed to it before. I read, and am told, that the cause of this effect is a subject of controversy. I claim no competence to discuss it, and think that it is not necessary for me to do so. It is the effect, not the cause, which concerns the present inquiry. Modern records prove beyond question that diseases which are seldom fatal in societies which have long been exposed to them may have very high rates of mortality in societies which have not been exposed to them. It may be the case that diseases lose their power over exposed societies; or it may be the case that the apparent intensification of that power over unexposed societies is to be explained rather through deficiency of medical treatment, and the patients' own folly and inexperience, which allow the disease to develop its utmost power unchecked, and to induce subsequent complications which proper care and treatment could have averted. But however doubtful the cause, the effect is certain: when we look for the modern counterpart to Thucydides' Plague, we must remember that what was so violent and so often fatal at Athens may be represented in modern civilized society by a relatively mild ailment. We shall therefore include in our search modern records of epidemics in unexposed societies; and, if we make an identification, we shall not be surprised to find that a particular symptom occurs *less* often or with *less* violence today.

This is the moment at which I must make it plain that the general conclusion of this paper was first stated a year earlier by an historian of medical science. Dr. R. Williamson, Reader in Pathology in the University of Cambridge, whom I consulted at this stage, drew my attention to an article by J. F. D. Shrewsbury, of the University of Birmingham, published in the *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, xxiv (1), Jan.-Feb. 1950, pp. 1-25. What follows here, however detailed in detail and in presentation, is in several most important points directly indebted to that article.

Shrewsbury stresses the need to examine modern records of the impact of infectious exanthematous diseases on unexposed societies, and reviews the history of the study of Thucydides' Plague by modern medical writers. It appears that the majority have pronounced in favour of smallpox; that typhus fever runs a good second, bubonic plague a poor third; that typhoid fever has had some fanciers; and that a number of medical authorities have declared identification to be impossible.

(1) *Smallpox*. The principal reasons for elimination are:

(i) Physical prostration at an early stage is characteristic of smallpox. The patient is 'neither desirous nor capable of leaving his bed, except perhaps occasionally under the spur of a purposeless delirium'. Here we find two of the

three most conspicuous absentees from Thucydides' description—prostration at an early stage, and delirium.

(ii) There is no mention in Thucydides of that pain in the loins and back which 'appears in no other acute febrile disease so frequently or with such intensity,' and which is a signal characteristic of smallpox.

(iii) It is out of the question to suppose that Thucydides could have failed to observe, or to think worth recording, the pits left all over the body, particularly on the face, after the rash of smallpox. He himself must have suffered this disfigurement.

(iv) From many other inconsistencies I select one only for mention: the fact that gangrene is not a complication associated with smallpox.¹

(2) *Typhus fever*. The onset is rapid, with severe headache, suffused eyes, and foul breath. Hoarseness is common, cough and some kind of bronchial disorder universal. Vomiting is not characteristic, but may occur. The body suffers internally a strong sensation of heat, which may not be apparent to the touch. The skin-eruption may be livid in colour as well as red. Further developments include gangrene of the intestine, with haemorrhage and diarrhoea. Loss of memory, and mortification of fingers and toes, are common complications; and there are records of impairment of the eyesight.

So far the case for identification is obviously strong; and fuller exposition of the detail would confirm it further. But (omitting minor discrepancies) there remain one or two serious obstacles:

(i) As Shrewsbury says, 'before typhus fever can even be considered, . . . we need some historical evidence, or at least a strong presumption, that the Athenians were familiar with the black rat'. It must be emphatically stated that there is no such historical evidence, and—since there are many places where a reference to the rat, if it were known, might confidently be expected—that the 'strong presumption' points decidedly in the opposite direction. Though the word *μῦς* might signify not only 'mouse' but also any other mouse-like creature, nobody has yet discovered any passage in early, classical, or Hellenistic literature where the meaning 'rat' has anything to recommend it, or any certain or even probable portrayal of the rat in Greek sculpture or painting of the pagan era. If the theory of typhus fever depends upon the existence of the rat² in Athens in the fifth century B.C., then it is a theory based on faith and hope, without (in this most important respect) a single fact in its favour. Arguments

¹ B. von Hagen, op. cit., is the most recent pleader for smallpox. He admits, but makes no attempt to answer, the objection stated under (iii) above (he scrutinized the Naples bust of Thuc. for scars, but it *gab keinen Anhaltspunkt*). He admits further that *gangrene* is incompatible with the smallpox-theory, and suggests that this complication was introduced by a concurrent outbreak of a second plague, *typhus exanthematicus*; the same notion, that Thuc. has confused a plurality of simultaneous plagues, had already been expressed by G. Sticker, *Festschr. für B. Nocht*, 1937, p. 604 (quoted by von Hagen; I have not seen it). He does not discuss objections (i) and (ii).

² I have seen it stated that it is not quite

certain that the rat is the sole permanent reservoir of epidemic typhus, and that the body-louse (which was thought to convey from man to man an infection derived by man from the rat) may itself be the host. But then we should have to make the very improbable assumption that the Athenians had already in the spring of 430 B.C. sunk to such a state of filth that the disease might be generated and the infection universally transmitted in this way. The city had indeed for some months been crowded by the abnormal influx of residents from the country: but the Athenians were not a dirty people, and there is no other indication that a decent standard of cleanliness and sanitation was not maintained.

ex sile
advan
(ii)
cinati
chara
Thuc
althe
this r
descri
that
end.

(3)
many
no rat
think
bubo
only
A.D.
to see
this d
even
stance

The
possib
(4)
ness, g
whitis
and in
stages
trate w
diarrh
back
charac
(ἀσθε
ἰχυπά
dysen
which

¹ Th
existen
century
Sir W.
Royal S
xvi, 1
p. 212
I am v
sending
another
that th
from R
Haas i
another
lithic s

ex silentio are unsatisfactory: but theories devoid of factual foundation have no advantage in this respect.¹

(ii) Mental disorders of various kinds and degrees, ranging from wild hallucination in the earlier stages to the typical coma-vigil in the later, are highly characteristic of typhus fever. Of these very striking and very common features Thucydides has nothing whatever to say. We should have to assume that although he recorded much less important and alarming matters, he thought this not worth mentioning: and it has been shown that the nature of his description sharply contradicts any such assumption. There is no suggestion that the patient did not retain his mental faculties unimpaired up to the end.

(3) *Bubonic plague.* This candidate has been examined and rejected by so many medical historians that he is not likely to present himself again. He brings no rat, and requires us to believe that Thucydides did not observe, or did not think worth recording, the features from which the Plague takes its name—the buboes, swelling of the glands, especially in the groin and armpits. One needs only to compare Procopius' account of the epidemic at Constantinople in A.D. 542 (*Persica* 2. 22), in which bubonic plague is unmistakably described, to see the absolute impossibility of reconciling Thucydides' description with this disease. The differences between the two are too great to be concealed even by Procopius, who copies so much of Thucydides' text as the circumstances allow.

Those varieties of the Plague known as pneumonic and septicaemic are, if possible, still less compatible with Thucydides' account.²

(4) *Typhoid (enteric) fever.* The onset is marked by headache, fever, sleeplessness, general distress. The cheeks are flushed, the tongue is at first covered with whitish fur but red and raw at the tip and edges. There may be much thirst, and in some cases vomiting. Physical prostration is not the rule in the earlier stages (the patient may not take to his bed for a week, and may not be prostrate until the end of the third week). Intestinal inflammation and ulceration, diarrhoea, and an eruption over the body, especially the abdomen, chest, and back (often with faint bluish patches as well as the pink or rose spots), are characteristic of this disease. Death is most commonly caused by exhaustion (*ἀσθενεῖαι διεφθείροντο*), by perforation of intestinal ulcers (*τῇ κοιλίᾳ ἀλκύσεως ἵχυρας ἐγγυγομένης*), or by haemorrhage from the intestines. Although dysenteric stools are common in serious cases, the characteristic stool is one which Thucydides would certainly have described as *διάρροια ἄκρατος*, not as

¹ There is apparently no doubt about the existence of the rat in Italy in the first century A.D. See the evidence assembled by Sir W. P. MacArthur in *Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, xlvi, 1952, pp. 209 ff., with references on p. 212 to modern treatments of the subject. I am very much obliged to the author for sending me a copy of this paper, and also of another, *ibid.* p. 464, where it is reported that the skeleton of a rat, indistinguishable from *Rattus Rattus*, has been found by Prof. Haas in a neolithic site on Mt. Carmel, another (of unidentified species) in a palaeolithic site in the desert of Judaea. I am

indebted to Sir William also for a description (which I have been careful not to go beyond) of the symptoms of typhus fever in relation to Thuc.'s Plague. The disagreement between us on the main issue here remains unfortunately absolute; but none of my numerous correspondents has helped me nearly so much.

² B. von Hagen quotes Schröder, *Mü. Med. Wochenschr.* 1916, as a supporter of pneumonic plague. The discrepancies seem to me so numerous and large that I have not thought it worth while to pursue the matter farther here.

δυσεντερία. About mental disorders the modern descriptions have little or nothing to say.

This is obviously a strong candidate: but, apart from the fact that some of the lesser Thucydidean symptoms are not characteristic of typhoid, there remain one or two serious discrepancies:

(i) The abdominal pains of typhoid fever are noticeable at a much earlier stage than that described by Thucydides. In the Athenian Plague the intestinal troubles are said to have supervened in cases where the patient survived the main crisis on the 7th or 9th day: in typhoid fever, they are of the essence of the disease, and their effect may be seen and felt at a relatively early stage.

(ii) If gangrene of the extremities is associated as a complication with typhoid fever, the modern descriptions which I have seen are at fault.

(iii) Although the characteristic stool is *διάρροια ὄκρατος*, stools of blood must have been common in fatal cases, and it would have to be supposed that Thucydides either did not know this or did not think it worth recording.¹

I now proceed to consider a claimant which may prove to be the best qualified of all, the one proposed by Shrewsbury: *measles*. I shall first summarize one modern description, of comparable length and scope, referring parenthetically to Thucydides' text:

'The incubation period is not accompanied by evident symptoms (ἔξ οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως κτλ.). The early stages are characterized by acute catarrh, attended by sneezing (πταρρός), discharge from the nose, redness and watering of the eyes (οφθαλμῶν ἐρυθμάτα), a dry noisy cough (μετὰ βηθός ἴχυροῦ), hoarseness (βράγχος), occasionally sickness (ἀποκάθαρσις χολῆς) and diarrhoea (διάρροια); other symptoms are headache and fever (κεφαλῆς θερμαί), rapid pulse, thirst (δύψα), restlessness (ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ήσυχάζειν), convulsions, as a rule in children (επανόν); on the fourth or fifth day appears the characteristic eruption on the skin, crimson or dusky red spots covering the greater part of the body (φλυκταίνας μικράς καὶ ἔλκεσιν ἐξηνθηκός). In malignant cases the rash may be dark purple in colour

¹ Since this paper was written I have seen in typescript an article by Mr. P. Salway and Miss W. Dell, arguing the case for ergotism. I had rejected this possibility for the reasons given by Finley in his *Thucydides*, p. 158, n. 2 (compare esp. R. Kober, *Zur Gesch. des Mutterkorns*, 1889, pp. 1 ff., with the objections of W. Ebstein, *Deutsche Med. Wochenschr.* xxxvi, 1899, pp. 594 ff.). The resemblance between the Athenian Plague and ergotism is in many respects most striking: the apparently insuperable objection was that it would be necessary to prove that rye was used in the making of food, yet we know, so surely as such things can be known, that rye was not used for bread in the Mediterranean region throughout antiquity' (Finley, i.c., with authorities). I learn from the above-mentioned article (due for publication soon, I hope) that this objection is not founded on fact—that *claviceps purpurea* may attack other grains (including wheat) as well as rye. There remain, how-

ever, at least two further obstacles: (1) we should have to suppose that Thuc. was mistaken in thinking that the Plague was *infectious*: a very bad blunder, if it was one; (2) delirium and similar mental disturbances are said to be characteristic of ergotism. I say no more about it at present, in the expectation that Mr. Salway and Miss Dell will throw new light on these and other points.

Sir Clifford Allbutt, *Greek Medicine in Rome*, pp. 340 f., inclines to favour *scarlatina maligna*. Again, there is much general similarity in the symptoms, but again the discrepancies are numerous and important (*sc. mal.* is normally accompanied by *prostration* and *delirium* in the early stages, and in fatal cases death normally ensues within 48 hours, or, at least, long before the 'seventh or ninth day' of Thuc.; moreover, I cannot find that gangrene is a complication of this disease. Brandeis, p. 24, absolutely rejects the possibility of this identification).

(n)
m
tr
rō
op
(d)

T
picture
recu
P =
253
Acu
Dict
(the

T
auth
tong
exc
diar
loss
also
McC
disea
stage
Thuc
colo
inter
tive

T
befo
Shre
imm
para
first
relat
Thuc
tion
Thuc
Colo
and
sick

ho
1
London
2 J
this I

(πελδόν), and the patient may suffer affections of the gastro-intestinal mucous membrane (ἐλκώσεως τῆς κοιλίας ἐγγυνομένης), causing great prostration (ἀσθενείας διεφθείροντο). Pulmonary complications are common (εἰς τὸ στήθος κατέβαντε); and there may remain as results of the disease chronic ophthalmia (crepiscόμενος ὀφθαλμῶν), deafness, and occasionally a form of gangrene of the tissue of the mouth, cheeks, and other parts of the body (ἀκρωτηρίων ἀντιληφής)."

The resemblance is obviously close; and it will save space, and present the picture more clearly, if I state summarily how far the Thucydidean symptoms recur in descriptions of measles in respectable modern works of reference: P = *Textbook of the Practice of Medicine*, ed. F. W. Price, 5th edn., 1937, pp. 253 ff.; C = *Textbook of Medicine*, ed. R. L. Cecil, 1935, pp. 290 ff.; R = *Acute Infectious Diseases*, J. D. Rolleston, 1925, pp. 266 ff.; B = *Black's Medical Dictionary*, 19th edn., 1948, s.v.; E = *The British Encyclopaedia*, 14th edn., s.v. (the source of the foregoing summary).

The following Thucydidean symptoms are mentioned by most or all of these authorities: Feverishness, inflammation and redness of the eyes, redness of tongue and throat; sneezing, hoarseness, coughing, vomiting, convulsions (rare except in children); the skin-eruption; thirst, restlessness, sleeplessness; diarrhoea. As complications: ulceration and other affections of the intestines; loss of eyesight; gangrene, especially *noma* of the tissue about the mouth, but also of other parts of the body, including the pudenda (Rolleston; also Osler-McCrae, *System of Medicine* s.v., quoted by Shrewsbury, p. 23). All state that the disease is highly infectious. None mentions physical prostration at an early stage, and none associates delirium or stools of blood with it. The following Thucydidean symptoms are mentioned by at least one of the five: dark purple colour of the skin during the exanthematous period (E); sensation of great internal heat (C); general distress (P) and mental depression (B); unproductive retching (C, B).

The case for identification so far is as strong as one could reasonably expect; before considering whether there is any residue of incompatibles I borrow from Shrewsbury a most interesting part of his exposition, showing that the desire to immerse the body in cold water, attested by Thucydides, has a remarkable parallel in a modern record of measles. Measles invaded the Fiji Islands for the first time in 1875; and if anyone is inclined to doubt whether a disease so relatively innocuous in a civilized society could have had the effect which Thucydides' Plague had on the Athenians, let him learn that out of a population of 100,000 about 25,000 died in a few months. Specially relevant to Thucydides' description are the following quotations from reports by the Colonial Surgeon¹ appointed to the Fiji Islands, by the Colonial Secretary,² and by missionaries present at the time.³ Thucydides says that the unattended sick would throw themselves into cold water and into wells: now listen to the modern witnesses:

"They preferred . . . when overtaken by the fever, to crawl out of their houses and cool their bodies by lying on the damp ground or in the bed of

¹ B. C. Corney, *Trans. Epidem. Soc.*, London, n.s. iii, 1884, pp. 76 ff.

² Esp. H. L. Layard, *Missionary Notices*, xxi, Methodist Mission House, London, 1875-7.

³ J. B. Thurston, *Report to the Governor*; for this I have depended wholly on Shrewsbury.

the nearest creek.' 'Unless watched, the men have a tendency to walk into the water by way of reducing the fever under which they suffer.' 'The natives . . . will expose themselves to cold and wet to allay the feverishness. Some actually creep away at night . . . and lie down in the sea or creeks.' 'Many of the patients have confessed to having . . . lain down in a cold running stream . . . They will try to allay the fever by lying in a mountain-stream.'¹

It is not denied that there are other records of the impact of measles on an unexposed society in which no such desire for immersion is recorded; or that there are a few examples of such an impulse in diseases other than measles. The relevance of the testimony must not be misunderstood: Thucydides states that this relatively rare phenomenon was characteristic of the Athenian Plague; modern records prove that it was characteristic of the plague of measles at Fiji. Our purpose is to establish so far as possible whether the facts recorded by Thucydides contain anything uncharacteristic of, or incompatible with, measles; and the Fijian record proves that this particular feature was in fact characteristic of a plague of measles.

Finally, I try to determine whether there remain any incompatibles. The verdict of course rests with the medical men: the layman can only point to matters of apparent fact and state the questions which suggest themselves.

First, the 'abnormal and foul breath.' This symptom is not mentioned in any of the accounts which I have seen; and though the layman is aware that the breath of children in the earlier stages of measles is malodorous, the physician may (for all I know) deny that this fact has any necessary connexion with the disease in question. I cannot judge whether any, or much, importance should be attributed to this point.

Secondly, Thucydides states that the Plague 'did not, with fatal result, seize upon the same person twice': the implication might seem to be that the sufferer was not absolutely immune thereafter. There is, however, nothing in Thucydides' words here inconsistent with measles: (i) Relapse in measles is rare, but does occur (Price, *l.c.*, p. 258); Thucydides need mean no more than that he found no case of relapse with fatal outcome; (ii) the words *ωτρε καὶ κτείνειν* may be prompted by caution: Thucydides observed that the Plague did not, in general, attack the same person twice: he could not possibly know that this was universally true; but it may well have been a matter of common knowledge or belief that there was no further danger to life after the first attack. It would then be a fair statement to say that 'there was no second attack (not with fatal outcome)'. It is worth noticing that he does not put his statement in the form 'Second attacks were not fatal,' or the like; he asserts positively that 'the same person was not attacked twice', and cautiously qualifies this with the parenthesis 'not so as to be killed'.

Third, loss of memory. This is not, so far as I know, said to be characteristic of measles. But neither is it said by Thucydides to be characteristic of the Plague at Athens. It was a final complication *in some cases*, after the patient had survived both the first and the second climax: and this matter may well have been considered specially worth mentioning by reason of its rarity—a survey

¹ These quotations are directly borrowed from Shrewsbury's article, though I have been able through the kindness of Dr.

Williamson to read in full the sources of most.

of the Hippocratic Corpus shows that loss of memory was very seldom recorded by the early Greek doctors in any connexion. It should be noticed that there is no suggestion in Thucydides that the condition lasted for any length of time.

Fourthly, mortification of the 'extremities', *ἀκρωτήρια*, of the body. Whereas a form of gangrene of the tissue, especially of the mouth, cheeks, and pudenda, is well attested as a complication of measles (Osler, Rolleston, Price, *ll. cc.*, and others), I have not seen it stated that it ever attacks the toes and fingers; and it has been suggested to me that the *noma* in question is of a type which would not be expected to affect those parts. Whether this is so, and whether, if it is so, it is a serious obstacle to the identification with measles, are questions on which I seek further enlightenment.¹

I conclude by repeating that the similarity between Thucydides' description of the Plague and an average modern description of measles is, as a simple matter of fact, close. Unless the modern accounts are misleading to the layman, or otherwise unreliable, there is probably a better case for the identification with measles than with any other disease.²

Trinity College, Cambridge

D. L. PAGE

¹ I should add, fifthly, a question raised and answered by Dr. W. H. S. Jones: if the Plague was measles, it should have become endemic; yet there is no later reference to measles in Greek (or Roman) medical (or other) writers. The strength of this negative argument is broken by the parallel example of *mumps*, described at Thasos in the fifth century B.C. but ignored by all subsequent Greek medical writers (though there may be a reference in Celsus).

² The foregoing is a revised version of a paper read to the Philological Society at

Cambridge and to the Classical Association at Oxford in 1952. I have done my best to improve it in the light of the considerable correspondence which followed those occasions. Medical opinions, in which of course I was most interested, were fairly evenly divided for and against. The measure of agreement was such as to encourage me, perhaps against my better judgement, to publish this; the expressions of disagreement were such as to lead me to expect no mercy for having done so.

NUM IN DIRECT QUESTIONS: A RULE RESTATE

WHAT seems to be the prevailing doctrine of the particle *num* is thus set forth in the most recent of major Latin grammars:¹

'*num* ist wahrscheinlich die unerweiterte Form von *nunc* . . . *num* diente also zunächst dazu, die Frage in der lebendigen Rede lebhaft an die Situation anzuknüpfen; es steht oft in erregten Erkundigungsfragen mit unentschiedener Erwartung (z. B. Plt. Merc. 173 *obsecro, num nauis perii?* : : *saluast nauis*); auch bejahende Antwort wird vielfach erwartet . . . Der in der klassischen Sprache alleinherrschende Gebrauch in Fragen mit erwarteter Antwort 'nein' setzte sich zunächst in lebhaften Fragen der Entrüstung oder des Erstaunens fest wie Plt. Asin. 619 *sed num fumus est haec mulier quam amplexare?*'

Many authorities do not allow themselves the protection of a *wahrscheinlich*. Mr. Hofmann himself does not, in his revision of Walde's *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch* (1949).² Scattered through the literature of Latin philology in the last sixty years are such pronouncements as 'Beide Partikeln, *nunc* und *num*, stehen im nämlichen Verhältnis zu einander wie *tunc* und *tum*. Demnach ergiebt sich als Grundbedeutung für *num* ein schwaches, tonloses, unbestimmtes fragendes "jetzt"';³ 'In class. Latin . . . *nonne* is limited to questions which expect an affirmative, *num* to those which expect a negative, answer. This distinction is unknown to Plautus, who uses . . . *num*, *numquis* without a negative sense occasionally. It is easy to see how these meanings came to be attached to *non-ne*, "is . . . not", and *num*, "now" [Gk. *νῦν*]',⁴ '*num* bedeutet so viel wie *nunc*',⁵ '*num* hat ursprünglich temporale Bedeutung (nun, jetzt) die noch in *etiamnum* erhalten ist . . . *num* hatte seiner Ableitung entsprechend von Haus aus neutrale Bedeutung, d. h. es gab zunächst keine Andeutung, ob der Fragende eine bejahende oder verneinende Antwort erwartet'.⁶

Here and there one meets a less confident judgement. Ernout and Meillet's dictionary⁷ concludes its article on *num* as follows:

'On peut concevoir que l'emploi interrogatif de *num* soit dérivé du sens de "maintenant" (v. Hofmann, *Lateinische Umgangssprache*, p. 41 et suiv.). Mais on peut aussi penser à quelque particule apparentée au groupe de *ne*, *nem-pe*, *enim*, etc. et qui serait de la forme du *tum*, *cum*, etc. Alors *num* aurait deux origines.'

Etymologies assigning a negative element to *num* have also been propounded from time to time.⁸

In the battle of etymologies I am not concerned, and anyone who chooses to think that an originally weak, unaccented, indeterminate interrogative 'now' somehow came to assume the functions discharged in Greek by *μῶν* will not

¹ Leumann-Hofmann, p. 649.

⁷ *Dict. étymologique de la langue latine* (1939).

² s.v. *num*.

⁸ See Ribbeck, *Lat. Partik.*, p. 12; Per

³ F. Glöckner, *Archiv. f. Lat. Lex.*, 1899, p. 495.

Persson, *Indo-Germ. Forsch.*, 1893, pp. 206 and 250; W. Prellwitz, *Glotta*, 1931, p. 114.

⁴ Lindsay, *Lat. Language*, p. 605.

⁹ Cf. Liddell-Scott, 8th ed., 'μῶν is the

⁵ Delbrück, *Vergl. Synt.*, p. 264.

Latin *num*'. The remark is absent from the

⁶ Kühner-Stegmann, II, ii, p. 512.

ninth edition.

be contradicted by me. But when I am told that this 'original meaning' survives in extant Latin, I think it needful to look closely at the literary evidence, lest texts be misconceived. It will show, if I read it aright, that alleged examples of *num* in a 'neutral sense' may plausibly, and therefore should, be taken as natural and even predictable extensions of the classical usage which every schoolboy once knew.

In fairness, however, much of the current misunderstanding (as I think it) must be put down to the old rough-and-ready classroom dogma that '*num* expects the answer "No"'. Exceptions to its letter are frequent in comedy and less rare in classical writing than grammarians and lexicographers suggest. It would be surprising if they were not, for the rule so stated imposes a restriction which no language would be likely to obey. If *A* asks *B* 'You are not going to London, are you?' he may, of course, expect a negative answer, but he may legitimately have one of several other reasons for phrasing his question in this way. Perhaps he is anxious—aware, it may be, that *A* has every intention of going to London but reluctant to recognize this. Perhaps he is astonished, or gently surprised, or merely disposed to convey some degree of apparent improbability, in which case he might add some such expression as 'by any chance'. Perhaps he speaks ironically or, implying that the question is absurd, challengingly. Tone and context will determine the nuance, but a negative implication is always present, i.e. something in the speaker's mind—his expectations or his sense of congruity or his wishes—opposes a positive reply. Never is such a question exactly equivalent to 'Are you going . . .?' or 'Are you not going . . .?' Much the same is true of Latin questions introduced by *num*, or its collaterals *numquid*, *numnam*. If we want the old rule to work in every case we must remodel it somewhat as follows: '*num* implies that the idea of a negative answer is present in the mind of the questioner.' Now that the entrance has been widened, perhaps the stray sheep will rejoin the fold.

Extant examples in Plautus and Terence of *num* in questions to which a negative answer is not expected were diligently collected by E. P. Morris in 1890.¹ He stresses more than once that their explanation and classification is a difficult task. Perhaps he would have found it simpler and performed it more successfully if he had not followed his own maxim that 'one must take some pains to rid himself of the inclination, which we get from familiarity with the classical Latin, to attach to *num* the idea of a negative answer'. While making use of his collection I shall generally ignore his expositions and arrange the examples under the four main headings, already indicated, of anxiety, surprise, irony, and challenge. My grouping is at times arbitrary, as grammatical schematism usually tends to be.

(a) The speaker knows that the answer to his question is likely to be 'Yes', but is reluctant to believe it. *num* in such cases corresponds to *oū nou* or *oū rī nou* (e.g. in *Eur. El.* 235). The following speak for themselves:

Asin. 31 num me illuc ducis ubi lapis lapidem terit?²

Aul. 241 sed pro Iuppiter, num ego disperri?

Aul. 389 strepitust intus. numnam ego compilor miser?

Merc. 173 obsecro, num nauis periit?³

¹ *Amer. Journ. Phil.* xi, pp. 22 ff. See also Bennett, *Synt. of Early Lat.* i, p. 473.

² Included by Morris among questions 'clearly asked for information'!

³ The speaker's son is at sea.

Ad. 487¹ Iuno Lucina, fer opem! serua me obsecro! *HEG.* hem, numnam illa quaeso parturit?

Andr. 591 numnam perimus?

Eun. 947 numnam ego perii?

Heaut. 517 quis hic loquitur? perii. numnam haec audiuit?

So in *Merc.* 215 an anxious lover, fearing the worst, asks 'num esse amicam suspicari uisus est [sc. pater]?' When Amphitryon cannot make head nor tail of his wife's story, the dialogue proceeds thus (*Amph.* 708):

AMPH. Alcmena, unum rogare te uolo. *ALC.* quiduis roga.

AMPH. num tibi aut stultitia accessit aut superbat superbia?

The possibility that the impeccable Alcmena is guilty of folly or pride is forced upon him, but he does not welcome it. Hence *num*.

In the same galley belongs the anxious inquiry *numquis hic (ad)est?*, when the speaker is about to tell a secret: cf. *Mil.* 994, 1019, *Most.* 472, *Rud.* 948, *Stich.* 102, *Eun.* 549.

Naturally the same form is followed in sympathetic questions when the speaker feels or courteously pretends to feel some anxiety on behalf of his interlocutor or a third party. A doctor asks of his patient (*Men.* 890) 'num laruatust aut cerritus? fac sciam. num eum ueterus aut aqua intercus tenet?' Compare the following:

Bacch. 538 numquae aduenienti aegritudo obiecta est?

Bacch. 667 numqui nummi exciderunt, ere, tibi, quod sic terram optuere?

Men. 620 numquis seruorum deliquit? num ancillae aut seruei tibi responsant? eloquere. inpune non erit. ('I hope the servants have not been impudent?')

Merc. 369 numquid tibi dolet?

Most. 1030 *TH.* ei mihi, disperii! uocis non habeo satis. uicine, perii, interii! *Si.* numquid Tranio turbauit? *TH.* immo exturbauit omnia.

Eun. 272 numquidnam hic quod nolis uides? *PAR.* te *GNATHO.* credo; at numquid aliud? (The sympathy is here ironical.)

(b) Surprise. This may be of all degrees. In English 'not, I suppose . . .', 'not, by any chance . . .?', 'surely not?' will often represent the force of *num*.

Amph. 620 num obdormiuisti dudum? ('You haven't been dreaming, I suppose?')

Amph. 753 quaeso edepol, num tu quoque etiam insanis, quom id me interrogas, qui etc.

Amph. 1072 sed quid hoc? quis hic est senex qui ante aedis nostras sic iacet? numnam hunc percussit Iuppiter?

Cist. 658 haec cistella numnam hinc ab nobis domo est?

Men. 412 pro Iuppiter, num istaec mulier illinc uenit, quae te nouit tam cate?

Poen. 975 sed quae illaec auis est quae huc cum tunicis aduenit? numnam in balineis circumductus pallio?

Andr. 943 quod, *Crito?* numquid meministi? (Here the note is one of eagerness. 'You don't recollect anything, by any chance?')

¹ Overlooked by Morris.

(c) Irony. Examples are *Andr.* 477 'num immemores discipuli?' ('Surely your pupils have not forgotten their instructions?') and *Eur.* 286 'echo, num-nam hic relictu's custos, ne quis forte internuntius clam a milite ad istam curset?'

(d) Challenge. A negative answer is not so much expected as demanded. So *Capt.* 632 'meam rem non cures si recte facias. num ego curo tuam?' and the stock phrase *num (quid) moror?*¹

The polite formula of leave-taking, *numquid (aliud me) vis*, is an example of *num* in its ordinary use—'Nothing else I can do for you, is there?' Why this should be considered less courteous than 'Is there anything else . . .' I am unable to perceive. *Most.* 999 'numquid processit ad forum hodie noui?' ('Nothing new in the forum today, I suppose?') is a casual inquiry expecting a negative answer. In fact the answer is positive, 'etiam' ('Why, yes, there was something.'): cf. *Ter. Hec.* 811 'nil dicam aliud? :: etiam' ('Shall I say nothing more?' 'Yes, there is something more.').

One other passage, omitted by Morris, requires separate mention. In *Poen.* 257 the slave asks 'ecquid gratiae, quom hoc foras te euocau? iam num me decet hic donari cado uini ueteris? dic dari.' It is not easy to bring this under any of the above categories and I suspect that *non* may be the right reading. However, one could translate 'I suppose you wouldn't consider that I deserve a jar of old wine?'

If these uses are what I take them to be, natural concomitants of 'num' expecting the answer "No", it would be surprising to find them almost non-existent in classical Latin, and those who view them as survivals of an original neutral sense of *num* may have been influenced by the belief that in the classical language they were almost entirely discarded. Brugmann³ states roundly 'in der klassischen Latinität hat sich *num* auf solche Fragen beschränkt, die verneinende Antworten erwarten lassen'. Similarly Lindsay.⁴ Grammars support this impression. Kühner-Stegmann cites only two classical exceptions to the rule, *Hor. Sat.* 2. 6. 53 'numquid de Dacis audisti?' and *Prop.* 2. 3. 23 'num tibi nascenti primis, mea uita, diebus | candidus argutum sternuit omen amor?'; Leumann-Hofmann only the latter of these. Neither, as a matter of fact, convince. The first is a casual inquiry expecting a negative answer, like *Plaut. Most.* 999.⁵ 'No news from Dacia, I suppose?' The second might pass as a timorous, hesitating query (see below under (b)), but the Neapolitanus and the generality of modern editions are probably right in reading *non*.

The truth is, however, that classical authors do provide examples of the types discussed, though in less abundance than the comic dramatists. This relative scarcity may be partly due to a hardening of usage, but it must be remembered that uses of an essentially conversational and even colloquial character are more at home in the dialogue of comedy than in the bulk of extant classical literature. The list which I subjoin is doubtless not exhaustive.

Most of my examples fall within category (a) where *num* = *oī nou*. In *Prop.*

¹ For further instances see Morris, op. cit., pp. 23-25. His comment 'it is hardly possible that *num* has here' (i.e. in this challenging use) 'any original negative effect, since a negative force would require an affirmative answer' might as well or as ill be made of the *num* of ordinary usage or of *μῶν*.

² In common with Morris (p. 27) I pass

over a few passages as doubtful or conjectural. The negative sense can be understood without difficulty in all of those where he thinks it allowable but not necessary (p. 23) or where he hesitates (p. 25).

³ *Grundr. Vergl. Gram.* II. iii², p. 994.

⁴ See above, p. 120.

⁵ See above.

4. 3. 23 'dic mihi, num teneros urit lorica lacertos? | num grauis imbellis atterit hasta manus?' the answer to both queries is undoubtedly 'Yes', but Arethusa's solicitude makes her reluctant to admit it. Three more Propertian instances are disguised by some editors who, lacking any other criterion, print *non* in accordance with what they imagine to be diplomatically probable. In 3. 6. 3 'num me laetitia tumefactum fallis inani' the slaves of N write *non* leaving *dum* of FLPDV to shift for itself; whereas *num* of the *deteriores* accounts for both. 2. 28. 9, 'num sibi collatam doluit Venus', presents a straightforward conflict between N and the rest of the tradition. In 1. 12. 9 'num me deus obruit' the weight of MS. evidence is for *non*. In all three passages sense decides for *num*. Like Arethusa, Ovid's Hermione is unwilling to recognize what she suspects to be true: *Her.* 8. 65 'num generis fato, quod nostros errat in annos, | Tantalides matres apta rapina sumus?' In *Am.* 2. 8. 7 the poet fears he may have betrayed himself: 'num tamen erubui? num uerbo lapsus in ullo | furtiue Veneris conscientia signa dedi?' This could be taken as an ordinary question with negative answer expected, or as a challenge equivalent to a denial, but I rather think it denotes uneasy self-suspicion. In 3. 7. 27 of the same he casts about for the explanation of an erotic disappointment: 'num mea Thessalico languent deuota ueneno | corpora? num misero carmen et herba nocent?' Anxiety is in the question, not denial. It is obviously so when Andromache (*Sen. Tro.* 930) asks, dreading the answer, of the fate in store for Polyxena 'num per has uastum in mare | uoluenda rupe', etc. Stat. *Theb.* 8. 503 is no less clear a case of reluctance to accept the all too probable: 'num regia Iuno | hoc molita nefas?' asks Juno's habitual victim, in indignation, it is true, rather than fear. *numquid* in *Mart.* 5. 80. 7 'quod si legeris ista cum diserto | —sed numquid sumus improbi?—Secundo' brings out the mock nervousness of the writer ('I trust I am not going too far?'). If anyone prefers with Hofmann¹ to think *numquid* 'sich am nächsten berührt mit der Ausgangsbedeutung "jetzt" in der lebhaften Frage', I invite his attention² to the similar nuance in *Cic. Rep.* 1. 17 'quid uos agitis? num sermonem uestrum aliquem diremit noster interuentus?' ('I hope we are not interrupting a discussion?'). Next, a sympathetic or politely anxious inquiry: Pliny begins a letter (8. 17) 'num istic quoque immite et turbidum caelum?' ('I hope you too are not getting this dreadful weather?'). Last in this category I include the remarkable *num* of Ov. *Tr.* 3. 1. 41 'num quia perpetuos meruit domus ista triumphos? | an quia Leucadio semper amata deo est?' This looks like a question pure and simple, but I do not think it is. It concerns the laurel outside the emperor's door and on his head. A loyal poet makes such inquiries with bated breath and *num* is the sign of his trepidation.

Under (b), surprise, may be placed *Sen. Ben.* 2. 18. 3 'num etiam maiore delectu quaerendus est cui debeamus quam cui praestemus?' He expects an affirmative answer but registers the surprising character of the thought. Compare the tentative, hesitating inquiry of Ov. *Fast.* 4. 801 'num tamen est uero propius, cum condita Roma est, | transferri iussos in nova tecta lares?', which has also affinities with *Tr.* 3. 1. 41 just discussed.

For (c), irony, cf. Cat. 55.17 'num te lacteolae tenent puellae?'² The supposition is not improbable, but the speaker ironically puts it as though it were—'you wouldn't, of course . . .?' There is a harsher irony in Cicero's scornful

¹ *Gnomon*, 1926, p. 254.

² So, rightly, most editions. The MSS. preponderate for *nunc* and Ellis follows them.

'quid est? num conturbo te?' (*Phil.* 2. 31), and a subtler in the dying Hercules' words to Philoctetes 'num manus pauida impium | scelus refugit?' (*Sen. Herc. Oct.* 1719), the 'impious crime' being to the speaker the truest loyalty.

(d) Challenging *num* is naturally not rare. *Cic. Diu.* 1. 24 'num igitur tot clarissimorum ducum regumque naufragium sustulit artem nauigandi?' and *Sen. Clem.* 1. 14. 1 'numquid aliquis sanus filium a prima offensa exheredat?' are typical. I have only one classical example to hand where the verb is in the first person, *Virg. Aen.* 10. 68 'num linquere castra | hortati sumus aut uitam committere uentis? | num puer summam belli, num credere muros?'

Conville and Caius College, Cambridge

D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY

PLATO'S *PARMENIDES*: SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS INTERPRETATION¹

THE FIRST PART OF THE DIALOGUE

IN modern work on the *Parmenides* it is commonly supposed that in the First Part of the dialogue Plato's main concern is criticism of his own (or Socrates') doctrine of Forms, or of some formulations of that doctrine, and that the criticisms have some sort of validity and are in some degree 'damaging' to the doctrine.² It is thus often assumed that Plato's purpose is to make the reader ask himself, 'Where is Plato (or Socrates) wrong? Where is his doctrine of Forms, or his statement of it, inadequate?' This is no doubt due partly to the fact that no reply is offered to the criticisms, and partly to the fact that they are put into the mouth of Parmenides, for whom (it is alleged) Plato had a very great respect. Nevertheless, Plato can hardly have had a greater respect for Parmenides than he had for Socrates; and therefore on general grounds it is at least as likely that he intends us to ask ourselves the question, 'Where is Parmenides wrong, or inadequate?' It is, of course, obvious that Socrates is represented as a young man, who, in his enthusiasm for a new doctrine which he has invented himself, has not thought out all the difficulties involved in it or prepared replies to all the possible criticisms. Yet again, on general principles it is not likely that Plato would have written a dialogue primarily to represent Parmenides' position as substantially more satisfactory than that of Socrates (or himself). It is therefore of the first importance not merely to have clearly in our minds the nature and purpose of the doctrine of Forms, but also to examine carefully the basis of the criticisms which Parmenides is made to bring against Socrates, and the methods by which Parmenides conducts his arguments.

With regard to the doctrine of Forms there can be no reasonable doubt. It is expounded by Socrates early in the dialogue itself. The essence of it is that there are two levels of things: (1) the Forms, apprehended by *λογισμός*; and (2) particular objects, apprehended by the senses. Each of the Forms is one, and there are many particulars which 'partake of' each Form, thereby acquiring the distinctive characteristic of the Form as denoted by its name, e.g. Socrates is just by partaking of the Form Just. That is to say, there is a connexion between the two levels, which Socrates states by using the terms *μεταλαμβάνειν* and *μετέχειν*. We are capable of apprehending both kinds of objects, the first by *λογισμός*, the second by our senses; though of course it is the soul which functions in both cases. It is the special mark of the doctrine of Forms that both kinds of objects must be taken account of; and no doctrine which fails to do this and to assert the connexion between the two can be genuinely Platonic (Socratic).

¹ This article is the outcome of a suggestion by Professor J. Tate that it might be useful to make an analysis of the *Parmenides* similar to my analysis of the *Sophist* in 'Plato and the *μέγιστα γένη* of the *Sophist*' (*C.Q.*, vol. ii (N.S.), 1952, pp. 32-56). I am much indebted to Professor Tate and to Professor Hackforth for criticisms of the present article

while in draft.

² I regret that I have no space here to offer a criticism of R. Robinson's defence of this view in *Classical Philology*, xxxvii, 1942, pp. 51 ff. I hope to do so in a paper to be read before the Cambridge Philological Society in the latter part of 1953.

Against this view is to be set another view, in some respects similar to that of Plato, but in others very different. This is the view which was held by the historic Parmenides, viz. that the evidence of the senses must be entirely disregarded in any attempt to construct an account of the universe; the only admissible criterion for any statement must be, 'Is it conceivable in thought? Is it rational?' This is summed up in Parmenides' own dictum, 'It is the same thing that can be thought and that can be' (fr. 3). The distinction on which Parmenides was insisting was the rational and consistent account which thought can provide us with, as against the confused and inconsistent account which the evidence of our senses offers. He was not setting up any such distinction as is represented by a class of material objects on the one hand and a class of immaterial objects on the other. This is shown by the language which he uses in his poem. He begins with the assumption that whatever is, is one. This was no new assumption. 'That the real is ultimately one had been assumed from the outset of philosophy; that may be why Parmenides takes this premiss for granted' (Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, p. 35). No doubt this is true; but we should add that Parmenides must also have considered it a rational assumption as opposed to any possible alternative. Furthermore, Parmenides does not appear to be claiming that he is proposing some new field of study for philosophy; his field, like his basic assumption, is the same as that of his predecessors; but he insists that their method of studying it was at fault. They had assumed one physical substance, but their assertions about it were logically indefensible; Parmenides gives us what he believes is the only rational account which can be given on the basis of that assumption. He tells us that 'it is indivisible, because it is homogeneous; . . . it is like unto the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally poised everywhere from the centre. . . . All is full of that which is; therefore it is all continuous, for what is is close to what is', and so forth (fr. 8). In face of such language, we have no right to maintain that because Parmenides nowhere in the surviving parts of his poem happens to call it *oūμa*, therefore he did not regard it as corporeal. What he is giving is an account, such as the reason can approve and accept, of the physical universe, based on the assumption of 'one substance'. There may be a large number of other attributes which our senses would like us to include in our account; but our reason does not tell us that the 'one substance' is pink, or soft, as it does tell us that it is homogeneous, equally poised, etc.; and therefore we cannot include statements that it is pink or soft in our description of it. If we wish to include such attributes in our account, then, says Parmenides, we must begin from a different basic assumption, which he appears to regard as in itself unreasonable, viz. 'the naming of two shapes'. But there will be no resemblance whatever between the former account and the account which results from this alternative assumption.

We have thus the following situation:

Parmenides has in his mind this contrast:

- (1) An account of the physical world, constructed by *λογισμός*, and describing what really *is*;
- (2) An account of the physical world, based on the evidence of the senses, and in no way describing what really *is*.

There can be no sort of resemblance or connexion between the two.

Socrates has in his mind this contrast:

- (1) A class of supra-physical entities, known as Forms, apprehended by *λογισμός*;
- (2) A class of physical objects ('particulars'), apprehended by the senses.

The connexion between the two classes is expressed by saying that the particulars 'partake of' the Forms: particulars which are called *X* partake of the Form *X*.

It is obvious that the contrast in the one man's mind is by no means identical with that in the other man's mind; and if the two are brought together in a dialogue we may expect to find them talking at cross-purposes.

When confronted with Socrates' theory, what is Parmenides' reaction likely to be? Points in favour of Socrates would be (a) that in a sort of way he subscribed to the belief that 'What is is one', in so far as he made each of the Forms one, but this would be discounted by the fact that there were numerous 'Ones', one for each group of identically-named particulars; and (b) that in a sort of way he recognized the importance of *λογισμός*, but again this would be offset by the fact that the Forms were not established by any satisfactory process of reasoning, and also by their similarity to particulars and their alleged connexion with them. Indeed, to Parmenides, the Socratic theory must have appeared erroneous in one fundamental respect: Socrates clearly did not intend to dismiss the evidence of the senses, and the theory of Forms must have appeared first and foremost as one which aimed at reconciling the evidence of the senses and the processes of thought. This was to be done by positing a sort of duplicate set of physical objects (simplified, it is true, by there being only one Form corresponding to each group of ordinary physical objects), and this duplicate set was discerned *λογισμῷ*.

In the dialogue, Parmenides' reaction to Socrates' theory is what we should expect. His first comment is to ask Socrates whether it was his own idea to posit this duplicate set—Forms such as 'Likeness and Unity, apart from the likeness and unity which we possess' (130 b). Secondly, if the content of Socrates' class of Forms is based on the evidence supplied by the senses (as Socrates himself admits), then Parmenides will naturally expect him to be consistent and to posit a Form for every group of identically named physical objects. And this point is in fact the subject of his next question, leading to his preliminary discussion with Socrates (130 b ff.).

Now we have seen that for Parmenides that which was discerned *λογισμῷ* was very different from that which was discerned by the senses. His 'one sphere' bears no resemblance to the world which we see and touch and hear. The objects, however, which according to *Socrates* are discerned *λογισμῷ* are duplicates of those apprehended by the senses and bear the same names; and however stoutly Socrates might maintain that the Forms are 'on their own', and that really the particulars are named after the Forms and not the Forms after particulars, he could hardly help giving Parmenides the impression that he was primarily concerned with the objects of sense, and that his whole theory was controlled by the necessity of accounting for them. 'You see a number of large things', says Parmenides, 'and that is why you think there is one Form, the Large' (132 a). Socrates' intelligible objects are really derived from the evidence of the senses—so it would seem to Parmenides. When Socrates adds to this the statement that physical objects 'partake of' the Forms, he seems to

be un
on an
that I
physi
λογισ
be su
becau
this t
their

Par
Socr
meni
of' th
surpri
which
theory
comes
spher
us to
Rath
λογισ
λογισ
conne
the o
aīrā.

In
extrem
concer
materi
exclus
favour
readil
as a m
when
two o
and th
Parme
way of

It w
and al
dialog
in min

Se

Th
Seco

be undermining still farther his claim that the Forms are in a separate category, on another level, 'on their own'; and it is not surprising if Parmenides assumes that Forms of this kind are not radically different in status from the ordinary physical objects. Besides, Socrates' statement that the Forms are discerned *λογισμῷ* would not of itself convey to Parmenides that they were intended to be supra-physical, any more than his own 'one sphere' was supra-physical because it was apprehended *λογισμῷ*. Parmenides is therefore confronted with this thesis, that there are Forms, which are discerned *λογισμῷ*, and are 'on their own', and yet are 'partaken of' by physical particulars.

Parmenides is presented with an ideal opportunity, for the two parts of Socrates' thesis seem so obviously to be incompatible with each other. Parmenides chooses to deal first with Socrates' assertion that particulars 'partake of' the Forms. In view of what we have just been considering, we shall not be surprised to find Parmenides using of Forms as well as of particulars language which is appropriate only to physical objects. The general bias of Socrates' theory seems amply to justify him in such a course, and also such treatment comes naturally to Parmenides, who used such language of his own 'one sphere' albeit this was apprehensible by *λογισμός*. There is thus no reason for us to think that Parmenides is represented as intending to discredit *λογισμός*. Rather, Parmenides' purpose will be to emphasize the importance of giving *λογισμός* free play, and to show what happens to a theory professedly based on *λογισμός* when an attempt is made to accommodate it to, or to establish its connexion with, the evidence of the senses. After that, he will go on to deal with the other part of Socrates' thesis, the assertion that the Forms are *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*.

In both these main sections of his criticism Parmenides will force to the extremity of its meaning that half of Socrates' thesis on which he has chosen to concentrate. In the first section he will take *μέθεξις* in its most literal and materialistic meaning; in the second section he will enforce the most rigid and exclusive meaning upon the phrase *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*. *Μέθεξις* is indeed his favourite line for attack. The reason is obvious: this term is one which most readily suggests a physical relationship. Parmenides consistently takes it not as a metaphor, but as a matter-of-fact description, to be understood as literally when used of Forms as it would be if used of a cake or a piece of cloth. The two other suggestions which Socrates makes (viz. that the Form is a *νόημα*, and that the particulars are 'likenesses' of the Forms) are both reduced by Parmenides to terms which permit him to make his final attack on them by way of *μέθεξις*.

It will help us to trace a consistent policy throughout Parmenides' criticisms, and also to detect tendencies and methods of argument in the First Part of the dialogue which will reappear in the Second Part, if we have the following plan in mind.

Socrates' thesis may be expressed in the following way:

There is in each case one Form, which is 'on its own', and particulars 'partake of' it. That is to say, Forms and particulars are on different levels, but there is a connexion between them.

This can be stated in terms of an hypothesis like those which we find in the Second Part of the dialogue (using Socrates' phraseology as at 129 a):

εἰ ἐστιν αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτό, οὐ μετέχει τὰ πολλά.

There are in all four main arguments on this:

In the first three arguments, the implications of the second half of the hypothesis, *οὐ μετέχει τὰ πολλά*, are examined. By concentrating upon this, Parmenides 'proves' that if this is true, then the first half of the hypothesis cannot stand.

In the fourth argument, the implications of the first half of the hypothesis, *ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό*, are examined, and Parmenides 'proves' that if this is true, then the second half of the hypothesis cannot stand.

The arguments may be tabulated and summarized as follows:

I. *If there is a connexion between the Forms and particulars, then the Form is not on a different level and the Form is not one.*

(a) *Mέθεξις.* Parmenides shows that the Form must either be divided or else be multiplied *ad infinitum*.

(1) 130 e-131 c. The Form cannot be in particulars either as a whole or as a part.

(2) 131 c-e. Coda showing the absurdity of assuming that a part of the Form is in each particular.

(3) 131 e-132 b. 'Third man.' Each Form will be not one but an indefinite multitude.

(b) *Νόημα.* Parmenides reduces this suggestion to the same terms as *μέθεξις*.

(1) 132 b-c. Parmenides shows that this suggestion, as he interprets it, takes us back to the 'one Form over the many' as in *μέθεξις*.

(2) 132 c. Coda showing the absurdity of 'Form equals νόημα' on the basis of *μέθεξις*.

(c) *Εἰκασθῆναι.* Parmenides shows that the Form must be multiplied *ad infinitum*.

132 d-133 a. An infinite succession of Forms will be required.

II. *If Forms and particulars are on different levels, then there is no connexion between them.*

(d) 133 a-134 e. Parmenides argues that if the Forms are really *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*, then the two sets, Forms and particulars, must be entirely separate, and we can have no knowledge of the Forms.

Both the pattern and the method are precisely parallel to what we find, for instance, in Examinations I and II in the Second Part of the dialogue. There the Hypothesis examined is *εἰ ἐν ἔστω*.

In Examination I Parmenides concentrates upon the *ἐν*, enforcing the full rigidity of its meaning, and shows *inter alia* that then even the *ἔστω* is not true.

In Examination II Parmenides concentrates upon the *ἔστω*, and shows that then the *ἐν* is not true.

To examine the arguments in detail:

Parmenides' objections to μέθεξις (131 a ff.)

'Each thing that comes to partake of a Form receives as its share (partakes of) either the whole Form or a part of it—or could there be any other way of partaking beside these?'

Parmenides presents two alternatives, which appear to exhaust all the possibilities. This is the usual Parmenidean method, which we find repeated in various guises. For example: (1) In his poem he sets up the two alternatives, $\tauὸ\;ōν$ and $\tauὸ\;\muὴ\;ōν$, which appear to be mutually exclusive and to exhaust all the possibilities. This, however, is a method which is not acceptable to Plato. We may take two examples, from different fields, of the way in which Plato corrects it. (a) In the *Republic* (5. 478 c ff.) Plato inserts an intermediate between $\tauὸ\;\muὴ\;ōν$ and $\tauὸ\;ōν\;\epsilonἰλεκτρῶν$ (which here is a generic description for the Forms), viz. the particular objects apprehended by the senses, which 'roll about' between the two extremes. (b) In the *Sophist*, $\tauὸ\;ōν$ and $\tauὸ\;\muὴ\;ōν$ are first introduced as two opposed and mutually exclusive and irreconcilable extremes. The Eleatic Visitor overthrows this rigid duality by drawing attention to a third possibility, viz. $\thetaάτερον$. (2) Similarly, in the Second Part of the *Parmenides* we find that Parmenides assumes that there are two, and only two, possible interpretations of the first hypothesis ($\epsilonὶ\;\epsilonὶ\;\epsilonօτων$), neither of which turns out to be satisfactory. His first set of arguments begins from a bare One, ignoring the ingredient 'Being', and shows that nothing whatever can be asserted about this One; his second set begins by treating the two ingredients as separable, One and Being, and deduces from this assumption that everything can be asserted of the One, including *inter alia* an indefinite plurality. (Incidentally, the condemnation in the *Philebus* (17 a) of those who pass from the One straight on to an indefinite plurality may be intended to glance at this sort of procedure.) Plato's treatment of the situation in the *Parmenides* differs from that in the *Republic* and *Sophist* in that he does not give any explicit indication of a solution. But if we bear in mind the nature of Parmenides' usual gambits, and also Plato's usual method of dealing with such arguments, the answer is clear. Both sets of Parmenides' deductions turn out to be unsatisfactory: this suggests the negative conclusion that neither of the two lines followed by him is correct. The positive conclusion implied is that 'Being-One' is an indivisible entity, analysable only in words and thought but not in fact; that the $\epsilonὶ$ cannot be isolated from the $\epsilonօτων$ and argued from separately, nor can the 'Being-One' be broken down into two separate ingredients, One and Being, so as to enable Parmenides to treat each of them as an independent entity. In all these cases Parmenides (or the Parmenidean view) is wrong from the very start. In the *Sophist* (242 c-243 b) the Eleatic Visitor points out that the Eleatics, like the other philosophers who 'tell us their stories', plunge straight *in medias res* without explaining first of all what their terms mean. Hence the E.V. has to investigate what they mean. Parmenides' success, so long as it lasts and for what it is worth, is due to his getting away to a good start by omitting to substantiate his initial assumption and to explain his terms; and so it is in the present case. The two alternative ways of 'partaking' which he presents for Socrates' acceptance are based on the assumption that language appropriate to physical objects can also be applied to a Form. The fact that Socrates allows this assumption to pass (he is insufficiently trained in logic) does not make Parmenides' argument any less irrelevant and invalid.

We may also notice that Socrates' attempt to preserve the unity of the Form by comparing it to the day or daylight which is in many places at the same time is at once discarded by Parmenides in favour of a much more concrete and materialistic comparison, viz. that of a sailcloth.

Parmenides' method of criticism here, then, is first to assume (wrongly) that $\muέθεξις$ justifies him in applying physical language such as 'part' and 'whole' to Forms as well, and then to deduce a pair of incompatible conclusions, both of which are impossible: (1) if the whole Form is in each particular, then the Form will be separate from itself; (2) if only a part of the Form is in each particular, then the unity of the Form is destroyed.

The coda which Parmenides adds (131 c-e) is simply an elaboration of the second alternative to the point of absurdity. Can X be large in virtue of a part only of the Form Large—which part is of course smaller than the whole Form Large? Can X be equal to Y or Z by having only a small part of the Form Equal in it? The Form Small will be larger than any portion of it which a particular contains, so the Form Small will be larger, yet any particular to which the detached portion is added will be smaller, not larger, than it was before. All this depends on the same false assumption, that physical language can be applied to Forms as well as to particulars, and thus that both are on one level.

Another way of describing the objection which Parmenides raises here is to say that Parmenides illegitimately treats the Form Large as being itself a large thing. This of course is true enough. But it is more significant to use the alternative description I have suggested (that Parmenides uses the same sort of language about Forms and particulars) because in this way we can follow more clearly what his policy is and see to how great an extent he is concerned merely with *words*. The stages in this part of his argument are these: (1) Socrates says particulars 'partake of' Forms. (2) Parmenides takes this as justifying his use generally of physical language in respect of Forms ('whole' and 'part', as in Argument (a) 1 above) as well as in respect of particulars. (3) In the coda (Argument (a) 2) he takes a special case of participation, viz. $\muέγεθος$, thereby making his transition to (4) the 'Third man' argument (Argument (a) 3 above), in which he takes advantage of the fact that Socrates himself uses the same word $\muέγα$ of Forms and of particulars, in order to assume that the meaning of the word is identical in all respects in both cases. Later (5) Parmenides similarly assumes that the word $\deltaύον$, which he succeeds in applying to both Forms and particulars, bears an identical meaning in both cases (Argument (c) 1).

This method of argument, whose basis is so largely verbalistic, is foreign to Plato's outlook. The circumstance that both Forms and particulars have the same word $\muέγα$ applied to them in common is a sufficient reason to Parmenides for going on to argue that therefore there must be yet another 'Form' beyond them; but it is not a sufficient reason to Plato for doing so. Plato is concerned with facts, not merely with words. Indeed, the problem with which the Eleatic Visitor in the *Sophist* has to deal is precisely the problem of deceptive verbal terms, and with people who claim to deduce facts from words. From the Parmenidean view that 'What can be thought can be' it is easy to pass on to 'What can be thought must be' and then to 'What can be stated can—and must—be.' Words come to be considered as possessing some intrinsic validity of their own, and as being a correct and reliable index to 'things', so that facts

can be actually deduced from them.¹ Plato no less than Parmenides believed that only those things which can be apprehended by thought can have 'being' in the fullest sense ('Only that which can be thought can be'); but—apart from their differences about what is meant by 'being' in its fullest sense—in Plato's view not everything that can be thought can be, nor can words be taken as a reliable guide to what is; and it is the art of the dialectical philosopher to distinguish correct verbal 'images' from misleading ones. It was clearly Plato's conviction that the Eleatics were especially liable to the danger of being led away consciously or unconsciously by mere words, and he is at great pains to expose this danger. Later in this article I shall deal with this point more fully; but it is important even in the First Part to realize the danger of arguments based on verbal plausibility, for the arguments which Parmenides uses here are of this character.

The 'Third man' objection (131 e ff.)

We notice that Parmenides says (as Professor Cornford remarks, op. cit., p. 84 n., it is almost a verbatim quotation from *Phaedo* 102 b) that particulars 'come to partake of the Forms and thereby are called after their names'. This in itself is a fair statement of the doctrine, although Socrates has not so far stated it in this way in the *Parmenides*. But not only do the particulars take the names of the Forms; to some extent they also partake of their nature. As Professor Cornford says again (p. 76), in using this sort of language 'Plato seems to be speaking not of the analysis of a statement, but of the corresponding fact.' This is where Plato and Parmenides differ. Parmenides is not really concerned with 'fact'. In the 'Third man' argument he states the case in this way (132 a): 'I imagine your belief in one Form in each case arises from some such consideration as this: when there appear to you to be a number of large things, then maybe there appears to you, as you look at them all, to be one *lóea* which is the same; and as a result you hold that the Large is one.' Then, Parmenides goes on to say, 'When you look at *avtò τὸ μέγα* and *τόλλα τὰ μεγάλα*, does not another *ἐν τι μέγα* appear?' Here he is deliberately suggesting that the *word μέγα*, which occurs in the description of the Form as well as in that of the particular, means the same in the two cases, and that therefore on Socrates' principles another 'Form' beyond them is required. Here again we see Parmenides using the same language of Forms and particulars and failing to allow for any difference in the way in which the same word is applied. In Socrates' view, *avtò τὸ μέγα* is that in virtue of which *τὰ τόλλα μεγάλα* are able to be *μεγάλα*. And this is not a property which belongs to the *τόλλα*. Parmenides has assumed that the application of the same *word* to both sets carries with it all the same characteristics indiscriminately. Another point of difference, to which Socrates has clearly drawn attention, is that the *τόλλα μεγάλα* can become *μεγάλα* and cease to be *μεγάλα*; and he has said he would begin to be surprised if anyone could show that Forms as well as particulars are subject to

¹ Examples of this (as we shall see below) are (1) in the *Sophist* Plato shows how the phrase *τὸ μὴ ὄν* is taken to indicate that no 'thing' whatever is referred to; and the E.V. demonstrates that this phrase is incomplete and therefore deceptive as a verbal term; (2) in the second part of the *Parm.* Parmenides analyses a complex *λόγος* such as *τὸ ἐν*

ὄν (arising from the hypothesis *εἰ ἐν ἔστω*) into two components, which though separable in thought and word are not separable in fact; (3) at *Parm.* 164 b Parmenides says 'If it were not true that the Others are others, we should not be talking about "the Others"' (this passage will be dealt with more fully below, in Section IV(b)).

such fluctuation. Here Parmenides, by lumping together Forms and particulars indiscriminately, has blandly implied that the Forms are subject to this sort of fluctuation.

The Form as νόημα ἐγγιγνόμενον ἐν ψυχαῖς (132 b ff.)

What is the purpose of this new suggestion? Socrates is now attempting to state his case in terms which will prevent Parmenides from being able to treat the Form as merely another physical object capable of division, etc. Parmenides has been arguing that *μέθεξις* implies that the Forms are physically 'in' τὰ πολλὰ μεγάλα etc. (ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἴναι, ἐν πολλοῖς ἐνεῖναι, 131 a, b). Socrates now attempts to avoid the awkward 'results' of this situation by suggesting that the Form is not 'in' physical things but only 'in' souls—or rather, that it 'comes to be in' souls (*ἐγγίγνεσθαι*). The terms of his statement are these: If the Form is a *νόημα*, it is not appropriate for it *ἐγγίγνεσθαι* anywhere except 'in souls', and so we can save its unity. The natural meaning of this statement in the mouth of Socrates is that the Form is a supra-physical entity apprehensible by thought, which 'comes to be present in' souls in that sense; and in any case Socrates clearly intends to make souls an integral factor in his new proposal. If he thus means that the Form is an object of thought, apprehended by souls, he is merely stating a regular piece of the doctrine of Forms, in which doctrine the soul is an important factor. Indeed, the soul is the key-stone of the doctrine, for the doctrine exists expressly to provide for the fact that the soul, acting by itself, can apprehend certain things which appear in some way to be common to many objects on the physical plane; and unless there had been this need to posit some *one* entity, unifying the many physical objects in each case, yet apprehensible only by the *soul*, there would have been no need for the doctrine at all. To that extent, the Form and the soul mutually involve each other, though neither is dependent on the other for its existence. If we consider this, and if we bear in mind that Socrates' purpose is to offer an alternative way of expressing his view which will not be open to the exclusively physical interpretation placed by Parmenides upon *μέθεξις*, then Socrates' statement that a Form cannot properly *ἐγγίγνεσθαι* elsewhere than 'in souls' is entirely justified from the point of view of orthodox Form doctrine. We, perhaps, may think that it deals with only one aspect of that doctrine, viz. the relationship between Forms and souls, ignoring the relationship between Forms and particulars; but is it clear that Plato believed there was any direct relationship between Forms and particulars, i.e. a relationship from which the soul or souls could be excluded? Again, we perhaps may think that the use of the term *ἐγγίγνεσθαι* comes unduly near to suggesting that the Form is *inside* the souls; but Socrates clearly does not mean to imply any physical presence: the whole purpose of his proposal here is expressly to exclude this. It has also been supposed by some scholars that Socrates' description of the Form as a *νόημα ἐγγιγνόμενον ἐν ψυχαῖς* involves the dependence of the Form on the souls for its existence; but this supposition is quite gratuitous, and arises from a misinterpretation of *νόημα*, which we shall examine in a moment. It would also involve the fixing of a minimum number of souls which must be thinking of the Form at any moment in order to make its existence possible. But, furthermore, there is no evidence whatsoever that either Socrates or Plato ever considered Forms to be dependent on souls for their existence.

Socrates' statement, then, will not mean, as Cornford translates it, that each

Form 'cannot properly exist anywhere but in a mind' (*sic*),¹ or, in other words, as he goes on to say, that the Form depends upon a mind (for 'a mind' we should of course substitute 'minds' or 'souls') for its existence. It is true that Parmenides, in his remarks which immediately follow, takes *vόημα* to mean 'an act of thinking'; and Cornford and others assume that therefore this is what Socrates means by it. But this is impossible. It could, perhaps, be dismissed as irrelevant that in no other passage of Plato is there any suggestion that either he or Socrates believed Forms to be acts of thinking. But quite apart from that, such a meaning simply will not fit Socrates' statement here. Socrates cannot possibly mean by *vόημα* 'an act of thinking' originating in a soul, for then there would have to be as many acts of thinking in the case of each Form as there are souls thinking of it at any time, and the Form's unity will be lost. Socrates' purpose in putting forward this proposal at all is to save the unity of the Form; and he could not possibly have presented Parmenides with so easy a target as this obvious multiplication of the Form would have been. The fact that Parmenides understands *vόημα* as 'an act of thinking' cannot retrospectively commit Socrates; and even Parmenides, although Plato makes him misunderstand the term, does not attempt to pretend that Socrates means anything so obviously stupid as a multiplication of this sort.

We may take it, then, that Socrates' purpose in putting forward this proposal is to maintain that the Form is an object of thought, that it is indeed 'present to', 'comes to be located in', many things, but that these many things are souls and not physical objects; that the Form itself, therefore, is not a physical object, and that he can escape from being forced into admitting that it is divided up on that account.

What does Parmenides make of Socrates' suggestion? It would not naturally occur to him that by describing the Form as a *vόημα* Socrates intends a supra-physical entity apprehended by thought, for such entities do not come into Parmenides' purview. Besides, Parmenides was, in his own way, quite a specialist on the subject of *vοεῖν* and *vοήματα*, and knew very well what he meant by those terms. For example: *ταῦτὸν δ' ἔστιν νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐκέτε ἔστιν νόημα* (fr. 8. 34). He naturally assumes that by *vόημα* Socrates means the same as he means himself, viz. a thought, an act of thinking *by which* some real object is apprehended—not the object itself, for to Parmenides the object must be physical, and the thought is *of* the object. Any other meaning of *vόημα* would be quite foreign to Parmenides' whole outlook. Indeed, he completely misunderstands what Socrates is trying to say, as we see from his reply; but he hears Socrates use the words *vόημα* and *ἐν*, and this gives him a cue. His words echo, but do not accurately reproduce, those which Socrates has just used. Socrates had said: *οὐτω γάρ ἀν ἐν γε ἔκαστον εἴη . . .* 'In this way [sc. if it is a *vόημα*] each [sc. Form] will be one. . . .' Parmenides says: *τι οὖν; ἐν ἔκαστον ἔστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός;* 'Right, then: if each of the *vοήματα* is *one*, can it be a *vόημα* of *no one* thing (of nothing)?' Socrates, however, has not been attempting to argue that 'each *vόημα* is one', but has said that *if* we consider each Form to be a *vόημα*, then the Form can still be one and escape division. At the same time, Parmenides' words 'If each of the *vοήματα* is one'

¹ It is quite unjustifiable to replace Socrates' words *ἐν ψυχαῖς* by 'in a mind', with the possibility of inferring that only one mind (?) that of the Demiurge of the

Timaeus) is intended. This error is bound up with the assumption that Socrates means by *vόημα* what Parmenides takes it to mean.

are not such as to call obviously for rejection by Socrates; although they are really beside the point, it might appear unreasonable, and even pedantic, to Socrates to quarrel with them. Besides, they seem at first hearing to indicate that Parmenides has accepted Socrates' point that the unity of the Form can be maintained. But, above all, Parmenides gives Socrates no opportunity to object to them; he goes on immediately to ask him whether a *vόημα* which is *ἐν* can be a *vόημα* of *οὐδέν*—a question which seems so obviously to call for the answer 'No' that Socrates gives it. It would require a much more experienced logician than the young Socrates—one who has had a good deal more 'gymnastic training' in logic—to deal satisfactorily with this apparently simple-minded question of Parmenides. For what answer ought Socrates to have given? Something on these lines: (a) My main point was not that each *vόημα* is one, but that each Form, *if it is a vόημα ἐγγινόμενον ἐν ψυχαῖς*, need not be divisible, and can therefore still be one; (b) by *vόημα* I meant 'something thought' in the sense of an object apprehended by thought, and not the process of thought which apprehends it; therefore the *vόημα* is not of anything; therefore your question whether a *vόημα* which is *ἐν* can be a *vόημα* of *οὐδέν* does not arise; (c) in any case, a Form cannot be of anything beyond itself; *αὐτὸν τὸ μέγα* is not of something further, but is itself ultimate; (d) will you please tell me what you mean by saying that each act of thinking is 'one'? How could it be 'two' or 'three'? But as soon as Parmenides has got the answer he expects, he can go straight ahead on his accustomed lines: The one *vόημα* is the *vόημα* of some one thing, and this one thing of course can be none other than the one *ἰδέα*, the one *εἴδος ἐπὶ πάσοις* (*not*, we should notice, *ἐγγινόμενον ἐν ψυχαῖς* as Socrates had said) which he was dealing with before. Souls are eliminated, Socrates' attempt to link the Forms with them and thereby to safeguard their supra-physical character is by-passed, and we are back at Parmenides' old notion of the Form as a physical object of thought, which is open to the same criticism as before.

It seems clear that in this passage Plato deliberately makes Socrates introduce a feature which is inherent in the doctrine of Forms, viz. that souls are an essential factor in the relationship between Forms and particulars. The close connexion between souls and Forms is plain enough in Socrates' words, and therefore Parmenides is not justified at this point in eliminating souls from the discussion, in order to reduce the problem to the more manageable terms of a direct relationship between particulars and Forms. In any case, Socrates appears to be putting forward the suggestion that the Form is a *vόημα* 'in souls' as an *alternative* to *μέθεξις*, and certainly as an alternative to *μέθεξις* as Parmenides has just interpreted it, viz. as the presence of Forms either as whole or as parts 'in particulars'. It therefore seems that Parmenides is unfair in going on, as he does in the coda which follows, to make a further criticism of the *μέθεξις* explanation in which he takes Forms as equivalent to *vόηματα*.

But apart from that: supposing Parmenides were justified in combining the *vόημα* theory and the *μέθεξις* theory in this way, is his criticism fair or even relevant? His criticism is as follows:

132 c 9. Particulars, according to Socrates, partake of the Forms. Socrates now says the Forms are *vόηματα*. In this case, then either (a) each particular will consist of *vόηματα*, and so all particulars will think; or (b) although they are *vόηματα*, they will be thoughtless (will not think).

Parmenides presents his deduction in two different forms of words: (a) a particular will consist of *vō̄mata*; (b) the particulars will be *vō̄mata*. The second of these is of course literally an exact parallel to Socrates' own way of stating his theory, e.g. 'A large object, because it partakes of the Large, is large'; but the two descriptions, *μέγα* and *νόημα*, are not in *pari materia*. Parmenides, relying on verbal plausibility, treats them as if they were. His argument is merely verbal, and it is this: 'You, Socrates, say that any particular which partakes of the Form *μέγα* is for that reason *μέγα*. You now say the Form is a *νόημα*. Therefore on your own showing any particular which partakes of the Form must be a *νόημα*.' The argument is fallacious, whichever interpretation of Socrates' *νόημα* we adopt. Again, Parmenides' claim that the particular will consist of *vō̄mata* is unjustified, independently of our interpretation of *νόημα*. There is no reason on Socrates' theory why participation in a Form *X* should result in the particular consisting of *X*; a particular which partakes of 'the Large' does not for that reason consist of the Large or Largeness.

But if, as I have argued, Socrates intended *νόημα* to mean an object of thought, apprehended by souls, then we can go farther. This description of the Form can obviously be intended by him to cover only one *πάθος* (though a very important *πάθος*) of the Form, viz. that character in virtue of which the Form is apprehensible by souls and which distinguishes it from other classes of objects, e.g. those which are apprehensible by the bodily senses. There is no reason why participation in such an entity should cause any particular to be or to consist of a *νόημα* or *vō̄mata*. It would be equally illegitimate to argue that because a particular partook of a Form which was non-temporal and non-spatial, therefore the particular must *ipso facto* be non-temporal and non-spatial itself. It is not every character of the Form which is transmitted to the particular in participation, but only the character denoted by the *αὐτὸν τὸ . . .* in each case;¹ and even then the particular is not caused to be or to consist of that character. Parmenides is deliberately taking the 'be' for which *μετέχειν* stands as representing an assertion of identity.

If, out of reverence for Parmenides, we hesitate to accuse him of verbal sophistry, we may put our comments into more dignified form and say that this argument of his is fundamentally of the same type as that which he has used earlier in the dialogue: it assumes that all characters without discrimination are interchangeable as between Forms and particulars. In the case of *μέθεξις* Parmenides assumed that the physical character of divisibility, which properly belongs to the particular, belonged also to the Form. Here now he assumes that the character of being a *νόημα*, which belongs properly to the Form, can and does belong also to the particular. We shall find him behaving in a similar way when he criticizes Socrates' theory that the particulars imitate the Forms. Parmenides' attitude shows the same pattern throughout: he will not deal with two levels at once, but either treats everything as being on one level, or else assumes that, if there are two levels, then there is no connexion between them.

I do not think that we should take this coda as too seriously intended by Plato. Parmenides has already completed his serious criticism of the *νόημata*-theory as he understands it, and has shown that it does not allow Socrates to

¹ This statement needs modification, as will be seen later (in Section II); but it is sufficiently exact in the present context.

save the unity of the Form after all. He now goes back to the equation 'Form equals *vόνημα*' (although he has just shown that the Form is not the *vόνημα* but the object apprehended by the *vόνημα*); but if his former 'refutation' was valid, this equation can no longer stand. But it provides him with the opportunity of having another hit at the *μέθεξις* doctrine, and of propounding the fantastic dilemma that either all particulars will think or there will be thoughts which do not think. It is too good an opportunity for him to be allowed to miss; and perhaps Plato is here quoting an objection raised by some opponent. Such an ebullition is hardly the appropriate occasion for gravely observing that 'Plato's Parmenides repudiates the doctrine which some critics ascribe to the real Parmenides, that "to think is the same thing as to be"' (Cornford, op. cit., p. 92); nevertheless, although, as I believe, this outburst is mainly intended by way of banter, Plato has made it exhibit the same features as we find in Parmenides' other criticisms—first and foremost, Parmenides opposes the *μέθεξις* theory; secondly, he confuses disparate types of attribution; and thirdly, as in the Second Part of the dialogue, he deduces two incompatible conclusions, both of which are absurd, from one and the same premiss.

The Forms as παραδείγματα ἐν τῇ φύσει (132 d 1)

Socrates at once passes on to make another suggestion, which is the well-known theory that the Forms are patterns subsisting *ἐν τῇ φύσει*, which the particulars resemble, and of which they are likenesses. This *εἰκασθῆναι*, he says, he now wishes to substitute for *μέθεξις*. Clearly, he hopes that by this means he will surely be able to save the unity of the Form.

Parmenides' argument here is again verbal. If the particular is 'like' the Form, then the Form must be 'like' the particular. What is *ὅμοιον* must be *ὅμοια ὅμοιον*. In the *Sophist* (259 c, d) the Eleatic Visitor condemns those who 'demonstrate ἀμή γέ τη that the same is other and the other is the same and that the great is small and the like is unlike'; such people, he says, must be forced to specify the *precise respect* in which these terms are applied. The same method is stigmatized in *Republic* 5. 454 a, b as characteristic of Antilogic. In the present passage Parmenides is using a similar method when he maintains, or rather assumes, that what is 'like' in some one respect is 'like' in any other respect he cares to choose, whether intended by Socrates or not. As a matter of fact, Socrates has made it clear at the start that the relationship of likeness was a one-way, not a two-way, relationship: the particulars resemble (*ἐοικέναι*) the Forms in virtue of being *ὅμοιάματα* of them, *εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς*. He does not intend to imply that the Forms are *ὅμοιάματα* of the particulars or that they have been fashioned after the pattern of the particulars. By simplifying this careful description into the single and ambiguous word *ὅμοιον*, Parmenides is guilty of deliberate confusion. In this way by a verbal trick he makes it appear that the relationship is mutually and identically reciprocal, and thereby succeeds in getting Forms and particulars on to one and the same level. He can then go on to argue that, since they are both *ὅμοιον*, they must both 'partake of' some third thing, which will be none other than Socrates' old *αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος*; and if they are 'like' this, then we shall need an infinite series of 'Forms', and so the Form's unity will vanish.

There is no need to spend more time in examining this argument; its fallaciousness has been sufficiently pointed out by commentators and indeed is obvious enough. We should, however, note that it shows the same features as

the other arguments: the same determination to use identical language about Forms and particulars, the same concentration on words, the same line of attack by way of $\mu\acute{e}\theta\epsilon\xi\varsigma$.

On the objections so far examined Professor Cornford remarks (p. 95): 'The reader is left to discover the answers to Parmenides' objections. . . . It is naive to conclude that Plato himself regarded the objections as seriously damaging his theory, although the nature of participation is undoubtedly obscure and hard for our imaginations to conceive.' (1) With the first remark no one can quarrel. (2) With regard to the 'damaging' effect of Parmenides' objections, we have seen reason for thinking that Plato's purpose in retailing them is to expose the total inadequacy of Parmenides' methods to come to grips with the theory of Forms. (3) As for the nature of participation, we have been given a strong hint that it cannot be understood if we regard it as a direct relationship between Forms and particulars, because the soul is an essential factor: the soul, as we know, can apprehend things on both levels: it can see that there must be some connexion between the two levels, however that connexion is expressed in words; it can rise up from particulars to Forms, and it can itself produce particulars which exhibit a connexion with the Forms. That is the only 'obscurity' about the matter; and it is fundamentally the same obscurity which still exists with regard to the relation of the physical to the non-physical. We are not to expect that Plato will ever produce an 'explanation' of the relationship between Forms and particulars. He cannot *prove* that there is a connexion; what he is doing here is to make plain to us the contrast between two attitudes—his own, which is the conviction that there *is* a connexion, and Parmenides', which is the conviction that there *is not* a connexion between the universe as discerned by thought and the universe as shown to us by our senses; and for this reason he makes Parmenides persistently attack $\mu\acute{e}\theta\epsilon\xi\varsigma$, for $\mu\acute{e}\theta\epsilon\xi\varsigma$ is perhaps the most challenging way of asserting the connexion.

The Forms cannot be known by us (133 a ff.)

The fallacies involved in this argument have been pointed out by others, and I need not refer to them here. We should, however, notice, as I mentioned earlier, that in this argument Parmenides bases himself on the first part only of Socrates' thesis, viz. that the Forms are *a\acute{v}r\acute{a} kai\acute{v}r\acute{a} a\acute{v}r\acute{a}*, and insists on the most extreme interpretation of that phrase, allowing no modification, precisely as he insisted on the most extreme interpretation of $\mu\acute{e}\theta\epsilon\xi\varsigma$ in the three preceding arguments. Here he maintains that the two sets of things (a) Forms and (b) the particulars 'in our world', including ourselves, are completely separate and isolated from each other; there is no sort of connexion between them. Hence, 'we cannot know the Forms' (134 b). Professor Cornford remarks that 'the assumption that if there is a sharp line between the two worlds "we" are confined to the hither side of it' is a 'weak point' in Parmenides' argument, because 'as the *Phaedo* argued, our souls are more akin to the unseen and intelligible. . . . Thus souls are an intermediate order of existents, having a foot in both worlds and capable of knowing both. . . . The doctrine of *Anamnesis* . . . expressly contradicts Parmenides' suggestion that the separation of Forms cuts them off from our knowledge' (p. 99). Precisely; but *Anamnesis* was Plato's doctrine, not Parmenides'. The sharp cleavage is not a 'weak point' for Parmenides; it is the keystone of his whole outlook and his whole method of argument. He takes one part of an hypothesis at a time and shows

that the other part of it is untenable; he will not allow both parts to come into the picture at the same time. We noticed earlier how adroitly Parmenides ignored Socrates' reference to souls in the *vόνημα* passage. He knows that souls do not suit his book at all—at least, not Platonic ones, because their function is to link together the two sides of the hypothesis, the physical things perceived by our senses and the supra-physical Forms apprehended by *λογισμός*.

I remarked earlier (p. 131) that Parmenides' success in argument is due to his getting away to a good start, i.e. by getting his opponent to agree to his first step without investigation. This is illustrated in a remarkable way by the four arguments with Socrates in the first part of the dialogue. In each of these Socrates gives his case away in his very first answer, by replying to Parmenides' leading question in the way Parmenides intends him to reply. In the following summary I use the same letters as before (p. 130) to denote the four arguments.

- (a) *P. Whole or part—can there be any other way of partaking?*—S. *No*. Here Socrates ought not to have allowed Parmenides to put the question in such a way as to imply that the same language suits both Forms and particulars.
- (b) *P. Can a vόνημα which is one be a vόνημα of not-one (nothing)?*—S. *No*. Here Socrates should have pointed out that Parmenides had misunderstood *vόνημα*. I have discussed this fully above. He should also not have allowed Parmenides to eliminate souls from the discussion.
- (c) *P. If a thing is like, must it not be like something that is like it?*—S. *It must*. Here Socrates should not have allowed Parmenides to get away with the ambiguity of *ὅμοιον*.
- (d) *P. If each Form is on its own by itself, can any of them be ἐν ἡμῖν?*—S. *No*; otherwise it could not be on its own by itself. Socrates should have pointed out that such a clear-cut separation was not what he intended.

All four of these opening questions are 'leading' and specious questions, to which at first hearing there appears to be only one possible answer—the one which Parmenides expects—and gets.

We shall find exactly the same method used by Parmenides in the Second Part of the dialogue. Professor Cornford (pp. 109–14 *et passim*) expresses surprise that Plato does not explicitly define at the beginning of each Examination the sense in which the terms are being used, but leaves it to become apparent as the argument proceeds. Cornford also complains that we find Plato representing inferences as 'necessary' which are not necessary or obligatory but merely possible. Such comments betray a complete misunderstanding of what Plato is doing. It is not Plato's method at all that we see here, but Parmenides', and it is all of a piece with the method which Parmenides has been employing in the First Part of the dialogue. There, without any indication to Socrates, Parmenides gets him to accept some partial or inadequate or even incorrect interpretation of the hypothesis which is ostensibly being examined, and then the rest follows. In the Second Part Parmenides is more open about his method, but the method itself is the same. That Plato could put forward this method of argument as his own is so completely out of keeping with all we know of him that one can only express bewilderment that any serious student of Plato has ever committed himself to such a belief.

Bound up with this procedure of Plato's is another interesting feature, which seems to have been overlooked or not fully understood. As I pointed out in

my article 'Plato and the *μέγιστα γένη* of the *Sophist*',¹ at the beginning of the discussion in that dialogue the Eleatic Visitor stipulates that if he is to carry on the argument with someone else, and not to give a solo performance, he wants an interlocutor 'who will not make a nuisance of himself and will be obedient to the rein' (217 d). Socrates replies on behalf of them all, that whoever is chosen to give the replies will give them meekly. At the beginning of his demonstration in the *Parmenides*, Parmenides suggests that the youngest of those present should act as interlocutor with him, on the ground that such a person *τηκιστα ἀν πολυπραγμονοῦ* (137 b). Similarly, in the First Part of the *Parmenides*, Socrates is represented as a young man who is sadly lacking in rigorous logical training. In all these three cases some interlocutor is required who will not detect the sharp practice in argument of which Plato wishes to give demonstrations, and these demonstrations could not be given if the demonstrator had to contend at every step, and especially at the first step, with a competent and vigilant critic.

In the First Part of the dialogue Plato has deliberately represented Socrates as a young man, inexperienced in defending his own theory against attack, and inexperienced also in expressing it with full precision and with full safeguards. But the whole doctrine of Forms as we know it, and as Plato's readers would know it, is implied by what Socrates says. The Forms are *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*—i.e. they are entities different in nature from particulars; they are apprehended *λογιαμῶ*, not by the senses; souls and Forms are closely akin; particulars partake of the Forms or are copies of them. The passage in which the Form is said to be a *νόημα ἐγγιγνόμενον ἐν ψυχαῖς* is perhaps the most liable to misinterpretation by Parmenides, although, like Socrates' other attempts to explain what his theory is, its purport is clear enough to anyone who knows the fuller formulations of the doctrine elsewhere in Plato's works; and in fact Socrates' other attempts (*μέθεξις*, etc.) are just as much misinterpreted by Parmenides as this one is. On each occasion in the dialogue, Socrates is thrown off his balance by the adroitness of Parmenides' long-practised methods of controvorting opponents, and instead of elucidating his own case he lets himself be sidetracked by Parmenides and plays into his hands.

In my account of the First Part of the dialogue I have tried to show how Parmenides' criticisms of Socrates' position can arise naturally from the views which we independently know Parmenides to have held. Nevertheless, it is impossible to avoid gaining the impression as one reads those criticisms that Parmenides' attitude to Socrates is eristic throughout. He makes no real attempt to help Socrates to elucidate his theory of Forms, but, as we have seen, applies the regular Eleatic technique to Socrates' hypothesis, and indeed uses eristic verbal tricks in order to score off Socrates. This is hardly the proper way for a 'revered' elderly philosopher to behave towards a young man just entering upon philosophy, however wrong-headed he may consider his views to be; and for my own part I cannot discount the possibility that Plato intends to paint Parmenides as the villain of the piece. Nevertheless, there are mitigating considerations. It may well be salutary for a young philosopher to be roughly handled by an experienced one; and at the conclusion of the First Part Parmenides makes some remarks which may be taken as an encouragement to Socrates. Parmenides puts the dilemma: (1) it will be very difficult to convert an unbeliever to belief in the Forms; (2) a persistent unbeliever will have

¹ *C.Q.* vol. ii (N.S.), 1952, p. 41 n.

nothing to fix his mind on unless he admits that there is an *ἰδέα* of each of the *ὄντα*, which remains always the same. We need not assume from this that Parmenides means to commit himself to the doctrine of Forms, or that Plato is here putting a commendation of it into his mouth. It is really a dilemma for the opponent of Socrates, and the dilemma is a useful one for Socrates to use when confronting such an opponent. It is quite in character for Parmenides to point this out to Socrates: he is fond of presenting dilemmas himself. Further, Parmenides emphasizes again the importance of thought (*διάνοια*); and so far as it goes this is an encouragement to Socrates to persevere with his theory. Secondly, Parmenides suggests that Socrates has fallen down in the argument owing to his lack of training, with the hint that such training might enable him to defend his case more successfully.

After some show of resistance, Parmenides is persuaded to undertake a demonstration of what he calls 'this laborious *παιδία*'—the same word that the Eleatic Visitor uses in the *Sophist* (234 a, 235 a) to describe the art of the 'sophist'. The subject of this demonstration is not Socrates' hypothesis, but Parmenides' own original hypothesis, *εἰ ἐν ἔστιν*; and Parmenides examines the consequences both of asserting and of denying the hypothesis both for 'the One' and for 'the Others'. As we have seen, the choice of an interlocutor 'who will not inquire too closely into what is going on' indicates that there is to be some sharp practice in the course of the argument.

THE SECOND PART OF THE DIALOGUE

The upshot of all these stage directions is that we are not to expect in the Second Part of the dialogue an exposition of what Plato believes himself. He has represented Socrates as unable, owing to his youth and inexperience, to deal with the objections brought against him by an experienced controversialist. In the Second Part Parmenides will do on a much larger scale precisely what he has been doing in the First Part. In this way the nature of those objections will be disclosed more clearly, and Socrates will be enabled to see how they must be controverted. Socrates (and we modern readers too) will find it easier to detect what the Parmenidean method is when he sees it done in slow motion and at full (not to say inordinate) length. This does not necessarily imply that there will be no subtle or valuable thought in the Second Part. Parmenides was no ignoramus, nor need we suppose that Plato intends to represent him as such; and here, as in the Eleatic Visitor's argumentation in the central part of the *Sophist*, there is much intricate and close analysis, which in itself is a valuable exercise for the young philosopher, quite apart from whether the premisses are valid or the conclusions true. Plato prefers not to spoon-feed his readers, but by means of the written discussions to lead them indirectly to reflect upon and formulate for themselves the problems involved, and so to arrive at the conclusions he has in mind.

It is sometimes said, as, for example, by Professor Cornford (p. 107), that although in the Second Part of the *Parmenides* 'we should expect to find in the sequel four deductions . . . there are in fact eight'. This point is a valuable one, in that it recognizes that 'the reason is that the Hypothesis is taken in more than one sense'; and it is essential to grasp this at the outset. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to let it mislead us. In the First Part, as we saw, Parmenides

takes each half of Socrates' hypothesis by itself and deals with it separately. He does the same in the Second Part with the hypotheses propounded there; and it is important therefore to keep in mind that the two Examinations in each case are ostensibly examinations of one and the same hypothesis, upon which Parmenides illegitimately places two quite different constructions. In this way he can produce two sets of conclusions which are mutually incompatible. There are, of course, as Sir David Ross points out (*Plato's Theory of Ideas*, p. 92), really only *two* hypotheses, each of which is twice examined for different purposes, once for the consequences to the One, and once for the consequences to the Others; and each of these examinations is twofold. I prefer therefore to speak of eight Examinations rather than of eight Hypotheses.

We shall expect, therefore, generally, that Parmenides will show Socrates that he must not allow his thesis to be divided into two by any Eleatic opponent. Parmenides will show this by exhibiting the incompatible conclusions which follow when his own hypothesis 'If One is' is so divided. In the First Part, by this method of dividing the hypothesis and taking each half singly, Parmenides showed that the Form must either (a) lose its unity (by being cut up into many pieces or by being multiplied), or (b) be entirely separate from particulars and from us and therefore unknowable. Both conclusions are unsatisfactory; and the reason is that they were arrived at by taking each half of Socrates' hypothesis separately. In the Second Part, using the same method, but to some extent explaining what he is doing, Parmenides will concentrate on one half of the Hypothesis at a time.

The scheme is as follows:

First Hyp.	(a) If One is, what about it?	Exams. I and II
	(b) If One is, what about the Others?	Exams. III and IV
Second Hyp.	(a) If One is not, what about it?	Exams. V and VI
	(b) If One is not, what about the Others?	Exams. VII and VIII

In Exam. I Parmenides concentrates on the term $\epsilon\nu$. From this he shows that the One has not parts, is not a whole, has no limits, extension, shape, is nowhere, is not in motion or at rest, is not the same as or different from itself or another, is not like or unlike, equal or unequal, to itself or another, cannot be in time, cannot in any sense 'be', or be named or known.

Here, then, the term $\epsilon\nu$ is given its fullest application.

In Exam. II Parmenides emphasizes the $\epsilon\nu\nu\nu$ to the extent of making it a separate ingredient or part of the One. From this he deduces that the One is a whole having parts (unity and being); each part must have unity and being; hence the One is unlimited in multitude. Yet, as the whole is a container of its parts, the One must be limited; it has extension and shape, can be in itself and in another, is in motion and at rest, is the same as and different from itself and the Others; is like and unlike itself and the Others; has and has not contact with itself and the Others; is equal and unequal to itself and to the Others; exists in time, etc.; has existence and becomes; can be known, named, and spoken of.

(In Exam. II, coda) It comes into being and passes out of being, is combined and separated, becomes like and unlike, grows and wanes. The transition in becoming and change is instantaneous.

In Exam. III Parmenides assumes the Others to be other than the One, yet also to partake of the One. As they are other than the One, they must have

parts; they are parts of a whole—one complete whole—and each part must have unity—it is *one* part. If you take away the unity from either part or whole, you are left with just unlimited multitude. Unity gives them a limit both with regard to one another and the whole: their own nature gives them *άτερπια*, the One gives them *πέρας*; so they have both. Hence they are both like and unlike one another and themselves, same and different, in motion and at rest, etc., etc.

In *Exam. IV* Parmenides assumes that the One is completely separate from the Others, and they from it: they do not partake either as parts or as wholes in Unity. They are not ones, therefore they cannot be many. Therefore not like or unlike, same, different, moving, at rest, coming to be, ceasing to be, greater, less, equal, etc.

In *Exam. V* Parmenides concentrates on the fact that it is *εν* which 'is not', as distinguished from other things which might possibly 'not be'. If we can thus distinguish the *εν* from other things, it must be knowable, and different from them, and have other characteristics; must have unlikeness to the Others and likeness to itself; have inequality to them, and have greatness, smallness, and equality; and in a sense have being; must pass from not-being into being, and not so pass.

(None of this could be argued, of course, unless Parmenides considered *εν* in isolation from *μὴ εστίν*.)

In *Exam. VI* Parmenides takes *μὴ εστίν* in the strictest sense: the One is *not*, without qualification. It cannot come or cease to be, or change; cannot have any characteristics, can have no relation with the Others, cannot be specified as distinct from other things, or be known, named, or spoken of.

In *Exam. VII* Parmenides assumes that the hypothesis means there is *not* any such thing as the One. Hence the Others must be different—not from the One, for there is no One—but different from themselves. They will differ not as ones from ones (*κατὰ εν*) but as multitudes from multitudes (*κατὰ πλήθη*). They each appear to be, but are not really, one; seem to have number, to be great, small, equal, limited, unlimited, one and many, like and unlike, etc.

In *Exam. VIII* Parmenides assumes that the hypothesis means there is no such thing as *Unity*, Oneness. Hence, the Others cannot be one (for there is none), so cannot even appear to be one or many. We cannot imagine them to be one or many, or like or unlike, same or different; in contact or apart, etc. If there is no One, there is nothing at all.

The following short summary of the interpretations adopted by Parmenides in Each examination will be convenient for comparison with the tabulation of the results of the Examinations which I append to it.

In *Exam. I* Parmenides concentrates exclusively on the term *εν*, ignoring the *εστίν*.

In *Exam. II* he emphasizes the *εστίν* to the extent of making it a separate ingredient, a 'part' alongside the *εν*, of which the *εν* 'partakes'.

In *Exam. III* the One has 'parts' as in *II*; the Others are not wholly cut off from the One, but 'partake' of it.

In *Exam. IV* the One has no 'parts'; the Others are completely cut off from the One, and do not 'partake' of it.

In *Exam. V* Parmenides again (as in *I*) concentrates on the *εν*.

In *Exam. VI* he concentrates on the *μὴ εστίν*, and takes this in the strictest sense.

In

Im

E

E

E

E

E

E

E

E

E

The

not

VII

other

them

Al

μετέ

κοννο

of μ

theses

as it

the

dia

to u

It

Par

does

and

those

of p

the

subj

γένη

‘are

A
among
in the
to μετέ
classifi
be se
discus

In *Exam. VII* Parmenides again emphasizes the $\mu\eta\ \xi\sigma\tau\iota\tau$. There is not any One, (a) than which, if it were, the Others would be other, while yet (b) they would partake of it as in III. (Note the preparation for this in III, where Parmenides speaks of mentally abstracting the Oneness from the Others.)

In *Exam. VIII* Parmenides emphasizes the $\epsilon\nu$. There is no *One*; hence the Others cannot be one or many or be at all.

The following are the results deduced from each Examination.

Exam. I. No $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ for the One. It cannot even be.

Exam. II. Universal $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ for the One.

Exam. III. The Others partake in a way of the One—hence universal $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ for them.

Exam. IV. The Others partake in no way whatsoever of the One—hence no $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ for them.

Exam. V. Universal $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ for the One. It must even be.

Exam. VI. No $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ for the One.

Exam. VII. <The Others appear to have universal $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$.>

Exam. VIII. The Others have no $\kappa\omega\pi\alpha$ whatsoever. They cannot even be.

The last two Examinations are the only ones in which the term $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ does not occur. Its equivalent, $\kappa\omega\pi\alpha$, occurs in *Exam. VIII*. Its absence from VII is not unnatural, since here the Others are not other than the *One*, but other than each other, and Parmenides does not assert any actual $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ about them.

Although it is commonly ignored, the very frequent occurrence of the term $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ (and also the occurrence of $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\iota\tau$, $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\iota\tau$, $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\iota\tau$, and $\kappa\omega\pi\alpha$) in the Second Part cannot be accidental, in view of the importance of $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ in the First Part of the dialogue. It is, of course, difficult to preserve these terms in a translation, because the idiom is not a natural one in English as it is in Greek; but, as any translator of dialogues such as the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* must know, most of the problems and difficulties dealt with in these dialogues turn upon the way in which Greek terms are used, and it is impossible to understand what Plato is doing if these terms are disguised in a translation.

It is, of course, equally important to realize that in the Second Part of the *Parmenides*, as in the discussion about the $\mu\acute{e}\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\ \gamma\acute{e}\nu\eta$ in the *Sophist*, $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ does not carry its normal Platonic meaning. For Plato, $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ has a special and precise use, viz. to describe the relationship of particulars to a Form in those cases where some common attribute can be truly predicated of a number of particulars (e.g. Socrates is just, Theodorus is just, etc.). In these parts of the *Parmenides* and *Sophist* Plato is dealing with a use of $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$ where the subjects of the verb are not particulars but are what are called in the *Sophist* $\gamma\acute{e}\nu\eta$.¹ These $\gamma\acute{e}\nu\eta$ are also the objects of the verb; thus $\gamma\acute{e}\nu\eta$ both 'partake' and 'are partaken of'.

¹ Although 'the One' does not appear among the $\gamma\acute{e}\nu\eta$ in the *Sophist*, its treatment in the *Parmenides* (particularly with regard to $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$) is similar enough to justify its classification generally with the $\gamma\acute{e}\nu\eta$, as will be seen. Its status in the *Parmenides* will be discussed below. The position in the *Par-*

menides is more complicated in that all the discussions start from a statement in hypothetical form, and that Plato does not offer any direct conclusion (the Second Part is $\pi\alpha\mu\acute{a}$).—In the *Parmenides* 'the Others' also can be the subject of the verb $\mu\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\kappa\iota\tau$.

There is no *a priori* reason for assuming that Plato himself believed in this very different sort of *μέθεξις*, simply on the ground that we find the same verb *μετέχειν* used. Indeed, a study of the *Sophist* makes it abundantly clear that he did not.¹ In the *Sophist* he shows explicitly that the *γένος* 'θάτερον' is not a true Form because it does not represent a common attribution; and the whole discussion there makes it clear that this disqualification must apply also to *ταῦτά* and to *οὐδία* (*τὸ δὲ*). It follows that if these *γένη* are not true Forms there can be no such thing as (Platonic) *μέθεξις* of them: the (sophistic) assumption that there is *μέθεξις* of them is based on the erroneous belief that because the same word (e.g. *θάτερον*) occurs in numerous predicates, therefore 'θάτερον' is a common attribution. It also follows that the use of such *γένη* as subjects of the verb *μετέχειν* is equally invalid.

What Plato is here attacking is the error of erecting *γένη* or Forms, and of founding consequent claims for *μέθεξις*, on mere verbal usage. In Plato's view, verbal usage can sometimes, but not always, give us a correct clue to the situation; and it is the true philosopher's business to see where verbal usage justifies the setting up of a Form and where it does not; in other words (to quote the *Sophist*) to make sure that one's terms are *eikônes* (faithful verbal images of 'things') and not *φαντάσματα* (deceptive verbal images). In the *Parmenides* (e.g. 132 a) Socrates subscribes to the view that where we find a common attribution there we may posit a Form. For instance, we say 'A is large', 'B is large', etc., and this justifies us in positing a Form known as 'the Large', of which *A*, *B*, etc., partake. The name 'the Large' (*τὸ μέγα*) is a correct and faithful verbal image (*eikônos*) of a 'thing' (*πρᾶγμα*). But this principle can be applied unintelligently and illegitimately; and in the *Sophist* and in the *Parmenides* we find Plato dealing with 'deceptive verbal images'. These verbal images are deceptive because they are based on incomplete phrases, which if completed would show at once that there is no common attribution; thus, although a term like *θάτερον* purports to represent a 'thing', it does not in fact do so. Thus in the *Parmenides* we see Plato setting in strong contrast the precise Socratic usage of *μέθεξις* (in the First Part) and the illegitimate and indiscriminate usage of *μέθεξις* as practised by other thinkers (in the Second Part).

In the *Sophist* the Eleatic Visitor investigates two 'sophistic' practices in the interpretation of verbal usage: (a) deductions made from incomplete phrases; (b) deductions made from compound phrases by illegitimately dividing them. These are of course two aspects of the same type of error.

An example of (a) is the phrase *τὸ μὴ δὲν*, which is investigated at considerable length by the Eleatic Visitor. The 'sophist' takes this phrase, *τὸ μὴ δὲν*, as his datum, and maintains that no 'thing' whatever is referred to by it—as indeed the phrase itself seems plainly to indicate. That is, the phrase is meaningless. In opposition to this view, the E.V. maintains that in fact we use the phrase *τὸ μὴ δὲν* as though it had some meaning, as though it referred to some 'thing', and he makes it his business to find out what this 'thing' is. He shows that the phrase is an incomplete one—it is a deceptive verbal image—and must be completed into *τὸ μὴ δὲν X*, or *τὸ μὴ δὲν Y*, etc. (i.e. 'other than *X*', 'other than *Y*', etc.), or (in the case of false speech and false thinking) into *τὸ μὴ δὲν περὶ τίνος*. In this way he shows that, contrary to what the 'sophists' maintain, *τὸ μὴ δὲν* cannot stand alone (*αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτόν*), but must be combined with,

¹ For a full examination of the evidence I and the *μέγιστα γένη* of the *Sophist* (C.Q. must refer the reader to my paper 'Plato vol. ii (N.S.), 1952, pp. 32-56).

this verb
at he
true
hole
o to
here
tion
the
pov'
ts of

must have attached to it, must partake of, 'some $\delta\sigma\nu$ ': e.g., that which is not *beautiful*, that which is not so *about Theaetetus*. The E.V. also raises the problem of an 'image' generally—an image which 'appears' but 'is not'. Here the sophistic argument is: The original, the genuine thing, is $\delta\lambda\eta\theta\nu\omega\nu$, $\delta\sigma\nu\omega\nu\delta\sigma\nu$; the image is not the genuine thing, therefore the image is not $\delta\sigma\nu\omega\nu\delta\sigma\nu$, is not really real ($\text{o}\nu\kappa\ \delta\sigma\nu\omega\nu\delta\sigma\nu$)—*aliter, μὴ δ* $\sigma\nu$.

The relevance of all this to Plato's own theory of Forms is obvious, though not explicitly pointed out in the *Sophist*: (1) Just as $\tau\delta\ \mu\eta\ \delta\sigma\nu$ is incomplete and misleading, so too is $\tau\delta\ \delta\sigma\nu$: it is a phrase which must be completed into (for example) $\tau\delta\ \delta\sigma\nu\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\nu$, which is precisely the formula for a Platonic Form ($\delta\ \delta\sigma\nu\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\nu$);¹ and this is the solution to the problem about $\tau\delta\ \delta\sigma\nu$ which was raised but not solved earlier in the *Sophist*. $\tau\delta\ \delta\sigma\nu$ 'all by itself' is a *φάντασμα*; therefore $\tau\delta\ \delta\sigma\nu$ cannot be the name of a Platonic Form. The Forms are *Being-Beautiful*, *Being-Good*, etc. And this, after all, is what we should expect from Plato's frequent description of them as *όντα*. (2) The problem of the 'image' is solved in a similar way. The sophist 'proved' that the image was, literally, $\text{o}\nu\kappa\ \delta\sigma\nu\omega\nu\delta\sigma\nu$; but this is partly a play on words, and depends on the equation of the original with $\delta\lambda\eta\theta\nu\omega\nu$ and $\delta\sigma\nu\omega\nu\delta\sigma\nu$. Still, it is an objection which could be used verbatim against Plato's theory of Forms, as follows: You, Plato, say the Form is $\delta\sigma\nu\omega\nu\delta\sigma\nu$; the particular is an imitation of it—an image of it; therefore the particular, not being the Form, is $\text{o}\nu\kappa\ \delta\sigma\nu\omega\nu\delta\sigma\nu$, *aliter, μὴ δ* $\sigma\nu$. Plato in the *Sophist* shows the answer to this. The statement 'The image is not' is incomplete; it should be 'The image is not the original', i.e. 'The image is *other than* the original'.

Thus in this part of the *Sophist* Plato is concerned to expose phrases which are deceptive through being incomplete; and in the course of doing so (1) he substantiates his own doctrine of Forms by showing that the sophistic phrase $\tau\delta\ \delta\sigma\nu$, *when completed as it should be*, yields precisely the formula for the name of any Platonic Form, and (2) *vis-à-vis* the sophists he vindicates his own champion-ship of particulars as something more than non-entities ($\text{o}\nu\kappa\ \delta\sigma\nu\omega\nu\delta\sigma\nu$, *μὴ δ* $\sigma\nu$).

(b) With regard to the deductions illegitimately made from compound phrases: As the Eleatic Visitor hinted before the discussion of the *μέγιστα γένη* began, the solution of the problem of $\tau\delta\ \mu\eta\ \delta\sigma\nu$ would provide the solution to the problem of $\tau\delta\ \delta\sigma\nu$; and it did so, as we saw just now. And this solution exposes the error involved in the sophistic interpretation of a compound phrase such as 'Motion is' (*κίνησις ἔστω*)—an interpretation which assumes that two things (two *γένη*) are involved. Before, in the case of $\tau\delta\ \mu\eta\ \delta\sigma\nu$, the sophist maintained that *no* thing at all was involved; here he maintains that *two* things are involved, Motion and Being, and that Motion partakes of Being; and here too he is wrong. The correct interpretation is that the phrase 'Motion is' refers not to *two* things but to *one* thing, Motion-which-is, Being-Motion. 'Motion is' really

¹ Objection could perhaps be raised to Plato's frequent use of the short versions of the phrase, e.g. $\alpha\nu\tau\delta\ \tau\delta\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\nu$, as names for his Forms, on the ground that the notion of 'being' is not formally expressed in them. Nevertheless, it is always presupposed and assumed by Plato himself; and even if the *έστι* were always explicitly expressed—if the full phrase $\alpha\nu\tau\delta\ \delta\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\nu$ were always

used—there would be no guarantee that a controversialist like Parmenides would pay proper regard to it. The way in which Parmenides treats *ει δι εστιν* in the first Hypothesis is an illustration of this: he is quite capable of ignoring the *έστιν* altogether, and he does so in his first examination of the first Hypothesis.

stands for 'Motion is Motion'; thus 'is' is not a common attribute, but in every case the *τὸ ὅν* (derived from the *ἔστω*) must be completed into *τὸ ὅν X*—in this case into 'that-which-is-Motion'.

In the *Parmenides* we find examples of both these types of sophistic error. (a) Examples of incomplete phrases, which Parmenides produces by taking one part of a statement in isolation from the other part. (1) As we saw, Parmenides attacks Socrates' thesis by taking first one half in isolation and then the other. (2) In the first Examination in the Second Part, Parmenides takes the *ἐν* of the hypothesis *εἰ ἐν ἔστω* in isolation, ignoring the *ἔστω*. A similar procedure is followed in other Examinations. (b) Examination II is an example of erroneous deduction from a compound phrase. At 142 b, c Parmenides interprets the phrase *ἐν ἔστω* as meaning that two 'things' are being referred to, viz. *ἐν* and *οὐσία*, and alleges that *ἐν* 'partakes of' *οὐσία*. This is exactly parallel to the sophistic interpretation of *κίνησις ἔστω* in the *Sophist*.¹ We have here, in fact, another example of the sophistic practice exhibited in the *Sophist*, although in the *Parmenides* *οὐσία*, *θάτεροι*, etc., are not described as *γένη*, nor are the alternative verbs to 'partaking' (viz. 'combining', 'mixing', 'blending', etc.) introduced. But we hear a very great deal of *μετέχειν*, and (as in the *Sophist*) it is used to describe the relationship whenever one term is found in association with another in the same statement (or, to be more precise, whenever Parmenides allows that the two terms may be so associated, since in some of the Examinations he refuses to allow it). Just as in the *Sophist*, words are regarded as a sufficient basis (a) for the positing of *γένη*,² and (b) for the consequent assertion of *μέθεξις*. Although other kinds of predicate beside those containing the word *ἔστω* are covered by this theory of *μέθεξις*,³ those which contain *ἔστω* are of the greatest importance and interest, and especially those which consist of the word *ἔστω* only. The mere occurrence of the word *ἔστω* in a predicate is a sufficient ground to Parmenides for claiming the case as a case of *μέθεξις*.

It is clear, then, from the way in which Plato treats these *γένη* and their '*μέθεξις*' in the *Sophist* that he does not intend to commit himself to the view that all the 'things' (*πράγματα*) dealt with in that dialogue are entities of the same class as his own Forms. He shows explicitly that *τὸ μὴ ὅν* and *θάτεροι* cannot be Forms, and by implication he shows that *τὸ ὅν* and *ταῦτά* cannot be Forms either. (About Rest and Motion nothing can be inferred either way from what is said in the *Sophist*.) His purpose in the *Sophist* is to point out the error of his opponents' method of deducing 'things' from words; and he does this primarily and typically in the case of *τὸ μὴ ὅν*, by showing that if their

¹ And therefore we might suppose that the correct interpretation of *ἐν ἔστω* is not that *two* things are being referred to, but *one* thing, viz. 'One-which-is', and this would imply that Plato believed in a Form 'the One'. As I try to show later, however, it seems probable that he did not. Cf. also the paragraph next following in the text. In the *Soph.* Plato is not concerned to give any indication about the status of Rest and Motion; but in the *Parmenides* he is very much concerned to make us think about the status of the One.

² See note above, p. 145. For an elaborate 'proof' by Parmenides that *θάτεροι* is a

γένος—or, as he puts it, that the word *θάτεροι* always refers to one and the same *φύσις*—see 147 d ff., which I discuss in my Conclusion.

³ Thus, as Professor Cornford comments on 140 c (op. cit., p. 126), "'Having no sameness'" (*μὴ μετέχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ*) means that no statement beginning "The One is the same as . . ." or "The One has the same . . ." can be true. (We must of course remember that 'true' means 'admitted as true by Parmenides during the Examination now proceeding'.) An example of a predicate without *ἔστω* is 'it will have the same number of measures as . . .' (140 b).

$\tau\delta\ \delta\nu$ refers to a 'thing', then $\tau\delta\ \mu\eta\ \delta\nu$ no less refers to a 'thing', i.e. to some other thing; or, to put it more exactly, he shows that both $\tau\delta\ \delta\nu$ and $\tau\delta\ \mu\eta\ \delta\nu$ refer to a large number of 'things'. If incidentally it turns out that the names of these 'pieces' of $\tau\delta\ \delta\nu$ are indistinguishable from the names of his own Forms, which are 'things' in the truest and fullest sense, well, what could be more fortunate? Plato's purpose in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides* is really to clear the ground, in the sense that until the fundamental assumptions and methods of argument dealt with in these dialogues are shown to be invalid, the theory of Forms is exposed to attack on the side of its verbal expression. And at the same time he gives indications to his readers of the lines along which the correct formulation of the problems, and their correct solution, is to be found.

The detailed considerations which I have so far brought forward against the assumption that Plato is using his own methods and putting forward his own views in the Second Part of the *Parmenides* are reinforced by the following more general considerations.

(1) Not only are two incompatible sets of deductions drawn from each Hypothesis, but even within a single set of deductions incompatible conclusions are drawn. For example: (a) Exam. I shows that nothing can be asserted about the One; Exam. II shows that very much indeed can be asserted about the One. (b) In Exam. II it is shown that the One is in motion and at rest, is like and unlike itself and the Others, etc. As Sir D. Ross remarks, 'There is nothing to show that the conclusion of the Second Argument is more acceptable to Plato than that of the First, or that of the Third more acceptable than that of the Fourth. . . . In the final conclusion he treats all the arguments as forming one single argument leading to completely contradictory conclusions' (op. cit., p. 95.) ' . . . It is clear that Plato is impartial as between all eight arguments' (p. 96). In view of this, which can hardly be disputed, it seems impossible to maintain that Plato is setting out to provide us with ready-made arguments for or against Eleaticism, or Pythagoreanism, or the Socratic doctrine of Forms, or anything else we care to mention. Any attempt to find such arguments in the *Parmenides* must fail, for whatever Plato might have established in one examination—or even in one sentence—he would be undermining in the next.

(2) What precisely are we to suppose 'Plato' is talking about in the Second Part? What are the One and the Others? Professor Cornford, who claims that some, at any rate, of the arguments are sound and are put forward by Plato in his own proper person, is forced to admit that 'the student is expected . . . to make out for himself what sort of "One" and what sort of "Others" are being discussed on each occasion' (p. 111). Parmenides almost appears to be using the words as mere counters, which, as Professor Cornford says, might just as well be replaced by *A* and *B*. The status of the One and the Others is as obscure as the status of Rest, Motion, Being, Same, and Other in the *Sophist*, the only difference being that the meaning of the latter terms is rather more stable. We might have expected the One to stand for Parmenides' own 'One which is' or for a Platonic Form; but neither of these can fit what he in fact says. In Exam. I the One is shown to have no extension or shape, and to be nowhere; in Exam. II it is shown to have extension and shape and to be in motion and at rest. Such physical language reminds us of the physical language used of the One by Parmenides in his poem; and the resemblance is not surprising, as it is ostensibly Parmenides' own hypothesis which is being examined. But the

resemblance is very limited. In his own poem Parmenides did not divorce the One from its own 'being', as he does in the dialogue, nor did he draw mutually incompatible conclusions. It is even more difficult to suppose that 'Plato' is speaking about his own Forms, for Forms do not have physical extension, do not move about, etc. And further, why is it taken for granted that there are 'Others'?

The attempt to attach any Platonic or Parmenidean meaning to 'the One' breaks down. As we shall see, in the Second Part Plato makes Parmenides speak of 'the One' in company with the Same and the Other and of their 'participation' in exactly the same way that the Eleatic Visitor speaks of the $\gamma\epsilon\eta$ and their 'participation' in the *Sophist*; and therefore it will not surprise us if Plato intends us, as a result of the Examinations in the dialogue, to realize that 'the One' is another 'deceptive verbal image'. The way in which the meaning of 'the One' varies in the *Parmenides* is not unlike the way in which the meaning of $\tau\ddot{o} \circ\nu$ varies in the *Sophist*. No term could possibly vary in this way if it referred to a Platonic Form; and this consideration in itself would be sufficient to rule out 'the One' of the *Parmenides* from serious candidature as a Platonic Form. This, perhaps, is so obvious as hardly to need saying; but, as we shall see, there are further considerations which point to the conclusion that there was for Plato no Form 'the One' at all.

I believe, therefore, that it is unnecessary, indeed impossible, to assume that as they stand the arguments of the Second Part of the *Parmenides* are anything more than verbal gymnastics—which after all is what Parmenides said they would be. It is literally a 'game', in which the rules and the value of the counters can be changed to suit the player's convenience, so that he always succeeds in winning.¹ And here too, as in the *Sophist*, there is a superficial appearance that matters of high metaphysics are being discussed; but really the discussion in itself penetrates no deeper than words. The whole of it is derived from the basic assumption that the truth about 'things' can be deduced from words. Plato's view is that words must be faithful images (*eikónes*) of 'things': that is their only justification and their only true basis. In the First Part Parmenides has consistently disregarded the whole purpose of Socrates' theory of Forms and the meaning of his terms, and has concentrated on criticizing its verbal expression. In the Second Part, too, he is dealing with words, and he is made to do so by Plato in so obvious and so superficial a way that neither Socrates nor anyone else should be able to mistake what he is doing. But the game is intended to make the reader feel its hollowness and inadequacy, and to suggest that this sort of manipulation of words is an abuse of them; and further, many of the arguments which Plato includes are deliberately chosen in order to start trains of thought in the mind of Socrates and of the attentive reader which may lead them to sound and valuable results.

(*To be concluded*)

Christ's College, Cambridge

A. L. PECK

¹ Cf. Ross, op. cit., p. 100.

ALEXANDER AND HIS 'SO-CALLED' FATHER¹

πλὴν περὶ Σάμου γράφων Αθηναῖοι, “έγώ μὲν οὐκ ἄν”, φησὶν, “οὐμὲν ἐλευθέραν τόλιν ἔδωκα καὶ ἔδοξον. ἔχετε δὲ αὐτὴν λαβόντες παρὰ τοῦ τότε κυρίου καὶ πατρὸς ἐμοῦ προσαγορευομένου,” λέγων τὸν Φίλιππον.²

THE object of this article is to examine the letter from which Plutarch quotes in the above passage from the twenty-eighth chapter of his life of Alexander; to attempt to prove, particularly by a comparison of the letter with the *διάγραμμα* sent in 319 B.C. by Polyperchon to the Greek cities,³ that it is a genuine part of Alexander's correspondence; and further to consider what light the letter, if genuine, throws upon the person of Alexander himself.

In this chapter Plutarch *more suo* is assembling a number of anecdotes to illuminate a particular aspect of his subject,⁴ and the theme here is Alexander's attitude towards the Greeks and barbarians with respect to his belief in his divine origin. He begins by saying that Alexander treated the latter as if he were convinced that he was the son of a god and contrasts this with his very different attitude towards the Greeks. After quoting the above extract, by way of providing an exception, Plutarch then goes on to recount two instances in which the king made light of the attempts of others to give him divine attributes and concludes the chapter by remarking that it is evident from what has been said that Alexander did not himself believe in his divine parentage but merely used it to impose upon others.

In the course of his general survey of the correspondence of Alexander, Kaeber⁵ came to the conclusion (which has the approval of Tarn) that there were no grounds for thinking that all the letters were genuine or that they were all forgeries. Each letter must be treated on its own merits, and so far as the present letter is concerned there are three reasons which led Kaeber to conclude that it was not genuine.

His first objection is that this letter cannot be referred to the latest period of Alexander's life (where scholars have generally placed it) as the succeeding words *ὑστερὸν δὲ πληγῇ περιπεσὸν ὑπὸ τοξεύματος* clearly show, since there is no

¹ I am greatly indebted in this article to Mr. G. T. Griffith and to Professor G. R. Manton for much constructive criticism.

² This may be translated: 'Except that in writing to the Athenians concerning Samos he said, "I would not have given you that free and famous city but you have it as a gift from its former master, my "so-called" father, meaning Philip".' The editor of the Loeb edition translates: 'I cannot have given you that free and illustrious city; for ye received it from him who was then your master and was called my father', meaning Philip. This rendering seems to me to make no sense. It is difficult to decide whether one should translate *τὸν τότε κυρίου* 'your former master' or 'its former master' (as Stewart does in the Bohn series); the former would agree with the idea I express below that Alexander is stressing that the island is a

gift from Philip to the Athenians, but either rendering makes good sense.

³ See Diodorus 18. 55-56, esp. chap. 56, where the *διάγραμμα* is given in full. It is translated in W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, pp. 29-30.

⁴ See A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. i (1945), pp. 54 ff., for some excellent remarks on Plutarch's aims and methods.

⁵ J. Kaeber, 'Die Briefwechsels Alexanders des Grossen', in *Philologus*, li (1892), pp. 602-22. See esp. p. 613. So far as I am aware there has been no detailed treatment of this letter since his article, e.g. W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, vol. ii (Sources and Studies), 1948, p. 351, n. 3, dismisses it briefly as 'an obvious forgery on historical grounds' and refers to Kaeber's article.

record of Alexander being wounded after his return from India and that he was wounded is extremely unlikely.

There are three possible answers to this: that the wound may after all have occurred in the last few months of Alexander's life, i.e. after the generally accepted date for the letter; that the letter may have been written at an earlier date; and finally that Plutarch has got the events in the wrong chronological order.

First of all can we be more precise as to the date of the wound? The same incident is mentioned in Athenaeus¹ (who quotes Aristoboulos as his authority), though the details are slightly altered, and occurs again in Plutarch's early work *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute*² in exactly the same form as here. In this latter passage Plutarch adds that Alexander received the wound while besieging Massaga, the capital of the Assacanians, in the north-west Punjab. From Arrian³ we learn that during these operations (which from his chronology we may date to the end of 327 B.C.) Alexander was wounded in the ankle by an arrow, though not seriously. We may take it, then, as proved beyond reasonable doubt that the wound which Plutarch mentions in this chapter occurred towards the end of 327 B.C.

The reasons which have led scholars to date the letter to the last year of Alexander's life are as follows. In the spring of 324 B.C. the king reached Susa after his hazardous march through the Gedrosian desert and there issued an order for the recall of those who had been exiled from the Greek cities.⁴ Two states in particular were hard hit by this order—Aetolia, which would have to surrender Oeniadae to the Acarnanians, and Athens, whose cleruchs would have to evacuate the island of Samos.⁵ It is with the latter that we are here concerned. The order was ill received at Athens and there was even some talk of war, but this was quickly suppressed by the more responsible statesmen, who realized that Athens was unprepared for hostilities. However, delegates were sent to Olympia to meet Nicanor, Alexander's representative, who had made the proclamation of the decree during the games and it was agreed that Athens (and any other cities who wished) might send ambassadors to Alexander to state their objections. The Athenian ambassadors no doubt formed part of that great concourse which flocked to meet the king at Babylon at the end of 324 or the beginning of 323,⁶ and the letter may well be his reply to the Athenian objections or perhaps more probably to a subsequent protest.

This dating fits in admirably with the facts as we know them. For on any dating we must consider that Alexander's decision was unfavourable; otherwise the contrast with Philip is incomprehensible and we know that the Athenians did have to restore Samos to the Samians.⁷ But it is not impossible that the letter could be dated earlier, perhaps to 331 B.C., i.e. between Alexander's visit to Ammon and his departure for the East. This would presuppose that the case of the Samians had been raised separately (perhaps by the Samians themselves),

¹ 6. 57, p. 251A (Aristoboulos fr. 47 Jacoby).

² *Moralia* 341 b (cf. ibid. 180 c).

³ *Anabasis* 4. 26. 4. For further references to the 'ichor' story see Tarn, op. cit., p. 358, n. 5, or Jacoby, *F.Gr.H.* ii. c, p. 519.

⁴ Diodorus 17. 109. 1 and 18. 8. 2; Q. Curtius 10. 2. 4.

⁵ Diodorus 18. 8. 6.

⁶ See Diodorus 17. 113. 3 δὲ ἀλέξανδρος

ἀπογραφὴν λαβὼν τῶν πρέσβεων διέταξε τοῖς μὲν πρώτοις διδόναι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ τοῖς ἔχοντις ἀπαρτίσαι . . . πέμπτος δὲ τοῖς ἀντιλέγοντοι περὶ τῆς καθέδου τῶν φυγάδων. The Athenians may well be included in τοῖς ἀντιλέγοντοι.

⁷ Diodorus 18. 18. 9. This is confirmed by a series of decrees recalling the liberation of the island, e.g. *S.E.G.* i. 350.

that the Samians had asked Alexander to make a ruling in their favour, that the Athenians had asked him not to, and that this letter is the ruling. However, it may be objected that this is to presuppose a great deal and that we know nothing of any such negotiations. More important perhaps is the fact that the Athenians remained in possession of the island for several years longer and it is doubtful whether they could have done so had Alexander decided against them in 331 B.C.

The later date then seems preferable, but against this is the use by Plutarch of *ὑστερον* referring to an event which took place in 327 B.C. Kaerst did not, apparently, regard this objection as particularly important since he writes: 'Yet we must admit that for a writer such as Plutarch no more fitting occasion than the present could be imagined for introducing the letter.' This is not entirely satisfactory. Admittedly Plutarch is not writing history, and as he clearly states in the opening chapter of this life his method is biographical rather than historical;¹ admittedly he introduces anecdotes, particularly in the non-chronological portions of his lives, out of chronological order both relative to the main narrative and to each other.² But that is a different matter from the present where he introduces an earlier episode with the words *ὑστερον δέ*. It is impossible to believe that these words were used by Plutarch when he meant no more than *ἄλλοτε*.

We must either abandon the later date in favour of the earlier or conclude that Plutarch has been guilty of an error, that he believed the wound to be later than the letter. No writer is infallible, Plutarch perhaps less so than most, and there is a much less excusable mistake in the fourteenth chapter of his life of Lysander. There he dates the surrender of Samos at the end of the Peloponnesian War *before* the fall of Athens whereas it took place later. It is true that he does not use *ὑστερον* there, but he clearly indicates the priority of the surrender of Samos and might well have done so. I intend therefore to assume that Plutarch has here made a similar error and to retain the earlier date, i.e. to connect the letter with the Exiles' Decree of 324 B.C.

The second objection which Kaerst raised, and it was this in particular which caused him to reject the letter, was that Philip could not have given Samos to the Athenians as it had never at any time been in his possession. We may admit at once that the Athenian cleruchs had been in continuous occupation of the island since 365 B.C.,³ but this is not a valid objection if we consider the wording of the *διάγραμμα*—'Σάμον δὲ δίδομεν Αθηναίοις, ἐπειδὴ καὶ Φλέππος ἔδωκεν ὁ πατήρ'. Here we have precisely the same expression, and we must therefore deny the genuineness of the *διάγραμμα* or admit that Alexander may have used the expression in this letter.

But if Philip had never possessed Samos, what do the author of the *διάγραμμα* and Alexander mean by saying that he gave Samos to the Athenians? When was he supposed to have made the gift? The explanation is, I think, as follows. In 338 B.C. Philip defeated the combined forces of Athens and

¹ "οὐτε γὰρ *ἰστορίας* γράφομεν ἀλλὰ *βίον*." The whole chapter should be read for a clear statement of Plutarch's biographical method.

² For an example of episodes introduced out of chronological order relatively to the main narrative see Tarn, op. cit. ii. 307: 'Plutarch puts three deaths out of chronological order . . . because he is collecting

illustrations of character, not writing a history.' For an example of events out of order relatively to each other see Gomme, op. cit., p. 57.

³ In 322 B.C. the island was restored to the Samians by Perdiccas after they had been in exile for more than 43 years (Diodorus 18. 18. 9).

Thebes at Chaeronea and as a result all Greece lay at his feet. He could, had he wished, have occupied Athens without great difficulty and forced the Athenians to accept whatever terms he chose to offer. All the Athenian possessions were at his mercy and he could then have deprived the Athenians of Samos. However, though he compelled them to disband the bulk of their confederacy he allowed them to retain Samos together with a few other islands and in these circumstances Alexander might well argue that Samos was a gift from Philip.

Tarn¹ makes the point that the use of the verb *ἔδωκεν* confirms that the letter is a forgery since what Alexander would have written was not *ἔδωκεν* but *ἀπέδωκεν*. Elsewhere² in a long discussion he stresses the distinction between the simple verb and its compound and cites the famous example of Halonnesus which Philip offered to give to the Athenians and they refused to accept unless he gave it back. 'The Greeks', he writes, 'distinguished it [i.e. *ἀποδοῦναι*] most carefully from *δοῦναι*.' That such a distinction does exist and was rigidly observed is abundantly proved by Tarn. But it does not constitute a valid objection to the genuineness of the letter. In the present instance Alexander is concerned to point out to the Athenians that Samos belongs to them by the courtesy, so to say, of the Macedonian king and that they have no right to the island apart from its being a gift. He feels at liberty to dissociate himself from the policy of Philip and to revoke that gift. In other words, the use of *ἔδωκεν* is deliberate and argues for the authenticity of the letter rather than against it. We would expect a forger to take particular care to conform to the established usage.

But the use of the verb *δοῦναι* in the *διάγραμμα* is a different matter altogether. The circumstances in which it was composed were quite different and are so important that I shall give a brief outline of the situation in 319 B.C.³

Shortly before his death in the summer of that year Antipater, the regent acting on behalf of the two kings, Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV, had designated Polyperchon to succeed him and had appointed his own son Cassander to a subordinate position under Polyperchon. The new regent, who was almost a contemporary of Antipater, had taken part in the campaigns of Alexander but had never achieved an important command and owed his present position very largely to his loyalty to the royal house. His position, except in Macedonia itself, was precarious, and Cassander soon began to intrigue against him and to make overtures to Ptolemy and to the commanders of the garrisons which Antipater had established in Greece. It was to weaken the supporters of Cassander and to win a reputation for generosity that late in 319 B.C. Polyperchon issued the *διάγραμμα* in the names of the two kings. In brief the terms were a renunciation of the policy which Antipater had followed in dealing with the Greek cities and a return to the 'enlightened' supervision of Philip and Alexander. The cities were to be 'liberated'. The restoration of the situation as it had existed during the reigns of Alexander and his father is a cardinal point in the new programme and is mentioned more than once in the *διάγραμμα*. The reason for this repetition is of course that Polyperchon and the kings required the prestige which association with the policies of Philip and Alexander still conferred. In paragraph 7 Polyperchon turns to Athens, and after ruling that the Athenians were to retain what they had had

¹ Op. cit. ii, p. 351, n. 3.

² See further C.A.H., vol. vi, pp. 472 ff. (Tarn), or *Histoire Générale*, iv. i, pp. 290 ff.

³ Ibid., pp. 208-9.

in the time of Philip and Alexander (with the exception of Oropus) he writes: 'Samos we give to the Athenians since our father Philip also gave it.'¹ There is no mention of *restoring* Samos,² and the use of *δίδομεν* instead of *ἀποδίδομεν* is really rather remarkable when we consider the need for conciliating this important city and when it occurs in what must have been a carefully thought-out manifesto. Moreover, the Athenians no longer possessed Samos as they had done at the time of Alexander's letter and it would therefore have to be restored to them. The coincidence of the use of the simple verb in the letter and the *διάγραμμα* is particularly striking when the position of the composers of the two documents is taken into account. Alexander was in a position to dictate to the Athenians about Samos; Polyperchon, on the other hand, was attempting to gain the support of the Greek cities and consequently, one would have thought, could not have adopted such a domineering attitude.

How then are we to explain the use of *δίδομεν*? It is impossible to speak with certainty of the actual process of composition of such *διάγραμμα* as this, i.e. exactly what documents were referred to, but we must surely assume that there existed even at this early date in the Hellenistic era some system, however rudimentary, of filing documents. I would suggest that what has occurred in this particular instance is that the main outlines of the programme were drafted by Polyperchon and his advisers³ and that the actual task of composition was handed over to the chief secretary.⁴ This official then looked up the correspondence on Samos,⁵ came across the letter of Alexander (quoted in part by Plutarch), and transcribed the relevant portion, omitting the derogatory reference to Philip. Hence we have in the *διάγραμμα* the verb *δοῦναι* and not as we would expect *ἀποδοῦναι*.

Kaerst's third point was that the comparison of Philip with the 'god-like' son of Ammon would not diminish the validity of the Athenian claim to Samos. Now from a legal point of view this is true enough since a god or the son of a god had no legal standing in a Greek city, but we may doubt whether Alexander was troubled by legal niceties. His edict had, as far as Samos was

¹ For the Greek see above, p. 153. I have not thought it necessary to argue that Diodorus preserves the actual wording of the *διάγραμμα* as, so far as I am aware, this is not disputed. The subject of *δίδομεν* is not Polyperchon but the two kings. Or just conceivably 'we' refers to Philip Arrhidaeus alone (since Alexander IV is not yet of an age to write), in which case the plural would be a royal one. Strictly speaking *διπάτηρ* refers only to Philip Arrhidaeus, but it is probably used loosely to refer to both kings.

² 'It gave Samos back as a sop to Athens' (Tarn, *C.A.H.* vi. 473) pithily expresses what took place, though the *διάγραμμα* merely speaks of 'giving'.

³ Diodorus 18. 55. 1 *συνήγαγε τούς τε ἡγέμονας ἀπαρτας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Μακεδόνων τοὺς ἀξιολογητάτους.*

⁴ F. Schroeter, *De regum hellenisticorum epistulis* (Leipzig, 1932), has analysed the extant correspondence of the Hellenistic kings so far as it is preserved on stone and

has come to the conclusion that all but two of the letters are the work of secretaries and not of their royal masters. But Tarn in a review of this book (*C.R.*, 1932) has pointed out the need for an intermediate class in which the main outlines are drafted by the king and the actual composition is carried out by the secretary. It is to this class that the *διάγραμμα* of Polyperchon is probably to be referred.

⁵ There is nothing surprising in a letter of Alexander being available to Polyperchon or his officials. As Tarn writes (*op. cit.* ii. 302), 'When Alexander died, Perdiccas presumably got all his papers, which in turn must have passed to Antipater when he was elected Regent of the Empire after Perdiccas' death; he would then have taken them back to Pella with him, for there was nothing else he could do with them. Cassander subsequently got everything at Pella.' After Antipater's death the royal correspondence would pass first to Polyperchon as his successor.

concerned, restored the situation prior to 365 B.C., and against this edict there was no appeal save war. The Athenians' only hope of retaining the island was to *persuade* Alexander to make an exception in their case on the ground that Philip, his father, had given them the island (or by leaving them in possession after Chaeronea had recognized their right to it). In his letter Alexander is saying quite bluntly that Philip is not his father and consequently he is in no way bound to uphold Philip's decisions from any motives of filial piety.¹ Thus the only plea which the Athenians could put forward with any chance of success is nullified.

None of Kaerst's objections seem to me to be well founded, and I can see no reason, therefore, for rejecting this letter as a forgery. The only difficulty is to what date we are to assign it. We may either, as I should prefer to do, conclude that Plutarch has been guilty of an error in chronology and, connecting the letter with the Exiles' Decree, place it in 323 B.C., or we may accept Plutarch's order of events and date it prior to 327 B.C.

We may now consider how acceptance of the letter affects our judgement of Alexander's character and actions towards the end of his life. In the first place the view of those historians who have maintained that Alexander believed himself to be the son of Ammon is proved correct beyond reasonable doubt. The other evidence for this view is, as we might expect, scanty, but it is perhaps significant that Alexander was roused to fury not (as Tarn maintained)² by the mere mention of Ammon but when others referred slightly to the god and, as it were, cast Ammon in his teeth. To argue that it is important in this connexion that at Opis³ Alexander made no mention of Ammon but recounted the benefits which Philip had conferred upon the Macedonians is to fail to take into account the circumstances of the speech. To have cast doubts upon his relationship to Philip in a speech to his troops (some at least of whom would have served under Philip) would at any time have been imprudent but at that particular juncture would have been incredibly gauche and impolitic.

But for Alexander to believe that he was the son of Ammon is one thing; for him to avow it openly in a letter to a Greek city is a very different matter. Obviously he is shown to be in a very queer state of mind, and the inference is that in the closing months of his life this belief has become an obsession with him. This is confirmed by two acts whose genuineness has sometimes been doubted merely on the ground of their improbability. The first of these is the order for the erection of the costly and elaborate pyre at Babylon for the dead Hephaestion. This order is mentioned not only by Plutarch but by Diodorus and above all by Arrian,⁴ whose remarks leave no room for doubt that such an order was actually made. Some authorities, says Arrian, tell us that Alexander ordered sacrifice to be made to Hephaestion as a hero; others that he sent to Ammon to inquire whether it was proper to sacrifice to him as a god. He then continues in these words—ἐκεῖνα δὲ πρὸς πάντων ξυμφωνούμενα—to give a list of the actions of Alexander which he considers authentic, and among these is the order for the pyre to be built at a cost of 10,000 talents. There is, then, no

¹ I have not thought it right to make anything of ὁ πατήρ, although earlier in the διάγραμμα we have ὁ ἡμέρεπος πατήρ. It is possible to argue that the secretary found the derogatory reference to Philip and substituted the neutral ὁ πατήρ, but I would hesitate to press this point.

² Op. cit. ii. 351.

³ For Alexander's speech to the mutineers see Arrian 7. 9-10, and for an analysis of the speech Tarn, op. cit. ii. 290-6.

⁴ Plutarch, *Alex.* 72; Diodorus 17. 115 (where the pyre is described in great detail); Arrian, *Anabasis* 7. 14. 8.

reason to deny that this took place. Jones¹ sees in 'the fantastic expenditure of Hephaestion's pyre' a sign of megalomania and one is compelled to agree that this is hardly the action of a normal person.

A much more abnormal action is the offer made by the king to Cleomenes² to pardon all his past misdeeds and to give him *carte blanche* for the future if the shrines which he is to erect in Egypt for Hephaestion are satisfactory. This Cleomenes, 'a Greek financier from Naucratis', had been guilty of oppression and misgovernment, and Tarn³ considers that such an action on Alexander's part is inexplicable and that the letter addressed to Cleomenes must be a forgery. 'No one but a madman', he writes, 'could have done such a thing; the position would have become unthinkable.' Certainly Alexander had meted out drastic punishment to his offending Persian satraps and had put to death one of the Macedonian aristocracy for similar offences, but Arrian has no doubts that Alexander did write the letter. His 'peculiar running commentary' which Tarn interprets as due to doubts about the genuineness of the letter may be equally well explained as due to his distress that Alexander should have done such a thing. His action, as Tarn says, runs contrary to all his previous actions and would almost certainly have had serious repercussions had not his early death intervened, but this constitutes no reason for dismissing the letter in Arrian as a forgery. The same state of mind is evident in this letter as in that which he sent to the Athenians about Samos.

To sum up, then, I would suggest that the letter quoted by Plutarch was actually written by Alexander to the Athenians probably in 323 B.C.; that it came into the hands of Polyperchon together with the rest of Alexander's correspondence and was consulted by the composer of the *διάγραμμα*; and further that it shows Alexander in the last few months of his life to have been in a peculiar mental state which we may, if we will, call as Jones does 'incipient megalomania'. The letter, if genuine, constitutes an important addition to the scanty evidence on the subject, evidence that is contemporary and moreover provided by Alexander himself.

University of Otago, Dunedin, N.Z.

J. R. HAMILTON

¹ Prof. A. H. M. Jones in a review of Tarn's *Alexander* in *C.R.* lxiii (1949), p. 122.

² See Arrian 7, 23, 6-8, esp. 8.

³ Op. cit. ii. 305.

SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT HISTORICAL WRITING IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

Of the early Roman historians who wrote in Greek, A. Postumius Albinus was not necessarily alone in realizing that his Greek was not the best Greek;¹ while, on the other hand, Cato and those who followed the new fashion of writing in Latin would have resented, we may assume, could they have foreknown, the statement of Q. Catulus in Cicero's *De Oratore*² that they had no literary or rather 'oratorical' merit; though Cato might have approved Catulus' caustic comment on Roman historical writing, 'Satis est non esse mendacem'.³ That an historian should not, consciously and deliberately, lie all second-century historians would no doubt have agreed;⁴ and they would have endorsed Polybius' condemnation of *κουρεακή καὶ πάνδημος λαλά* masquerading as history in a story whose falseness was self-evident, because it assumed, on the part of the young sons of senators at Rome, a *gravitas* such as no young boy could possibly possess.⁵

At the same time we need not suppose that all second-century historians took the same view about what was worth recording and what was not. Cato, for instance, might have been challenged in his view that neither market prices of grain nor eclipses of sun and moon were proper subjects for the historian to describe. While some historians may have accepted it as a canon that 'shortest is best'—as, in Cicero's *De Oratore*, Antonius suggests⁶—and have aspired to leave no more than 'monumenta temporum, hominum, locorum gestarumque rerum',⁷ at the end of the century one historian at least, Sempronius Asellio who, with Polybius, had been at Numantia and who, on the subject of history,

¹ P(olybius) 39. 1. 4 f.

² 2. 51.

³ Ibid.

⁴ P. 2. 56. 10 ff. (in criticism of Phylarchus); 12. 7. 6; 12. 11. 8; 12. 12. 4 ff.; 12. 25b. 4 (all four passages in criticism of Timaeus); 36. 1. 7. Polybius thought that speeches should be reported as accurately as events (12. 25i. 8; cf. 2. 56. 10 ff.; 12. 25b. 4; 36. 1. 7). I cannot follow the statement of F. W. Walbank, *C.Q.* xxxix (1945), 10, n. 4, that Polybius 'drew no clear distinction between the actual words spoken and *τοὺς ἀρρότορτας καὶ καιρὸν λόγους*'. The phrase (which, in my opinion, means something like 'the relevant and vital arguments') has nothing at all in common with *τοὺς ἐθέχομένους λόγους* of 2. 56. 10, but is to be read in its context—an injunction to the historian three sentences later (12. 25n. 8) to record *τοὺς καὶ ἀλφέους ὥρθεντας λόγους*.

Polybius would have agreed readily that, as well as educating politicians, pointing a moral was a function of history, and knew as well as anybody that the historian must be selective with his facts (just as with his speeches—12. 25i. 5 *τοὺς ἀρρότορτας καὶ καιρὸν λόγους*). What he says over and over

again is that the historian must not *invent* either facts or speeches 'so as to fit his theme' (2. 56. 10), i.e. so as to give substance to his theories. That is what the tragedian does, in contrast to the historian. This perfectly lucid theory of history has no connexion with Polybius' other view (also perfectly understandable) that the fear inspired by the State religion at Rome (which was palpably full of falsifications) was a large element in the disciplined life which Polybius admired as distinguishing contemporary Rome from contemporary Greece, the rising from the disintegrating State (6. 56. 6 ff.). Walbank's remark (*C.Q.* xxxix. 10) that the connexion between the improving effect of Religion and of History 'drawn by Diodorus in a prologue (1. 2. 2) which is very reminiscent of Polybius . . . shows how very much moral aims governed Polybius both as a citizen and as a historian, and how very far he was from applying in practice the criterion of objective, unvarnished truth', is, I confess, unintelligible to me. Why should the sins of Diodorus be visited on Polybius?

⁵ P. 3. 20. 5.

⁶ 2. 53.

⁷ Ibid.

had swallowed Polybius' teaching, knew that for any historian deserving the name there are no such things as 'bare facts'. 'Facts', on the contrary, have to be seen in a living context of thought and policy: 'nobis non modo satis esse video, quod factum esset, id pronuntiare, sed etiam quo consilio quaque ratione gesta essent demonstrare.'¹ That was an aspect of what Polybius himself called *ἀποδεικτική ἱστορία*.² 'Names of consuls and triumphators and accounts of wars', Asellio wrote, 'are not enough. You want to know, too, of senatorial decrees and of laws'—what we should call 'policy'—*quibusque consiliis ea gesta sint*.³

So much for standards.

What of the selection of a subject, of a field for historical writing? This was a matter on which Polybius held extremely clear and rigid views, distinguishing between what we might call 'ancient' and 'modern' history. Polybius divides history into three 'parts':⁴ genealogies (which, we learn with surprise, appeal to the *φύληκος*); accounts of colonies, foundations of cities and kinships (which appeal to the *πολυτράγυμαν* and the *περιττός*); and, finally, the story of tribes (or rather 'Leagues'),⁵ cities, and dynasts, which appeal to the *πολιτικός*.

The first two branches of history Polybius eschews, with simple and naïve argument. They are subjects, he says,⁶ which have been treated already by earlier writers. The choice therefore lay between simple plagiarism (if an historian was without morals) or (if he was conscientious) the wasted effort of going over ground which had already been covered by others, only to reach the same result. It is a devastatingly simple argument against research into the remote past.

There remains the history of your own times—*οὐ πραγματικὸς τρόπος*.⁷ Here your work will be original, because 'one generation cannot write the history of the next'.⁸

There is, of course, the difficulty of determining how far back your own times stretch.

Polybius' subject was the story of the successive subjugation of Carthage (with its empire), Macedon, Syria, and Greece to Roman dominion, and at first he proposed to regard Pydna as the conclusion and the year 219 B.C. as the start of the process. History, in his own phrase, became 'organic' in this fifty years.⁹ Any such determination of an historical 'period' must be largely

¹ (H. Peter), *H(istoricorum) R(omanorum) R(eligiae)*, i². 179, 1 (Aulus Gellius 5. 18. 7).

² Walbank, *C.Q.* xxxix. 16. Polybius states (3. 31. 12) that nothing is to be learnt from history if you remove from it *τὸ διά τὸ καὶ πῶς καὶ τίος χάρων ἐπράχθη τὸ πραχθέν* (cf. 3. 32. 6). Causality, properly understood, makes history 'fruitful' (12. 25b. 2). In particular the reader should know in the field of causality (a) why historical characters acted as they did, and (b) the reason why their actions succeeded or failed (12. 25b. 1). The main practical lessons to be learnt from history, in Polybius' view, were, I think, not to trust overmuch in present success (3. 31. 3; 8. 21. 11; and the story of Regulus in 1. 31-35) and not to be too easily discouraged in a good cause if the odds are apparently heavily against you. The

first of these lessons, of course, has a certain affinity to the traditional view of *ἱβπις*, but you could be over-confident in success *κατ'* *ἔγνωσαν*, as it were, and I cannot find in P. 1. 31-35 any authority for Walbank's statement (*C.Q.* xxxix. 10) that, for Polybius, 'the *peripetiae* befell Regulus through a fault in his character'. The disaster befell Regulus for two reasons: (a) by what proved in the event to have been a mistake, he called for unconditional surrender, and (b) Xanthippus was a man of genius. And that is what Polybius' own summary at the end of the story (1. 35) amounts to.

³ *H.R.R.* i². 180. 2.

⁴ 9. 1 f.

⁵ Cf. P. 2. 58. 5.

⁶ 9. 2. 1-3.

⁷ 9. 2. 4.

⁸ Ilid. *ομακορειδή συμβάνει γίνεσθαι τὴν ἱστο-*

πλαν, 1. 3. 4.

subjective; it must also, as tutors in the Oxford Greats School know well, be largely artificial. This was what Polybius himself discovered. He had to go back, in a long introduction, over the period 265-219 B.C.; and at the other end, to complete the story, he had to continue his history to 146 B.C.

Even so, he distinguished sharply between his *real* period, starting in 219 B.C.—*ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας*¹—and what went before. This is especially clear in the case of the history of Greece. Down to 219 B.C. it was already satisfactorily described in a reputable published work, the *Memoirs of Aratos*; after 219 B.C. it fell in the lifetime of Polybius' own generation or the generation older than his. He had, therefore, either been a witness himself of the events to be described or, if not, he could rely on eyewitnesses' accounts.² Likewise in Roman history, he evidently regarded his work as original after 219 B.C., while it was a précis of other people's accounts for the years before that; though in fact it is only in the case of the First Punic War that he made explicit mention of his main sources, *Fabius Pictor* and *Philinus*.³

Once you moved back into a period in which eyewitnesses were no longer available, your information became less trustworthy—*ως ἀκοήν ἐξ ἀκοής γράφειν*.⁴

'Nature has bestowed on us two instruments of enquiry and research, hearing and sight', he writes elsewhere.⁵ The traveller and the politician are pre-eminently qualified to write history, and, if they are to write it, and library research is no reputable occupation,⁶ it stands to reason that the history which they write must be, in the main, contemporary history.⁷

Not that what we should call learned historical research was entirely ruled out by Polybius. The despised figure on a couch comfortably comparing *τὰς τῶν προγενούτων συγγραφέων ἀγνοίας*⁸ was at least exercising his critical faculties; and Polybius himself gives ample evidence of such a critical spirit in the study of his literary sources in the period before 219 B.C. He appreciated the 'honest bias' both of *Pictor* and of *Philinus*,⁹ which means that he cannot be assumed at any point to have followed the account of either author blindly. Likewise he appreciated the existence of gaps, and very important gaps, in the writings of his hero Aratos—gaps which he was honest enough to fill in, however disingenuously he may have explained their presence.¹⁰

Even on his main field, the history of the years 219 to 168 B.C., Polybius must have done plenty of reading. What was original in his own treatment was the presentation of the period as 'organic' in a 'universal history'. Earlier writers had covered the period, but from a different point of view. Either they had written monographs on limited subjects¹¹ or, in the case of published

¹ 1. 3. 1 and 5.

² 4. 2. 2. Cf. 3. 48. 12 where, in the field of Roman history, he states that he has questioned people present at Hannibal's crossing of the Alps in 218 B.C. The modern historian (unless he has served in Intelligence during a war) may (unlike the modern anthropologist, with field experience) forget that for the ancient historian writing contemporary history the technique of questioning was an extremely important one. Polybius knew this well, and says so, 12. 28a. 7 ff. *οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον ὁ πυνθανόμενος τῶν ἐπαγγελ-λόντων συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ἐξήγησον, α*

remark which must have delighted R. G. Collingwood.

³ 1. 14 f.

⁴ 4. 2. 3.

⁵ 12. 27. 1, tr. Shuckburgh.

⁶ 12. 27. 4.

⁷ Sir Winston Churchill's current history, in respect of author and subject alike, would, more than any book published for a long time, satisfy Polybius' notion of real historical writing. Cf. 12. 25h. 6 on the importance of practical experience on the part of the historian.

⁸ 12. 27. 5.

⁹ 1. 14 f.

¹⁰ 2. 47. 11.

¹¹ 1. 4. 6; 32. 3 ff.

histories of Rome, whether written in Greek or in Latin (and it is curious that Polybius has nothing to say of Latin histories), they had presumably been written from the point of view of the expanding Italian power, without giving Greece, Macedon, and the eastern Powers the creative part in the huge complex which Polybius gave them.

Which of these Roman historians is Polybius likely to have read? Fabius Pictor, on his own statement, he used for the First Punic War, and it is as certain as can be that he used him for the Gallic War of 225 B.C.¹ If the view is correct that Fabius' history extended to the end of the Second Punic War, Polybius presumably read it for that war too—however unsympathetically, for it was a war in which Fabius and Polybius had different heroes. There were three other Roman histories written in Greek which were published in time for Polybius to read, those of L. Cincius Alimentus, C. Acilius, and A. Postumius Albinus (this last he knew about, by his own statement²), and one in Latin which he would have had to be very strong-minded indeed not to insist on reading, the *Origines* of Cato. And L. Cassius Hemina's history, down to book 4 (dealing with the Second Punic War) was evidently published before 149 B.C.³

In general scope all these histories written by Romans were remarkably alike. They started with the first origins of Rome and they came down to the writer's own time, the histories of Fabius (probably) and of Cincius Alimentus⁴ to the end of the Second Punic War, Cato's to 150 B.C., and those of Acilius⁵ and Postumius Albinus⁶ to the middle of the second century B.C. Polybius may indeed have had his eye on these very histories when he wrote as contemptuously as he did of contemporary historians who concerned themselves with myths, genealogies, and the foundations of cities (this last a subject which occupied three out of the seven books of Cato's *Origines*).⁷ The allocation of space to different periods of history seems in every case to have been alike. The early history of Rome, on which there was abundant legendary tradition, was treated at great length; so was the history of events near to the lifetime of the writer. The intervening period was sketchily handled, presumably because the historians knew very little indeed about it.

Modern historians have concerned themselves widely about the titles of these books and the chronological methods followed by their writers. Nearly all of them are referred to sometimes as *Annales*, sometimes as *Historiae*. Cato's book was called *Origines*. The other four, written in Greek, two at least—those of Fabius Pictor⁸ and of Cincius Alimentus⁹—with a certain propagandist purpose and with one eye on the Greek reading public outside Italy, must have been called *Ῥωμαϊκά, περὶ τῆς Ῥωμῆς, Ῥωμαίων Πράξεις*, or something of the kind. And that the Latin description of a work, whether *Annales* or *Historiae*, on the part of a later writer, cannot be pressed for evidence about method, should be clear enough.¹⁰

¹ 2. 24; Peter, *H.R.R.* i², pp. xciii and 35 f., 23 (with note). I regret that P. Bung, *Q. Fabius Pictor, der erste römische Annalist*, Kölner Phil. Diss., 1950, has not been accessible to me.

² 39. 1. 4. He referred to it as a *πραγματική ἱστορία*. I agree with Walbank (*C.Q.* xxxix. 16) that this means 'serious history', and carries no implication at all about the historical method which Postumius em-

ployed.

³ *H.R.R.* i², p. clxv.

⁴ *H.R.R.* i², p. ciii.

⁵ *H.R.R.* i², pp. cxxi f.

⁶ *H.R.R.* i², pp. cxxiv f.

⁷ *H.R.R.* i², pp. cxxxiii f.; cf. Dionysius 1.

11. 1.

⁸ See M. Gelzer, *Hermes*, lxviii (1933), 129–66.

⁹ *H.R.R.* i², p. ciii, n. 1.

¹⁰ Though not, unfortunately, from the analogy of Tacitus' *Histories* and *Annals*,

In speculating about historical writing at Rome in the second century B.C. we are handicapped by knowing so little about the accessibility for consultation of the records of the Pontifices, the *annales pontificum*,¹ known after their publication as the *Annales Maximi*.

Though there are discrepancies between our only two descriptions of the *Annales Maximi*, those of Cicero² and of Servius Danielis,³ we can with some confidence believe that in the period down to about 120 B.C. a board was posted annually outside the *Regia*, headed by the names of the consuls and other magistrates of the year, and that notable events of the year were recorded on it under their proper dates, as they occurred, for the information of the public, and that these boards were subsequently stacked, or more probably their contents were copied and preserved inside the *Regia* for the purpose of record. In about 120 B.C. they were published in eighty books by the Pontifex Maximus P. Mucius Scaevola and, for the first time, called *Annales Maximi*.⁴

After that we cannot answer the questions which we are, none the less, bound to ask. What was the earliest date on these records? and—this is something quite different—when did the practice of posting up the *tabula* and keeping the records start? Apart from such things as corn prices, eclipses,⁵ and prodigies,⁶ what sort of information was to be found in these records?⁷ Were they consulted at all for the past history of Rome by historians from the time of Q. Fabius Pictor down to the time of their publication? What led P. Mucius Scaevola to publish them? And how could they contain enough information to fill eighty books? Did the practice of posting and keeping records stop after Scaevola's publication? What substitute was there, in that case, until the publication of the *Acta Senatus* and *Acta Diurna* started in 59 B.C.? Did the publication of Scaevola at once release historical information of great value which earlier historians had not possessed? Why are quotations from the *Annales Maximi* in surviving Latin literature of a later date so rare? Why, indeed, is it that there are only three men who have left any record of having read them—Cicero, Atticus, and Verrius Flaccus?⁸

As an example of a typical year's record finding its way with little change from the *Annales Maximi* into the history books, Peter⁹ quotes Livy 30. 26 (for the year 203 B.C.). The events recorded are the dispatch of three named envoys¹⁰ to protest to Philip of Macedon concerning his infringement of the Peace of Phoenice, a great fire, floods, the state of the corn market, the death of Q. Fabius Maximus, the election of his successors in the College of Augurs and the College of Pontifices, and notes on the games.

It is a curious thing that Peter should have selected this chapter of Livy for

since we do not know what were the titles of those works at the time of their publication. For a discussion of the form of these early histories, see M. Gelzer, *Hermes*, lxix (1934), 46–55.

¹ Distinct from the *Libri Pontificales* and the *Commentarii Pontificum*: *H.R.R.* i², pp. iii–vii.

² *De Oratore* 2. 52.

³ Ad Verg. *Aen.* 1. 373 ('Et vacet annalis nostrorum audire laborum').

⁴ For clear and good articles on the *Annales Maximi*, see Peter, *H.R.R.* i², pp. iii–xxix, C. Cichorius, *R.-E.* 1. 2248 ff. (s.v. 'Annales').

⁵ Cato, fr. 77 (*H.R.R.* i², 77); Cic. *De Rep.* 1. 25.

⁶ Aulus Gellius 4. 5. 1–6.

⁷ Peter suggests election results, deaths of distinguished men (particularly priests), dedications of buildings, and notable public events.

⁸ Atticus in Cic. *De Legg.* 1. 6 ('Quibus nihil potest esse ieiunius', if we accept Ursinus' emendation of the MSS. *iucundius*!); Cic. *De Rep.* 1. 25; Verrius Flaccus, source of Aulus Gellius 4. 3. 1–6.

⁹ *H.R.R.* i², p. xxvii.

¹⁰ C. Terentius Varro, C. Mamilius, M. Aurelius.

his illustration, for on the question whether the dispatch of three envoys to Philip in 203 B.C. is a true historical fact big historical issues depend. If it is true, then relations between Rome and Philip between the Peace of Phoenice and the declaration of war in 200 B.C. were uneasy. And, if that is true, the theory which Holleaux propounded of the causes of the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War which, with one variation or another, has since become orthodox, will not hold water at all. Holleaux and the scholars after him have therefore dismissed the embassy mentioned by Livy as a palpable annalist invention;¹ one has even gone so far in paradox as to claim that the very fact that the three envoys can be identified as historical characters actually alive at the time makes the story highly suspect.²

It is possible, of course, to be radical, but less radical than that; to believe that the embassy is an historical embassy, its existence and the names of its members having been recorded once and for all in the *Annales Maximi*, but to suggest that the alleged purpose of the embassy may not have been recorded officially and may be an invention of the 'Roman annalists'. This midway course is adopted by T. R. S. Broughton in his *Magistrates of the Roman Republic*.³

However, the embassy must have been an embassy to Philip and in the *Annales Maximi* it must have been recorded as such. And as, quite certainly, it did not go to congratulate Philip, it must have gone in order to warn him, or to complain. To warn or to complain about what?

According to Livy, about his reported violation of the Peace of Phoenice. Impossible, Holleaux contends, because Philip never violated the Peace of Phoenice. How can we be sure of this? Because of the evidence of Polybius. And what is the evidence of Polybius? For let it be remembered that the portion of Polybius' history describing events in Greece between 205 and 201 B.C. is lost. And let it be remembered further that in 198 B.C. Flamininus offered Philip peace if, among other conditions, he restored the districts in Illyria ὅπερ γέγονε κύριος μετὰ τὰς ἐν Ἡπείρῳ διαλύσεις (i.e. after 205 B.C.).⁴ Holleaux has argued vigorously for translating this 'the places which Philip acquired after (i.e. in accordance with) the Peace of Phoenice'⁵ and, if you restrict your reading of Polybius 18. 1. 14 to this part of the sentence, as Holleaux in quoting always does, this translation is possible. But the sentence of Polybius continues: ἐρωτός δὲ καὶ Πτολεμαῖον τὰς πόλεις ἀποκαταστήσαι πάσας, ὃς παρήργηται μετὰ τὸν Πτολεμαῖον τοῦ Φιλοπάτορος θάνατον.

μετὰ τὸν θάνατον certainly does not mean 'in accordance with the death of Ptolemy'. And so one may wonder again about μετὰ τὰς ἐν Ἡπείρῳ διαλύσεις.

¹ So F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge, 1940), 283, n. 1, 'Derived from the anti-Macedonian propaganda of the years 200-199 B.C.'

² E. J. Bickerman, *C.P.* xl (1945), 143 and note 78, 'The names of imaginary [sic] Roman envoys of 203 B.C. are well chosen—a trick often used in annalistic amplifications.' Varro was the unfortunate consul of 216 B.C. and, if Livy (A) 31. 11. 18 is to be trusted, was to serve on another *legatio* in 200 B.C. Mamilius was praetor in 207, Aurelius plebeian aedile in 216.

³ American Philological Association, New

York, i. 313 and 315, n. 7, quoting J. E. A. Crake, *Archival Material in Livy*, Johns Hopkins Dissertation, 1939, 155 (alas, unpublished).

⁴ P. 18. 1. 14.

⁵ *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques* (Paris, 1921), 278, n. 1 and *C.A.H.* viii. 156, n. 1. Holleaux's further contention that, as Polybius did not use the perfect tense as a past definite, γέγονε κύριος must mean 'he possessed', not 'he seized', is of no validity; for the monograph of A. Schøy, *De Perfecti Usu Polybiano* (Bonn, 1913), shows that Polybius used the perfect tense in a variety of senses, sometimes as a past definite.

With all the caution in the world, it is at least not impossible that *ἀντικένεις κύριος μετὰ τὰς διαλύσεις* does mean 'which he seized after the Peace of Phoenice'.¹ In which case there is Polybian evidence of misbehaviour by Philip in the west between 205 and 201 B.C.

This is no place to stir up the great hornet's nest of the causes of the Second Macedonian War. My object here is simply to urge that we should talk less sweepingly than is the present fashion of 'palpable annalist inventions' and should not reject wilfully evidence in the annalistic portions of Livy which may well have the respectable authority of the *Annales Maximi*. We need further to inquire whether the publication of the *Annales Maximi* in the late second century B.C. made available to historians much solid factual evidence which had not been at all easily available earlier. For, if this was the case, the next generation of historians, and in particular the important 'Sullan annalists' Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius, may have had some good historical material to work on which was not used by earlier Roman historians, and was not even used by Polybius himself.²

Exeter College, Oxford

J. P. V. D. BALSDON

¹ As, if we may be allowed to attach any importance to the fact, Livy, in translating this sentence of Polybius, thought that it did (32. 33. 3 'Quae post pacem in Epiro factam occupasest').

² See Peter, *H.R.R.* i², pp. xii f., esp. xiii, n. 1, on the question of Polybius' use of the pontifical records. The evidence is odd—

not from the text of Polybius, but from the statement of Dionysius 1. 74. 3 (accepting Niebuhr's very plausible alteration of the manuscript reading). And it is impossible to be sure what, on a very remote point of Roman history, the *πίναξ* was, which he is said to have consulted.

THE NEA 'ΕΚΔΟΣΙΣ OF EUNAPIUS' HISTORIES

EUNAPIUS makes it clear in his *Lives of the Philosophers*, published some time after A.D. 396, that he had already published the major part of his historical work, and that he was contemplating extending its scope. He refers to the Gothic invasion of Greece in 395, and states that he has already recorded some of the disasters which befell about that time, and that he hopes to relate others *ἐὰν ἐπιτρέπῃ τὸ Θεῖον* (52/476).¹

Again (67/482) he refers to the death of Hilarius at the hands of the Goths during the same invasion and mentions that he will relate these events more fully in his historical work—this time *ἐὰν τῷ δάμονι δόξῃ*. Most probably at this period his work had been carried down to the death of Theodosius I in January 395. It is clear from the surviving fragments that Eunapius did in fact continue his work, and there is no reason to doubt the statement of Photius (*Bibl. Cod. 77*) that his *Histories* ended with the year 404, the year when Arsacius took the place of the exiled John Chrysostom as Bishop of Constantinople and when the Empress Eudoxia, the wife of Arcadius, died.² This task cannot have been completed before 414, as that year is alluded to in fragment 87.³ It would be natural to suppose that this extended version was the *νέα ἔκδοσις* which Photius stated that he had read, if it were not for some difficulties raised by his description of the work. He says, in brief, that he had read Eunapius' *Χρονικὴ ἱστορία ἡ μετὰ Δεξίππου, νέα ἔκδοσις*, a work in fourteen books beginning where Dexippus' history stopped, i.e. with the year 270, the last year of the reign of Claudius Gothicus, and ending with the year 404. Eunapius showed himself to be a keen supporter of paganism and a bitter enemy of Christianity, and so great was his admiration for the Emperor Julian that his history was almost an encomium in his honour. He had left two *πραγματεῖαι* embracing the same subject-matter, and Photius, from a comparison of the two made possible by the fact that in his day both were sometimes preserved together, had noticed that many passages hostile to Christianity had been removed from the second, although Eunapius' antipathy was still obvious. Where excisions had been made, the subsequent linking up of the narrative had been done so badly that it outraged the intelligence of his readers.

Since the *Lives of the Philosophers* contains some bitter statements about the Christians (e.g. 45/472 where he describes the deeds of Christian monks at Alexandria and Canobus in 391, and 53/476 where he speaks of monks as having aided Alaric's invasion of Greece in 395) it is difficult to explain why the *νέα ἔκδοσις* should display any modification in his feelings. It is also difficult

¹ In quoting from the *Lives of the Philosophers* I have given the reference both to Boissonade's edition of 1822 and to the Didot edition of 1849. Continental scholars usually refer to the former, while the pagination of the latter is reproduced in the Loeb edition (Philostratus and Eunapius: *The Lives of the Sophists*, with an English translation by Wilmer Cave Wright; London, 1922), which is probably the one

most readily available to English readers.

² For Photius' remarks on Eunapius cf. Migne, *P.G. ciii*, cols. 245-8; Müller, *Fragments Historicorum Graecorum*, vol. iv, p. 9; and Dindorf, *Historici Graeci Minores*, vol. i, pp. 205-7.

³ The historical fragments are to be found in Müller, op. cit., pp. 11-56, and Dindorf, op. cit., pp. 207-74. On this point cf. Müller's note on p. 53.

to see why the revision was not done in a more satisfactory fashion. These considerations have induced a number of scholars to adopt the view that the *vía ἔκδοσις* was not in fact produced by Eunapius himself but by a later editor, publishing at some period when it was dangerous or impolitic to put again into circulation a work so much opposed to official belief.

This view was first put forward by Niebuhr in *Script. Hist. Byz.*, tom. i, p. xix. He suggested that at some period between the times of Eunapius and Photius circumstances may have arisen, similar to those which arose in Europe after the Council of Trent, in which it became necessary to expurgate existing books, and that the task of revision may have been entrusted by some bookseller to an *inductus amanuensis* whose efforts produced the results of which Photius complains.

Niebuhr was followed by De Boor, who maintained¹ that the hypothesis was substantiated by the note inserted in the *Excerpta De Sententiis* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus between the sub-title introducing the excerpts from Eunapius and the text of frag. 1.² This note, which asserts that the writer had placed Eunapius after Priscus not through ignorance of history, but because of the dog-in-the-manger attitude of certain book-owners who had not allowed him to have access to their possessions, had been accepted by Mai and Niebuhr as being the work of the *eclogarius*. De Boor pointed out that it was extremely improbable that such a man, with the authority of the emperor behind him, would encounter difficulty in obtaining material to copy, and moreover, that an apology for contravention of chronological order is out of place in a work which does not elsewhere betray any attempt to adhere to it in the arrangement of authors. He suggested therefore that the excerptor must have found this note in his edition of Eunapius and unthinkingly copied it out as being by the author himself, and he further suggested that this note originated in a *Weltgeschichte in Einzeldarstellungen* containing the work of both Priscus and Eunapius. His next step was to maintain that the publisher of this Universal History was responsible for making alterations in the text as he found it and so created the *vía ἔκδοσις* read by Photius.³

Although Lundström⁴ has argued that even Constantine's excerptors might have had difficulty in obtaining all the material that they desired, and that they would not have been so stupid as to mistake this note for the work of Eunapius, De Boor seems justified in thinking that the note is from an earlier source. It is, however, quite possible that this earlier source might have been, not a Universal History as De Boor supposed, but an already existing collection of excerpts which was used as a quarry by Constantine's excerptors. Krumbacher⁵ points out that collections of excerpts were popular before the time of Constantine, and it would seem more likely that this note was written by the compiler of such a collection than that a publisher would embark on so ambitious a project as De Boor suggests without first making sure of his material. Moreover, the style of the note, with its Homeric quotation and its allusion to a fable, suggests rather the compiler of an educational work than the *inductus amanuensis* presupposed by the general argument. If this note did originate in

¹ *Rh. Mus.* xlvi (1896), pp. 321 ff.

² *Excerpta Historica Constantini Porphyrogeniti*, ediderunt Boissévain, De Boor, Bütner-Wobst, vol. iv, p. 71.

³ It should be noted that De Boor does not apply his theory to the *Lives of the Philo-*

sophers also, as Wright (*op. cit.*, p. 340) says that he does.

⁴ *Prolegomena in Eunapii Vitas Philosophorum et Sophistarum*, Uppsala, 1897, pp. 33 f.

⁵ *Byzantinische Litteraturgeschichte*, p. 258.

such a collection of excerpts, it is clear that while the collection may have used, it cannot have been, the *νέα ἔκδοσις*, and therefore De Boor's solution cannot be taken as cogent.

His theory has not generally been accepted *in toto*,¹ but it has been felt that the change in attitude towards Christianity and the stylistic flaws are best accounted for by presupposing the intervention of a publisher's hack of a later era. This idea, however, presents serious difficulties. It takes no account of the fact that Eunapius clearly had published a large part of his historical work before he wrote the *Lives*, and that thereafter he produced an extended version as we have seen above. Moreover, if the *νέα ἔκδοσις* were merely a less elegant and less fiercely anti-Christian production than the first edition, it is hard to explain why in the time of Photius both editions were often preserved together. This fact would surely suggest that each was considered to possess some independent merit. Lastly, if, as De Boor's theory suggests, the aim of the *νέα ἔκδοσις* was to make Eunapius more acceptable to Christian readers, it is strange that Photius describes it as *ἐπι πολλὰ τῆς ἐκεῖσε λύσσης ὑποφάίνουσαν*. (This difficulty seems to have been noticed by Vollebregt, as in No. IX of the theses appended to his dissertation² he suggests that the intention of the second edition was not so much to remove the violent outburst against the Christians as to arrange the historical facts in a more systematic fashion while at the same time curtailing some of the more polemic passages.)

One might add that, if it was considered necessary to expurgate Eunapius, it is strange that Zosimus should have escaped such treatment. Photius (*cod. 98*) says that the edition in which he read Zosimus was also called a *νέα ἔκδοσις*, but his description of it shows that this was not an expurgated edition. Moreover, the epithets applied to Zosimus by Evagrius in his *Ecclesiastical History*, written some time after 593,³ clearly indicate that Evagrius was not using an expurgated edition. This does not, of course, constitute any proof in the case of Eunapius, but one feels that it would be incumbent upon the supporters of the theories of Niebuhr and De Boor to account for the survival of Zosimus in unexpurgated form. It is perhaps significant, too, that while in his list of authorities⁴ Evagrius mentions both Dexippus and Zosimus, he does not include Eunapius. This might indicate that after Zosimus' work had appeared it was generally used in preference to that of Eunapius—a preference which would be understandable on stylistic grounds.

The most vigorous support for the claims of Eunapius himself to be the author of the *νέα ἔκδοσις* has been given by Lundström.⁵ He maintained that Eunapius produced a revised edition not only of the *Histories*, but also of the *Lives of the Philosophers*. He claimed that this revised edition had been used by Georgius Lacapenus in the first half of the fourteenth century in the version of Eunapius' Life of Libanius which he prefixed to his selection of the letters of Libanius.⁶ From a comparison of this version with that of the Life of Libanius in the Codex Laurentianus Mediceus, our best authority for the *Lives*, he pointed out that in the former *ὁ βασιλέψ* is used as an epithet of Julian instead of *ὁ θεούταρος*, that some passages are omitted, and that at the end a sentence

¹ See the remarks of Kroll (*Phil. Woch.* 1898, pp. 932-4), Boissevain (*Excerpta*, vol. iv, p. xiv, n. 2), and Schmid (*R.-E.* vi, pp. 1121-7).

² *Symbola in novam Eunapii Vitarum editionem*: J. C. Vollebregt, Amsterdam, 1929.

³ iii. 40-41.

⁴ v. 24.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 20-35.

⁶ Cf. Förster's edition of Libanius, vol. i, pp. 1 ff. On Lacapenus, cf. Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 558-60.

is added. He could not account for Lacapenus himself making these alterations, and therefore he concluded that they came from Eunapius' own revision of his work. Kroll¹ showed that one of the passages omitted contained a complicated simile, while another contained a cross-reference to the *Histories* which would be of little relevance in a passage detached from the main work, and therefore expressed doubt about the soundness of Lundström's theory. Vollebregt, who made a most exhaustive study of the two versions,² pointed out that many of the variations in the Lacapenus version were such as might have been introduced by one editing *in usum scholarum*, and that the final sentence might easily have been accidentally omitted from the Codex Laurentianus Mediceus. On stylistic grounds he maintained that the Lacapenus version as it stands could not be the work of Eunapius himself.

Kurt Latte³ has put forward the suggestion that there are traces of a revised version in the text of the *Lives* as we have it. His view is based mainly on the passage about the sons of Sosipatra (pp. 41/470 ff.), where he maintains that the two versions survive together. Vollebregt, however, points out⁴ that the passage linking the two appears to have been written by Eunapius himself, and that Eunapius is merely reiterating for the sake of clarity.

The theory that Eunapius made a revised version of the *Lives of the Philosophers* cannot therefore be taken as proved, but that does not really affect the main problem. The existence of such a revised version of the *Lives* would help to corroborate that Eunapius himself was responsible for the *νέα ἔκδοσις* of the *Histories*, but its non-existence does nothing to prove that he was not. The solution to the problem may be found, in my opinion, by a closer examination of the surviving fragments, and of the references made in the *Lives* to the historical work, which suggest that Photius was right in attributing the 'new edition' to the author himself.

To begin with, it is possible to show that, after publishing the *Lives*, Eunapius not only extended the scope of his historical work but also in places revised the subject-matter. Fragment 41⁵ is clearly an introduction to an account of the Huns. It begins as follows: *Tὰ μὲν οὖν πρώτα τῆς συγγραφῆς, οὐδένες οὐδὲν οὐφέλει λέγειν ἔχοντος ὅθεν τε ὅπεις οἱ Οὖννοι ὅπῃ τε κείμενοι τὴν Εὐρώπην πάσαν ἐπέδραμον καὶ τὸ Σκυθικὸν ἔτριψαν γένος, ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν συντιθέντοι κατὰ τοὺς εἰκότας λογισμὸὺς εἴρηται κτλ.* The first words have usually been interpreted as being a reference to the early parts of his book (cf. the translation in Müller, *In priore Historiae parte*), but this appears to be exceedingly improbable. The fragments of Eunapius preserved in the *Excerpta De Sententiis* seem to be in chronological order. The preceding excerpt (fr. 38 in Müller and Dindorf) refers to the conspiracy of Theodore, the imperial notary, against Valens in 374. It would be most probable that the Huns would make their first appearance in this or in any other history in the year 376 when they first defeated the Goths and compelled them to take refuge across the Danube, and so it seems likely that Eunapius here intends to give a descriptive note on the Huns when they first appear in his History.⁶ Surely then *τὰ πρώτα* cannot refer to the first books of

¹ Loc. cit.

² Op. cit., pp. 6-48.

³ 'Eine Doppelfassung in den Sophisten-Biographien des Eunapios', *Hermes*, 1923, pp. 441-7.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 93.

⁵ Cf. *Excerpta*, vol. iv, p. 84, no. 39. I have here adopted Boissévain's text.

⁶ This fragment and later descriptions of the Huns based on Eunapius are discussed by E. A. Thompson, *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 16 f.

the work. Since we know that a considerable portion of the work was devoted to the life of Julian, the first books must have been concerned with the period before his death, when there is no question of the Huns intruding into history. The fragments in the *Excerpta De Sententiis* are derived from the νέα ἔκδοσις as is stated by the title prefixed to them, and it is, I think, therefore certain that the words τὰ πρώτα refer to the first edition of the work. This proves that when he fulfilled his declared intention of adding to his work, Eunapius also made alterations and revisions. (This particular passage may have been revised on the strength of information received about the Huns who enlisted in the army of Theodosius in 388. Information about their habits may not have reached Sardis before 395, or alternatively, this part of the work may have been published some years before 395.)

One cannot, of course, claim that this 'revised' edition was the 'new' edition read by Photius unless one can give some explanation of the apparent change in attitude and the defects in composition to which Photius alludes. In this connexion, some passages in the *Lives of the Philosophers* afford useful clues.

There (25/464) we are told that Constantine entrusted to Ablabius his son Constantius, who had reigned along with himself, and who succeeded to his father's empire with his brothers Constantine and Constans. . . . ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν θείατον Ἰουλιανὸν ταῦτα εἴργαται. This statement is surely remarkable. Granted that Eunapius greatly admired Julian and that, as fr. 1 indicates, he thought that history should be written with a biographical bias, it is difficult to believe that in a history covering the period from 270 to 395 Eunapius would discuss the accession of Constantius in a book devoted to Julian. It is even more difficult to believe when we examine fr. 14. 1 where Eunapius reminds his readers that, although he is describing the deeds of Julian as Caesar, these actually took place when Constantius was on the throne. 'Just as, in the part devoted to Constantius, when my work made mention of them both, it brought into consideration to a greater extent the affairs of Constantius as the foremost personage, so now, when it is recording the story of Julian from his birth to his appointment as Caesar, it will again, as far as is possible, recall the stratagems and plots made by Constantius as opportunity arose.' This fragment is taken from the *Excerpta De Sententiis* and is consequently, as we have seen, quoted from the νέα ἔκδοσις. The most likely conclusion therefore is that in it part of the work was devoted to the reign of Constantius, adopting him as the main figure, whereas when the *Lives* were published the only treatment of the reign of Constantius was to be found in a passage centring round Julian. In 25/464 we have a reference to a work on Constantine, and therefore it seems likely that the 'first edition' contained lives of Constantine and Julian, but no separate discussion of Constantius. None of the references to Julian in the *Lives* would upset this theory.¹

It is noticeable too that the other references to the historical work in the *Lives* do not quote the name of the reigning emperor. In one of these (45/472) the phrase ἐν τοῖς καθολικοῖς τῆς ἱστορίας συγγράμμασι occurs. Elsewhere

¹ There are eight of these including the one already quoted. The others are 47/473 ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Ἰουλιανὸν; 53/476 ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἔκεινον (sc. Ἰουλιανὸν); 54/476 ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Ἰουλιανὸν βιβλίοις; 58/478 ἐν τοῖς διεξοδικοῖς τοῖς κατὰ Ἰουλιανὸν; 68/483 ἐν τοῖς κατὰ

Ἰουλιανὸν . . . διεξοδικοῖς; 97/495 ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς κατὰ τὸν Ἰουλιανὸν; 104/498 ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἔκεινον (sc. Ἰουλιανὸν). The variation in the method of citation probably afforded Eunapius considerable satisfaction.

(52/476, 63/480, 67/482, and 92/493) we find *ἐν τοῖς διεξοδικοῖς* or *ἐν τοῖς διεξοδικοῖς τῆς ἱστορίας*. These all refer to events after 363, and suggest that the work on Julian was followed by a Universal History which was less biographical in its form. The remaining reference (73/485), dealing with Prohaeresius, has the phrase *ἐν τοῖς ἱστορικοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἐξῆγησαν ὑπομνήμασι*, which suggests that some minor works may have existed.

It may well be, therefore, that after writing the *Lives of the Philosophers* Eunapius decided to reorganize the work which he had already published in such a way as to form a History beginning where Dexippus stopped and to add to it an account of events which had taken place since the first publication.¹

Such a task would not involve covering much extra ground. Constantine was born in 274 and was said to be related to Claudius Gothicus, and so even in a Life of Constantine it would be natural to discuss the period from 270 on. Fr. 8, which is said in the *Excerpta De Sententiis* to be the prologue of the second book, and which appears to refer to Julian's accession as Caesar, makes it clear that the first book cannot have been a detailed account of the period from 270 to 355. The adaptation of his earlier work necessitated by this change of purpose possibly involved the excision of matter which had more polemic than historical value, and this would help to explain the apparent change of attitude. This may of course also have been affected by the fact that pagan hopes suffered a severe set-back when Eugenius and Arbogast were defeated at the River Frigidus in 394.

The first edition, however, possibly gave a fuller treatment to some matters than did the second, and this would account for its subsequent preservation along with the second. If the objection is made that Photius would have noticed that the first edition stopped at 395, it can be pointed out that Photius only claimed to have read the second edition. His other activities and the vast scope of the Bibliotheca possibly did not afford him time for a detailed examination of the first edition, and on the hypothesis put forward the book most likely to have been affected by alteration would be the first—also the one most likely to have been used by Photius for the purposes of comparison. In 414, the earliest date at which the *νέα ἔκδοσις* could have been published, Eunapius was already sixty-eight, and it is quite possible that death or the decline of his powers prevented him from revising his work adequately, and this lack of revision would account for the occasional lack of clarity of which Photius complains.

This theory cannot, of course, be completely proved, but it does, I think, give a more satisfactory answer to the problem than those so far propounded.²

University of Nottingham

WALTER R. CHALMERS

¹ It may be significant that although Dexippus is mentioned in the *Lives* (114/57), Eunapius does not there refer to any connexion

between his own work and that of Dexippus.

² I am very grateful to Prof. E. A. Thompson for advice and suggestions.

AN IDENTIFICATION IN SUIDAS

Suidas s.v. ὑποστάς (Y 583, Adler): πορευομένων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ γενομένων κατὰ τὸν στεναπόν, προῆι μὲν δὲ Οὐλίθ, ὑποστάς δὲ δὲ Ἀναγάστης, τῷ δῆθεν ῥᾳδίως ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν διεξελθεῖν, τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς πῦλον ἀνέλαβε.

THIS passage was attributed to Menander Protector by Bernhardy, who, influenced apparently by Men. Prot. fr. 43 (F.H.G. iv. 245), suggested that here the name Ἀναγάστης disguised the Ἀναγάστης of Menander. This explanation, besides interfering with the text without due cause, ignores altogether the name Οὐλίθ.

In fact, the incident occurs a century earlier, in the period A.D. 467-70. Anagastes is then found in Roman service in Thrace during the reign of Leo (cf. Priscus, frs. 38-39, F.H.G. iv. 108-9). Moreover, the name of Anagastes is linked with an easily recognized variant of Οὐλίθ in Jo. Ant., fr. 205 (F.H.G. iv. 616): ἐπὶ Αἰθερίου καὶ Λέοντος τῶν βασιλέων, Οὐλίβος ὑπὸ Ἀναγάστου ἀνηρέθη κατὰ τὴν Θράκην, ἀμφότεροι τοῦ Σκυθικοῦ γένους, καὶ πρὸς τὸ νεωτερίζειν ἐπιτίθειοι.

The name Οὐλίβος, to which Müller took such grave exception (*nomen procul dubio corruptum*), thus receives the confirmation of Suidas, being merely a transcription of Οὐλίθ. This serves to dispose of the somewhat fanciful alternatives, based only upon historical probability, which are suggested in the note to Jo. Ant., fr. 205. The incident in Suidas, then, is a preliminary to the murder of Ulith (Ullibus), which must have been described in greater detail in a later passage, of which Jo. Ant., fr. 205, is a summary.

The author of this excerpt of Suidas is almost certainly Priscus. Long ago, Müller pointed out the indebtedness of Joannes to Priscus in this section of his work (fr. 203, note; F.H.G. iv. 616). The two names here, Ulith and Anagastes, find their parallel in the Ullibus and Anagastes of Joannes, in a passage which occurs just after a word-for-word rendering of Priscus (cf. Jo. Ant., fr. 204, note). Finally, the form of the name Οὐλίθ, which Joannes clothes in a form somewhat less barbarous, is in the best tradition of Priscus' nomenclature for barbarians (cf. fr. 38, Δεγγιζίχ; fr. 39, Χελχάλ).

Who was this Ulith? Joannes implies that he was, like Anagastes, a Goth in Roman service, where the barbarian turbulence and lack of discipline of the two of them caused trouble (*πρὸς τὸ νεωτερίζειν ἐπιτίθειοι*). He would probably one of the 'other generals' of Priscus, fr. 39, who took part in the Thracian operations of 466-469. After the murder of Ulith, in 469 Anagastes revolts, disgusted by the appointment of Jordanes to the consulship of 470, but he is finally induced to come to heel. Thereupon he blames Ardaburius for forcing him to rebel, and as confirmation forwards to the Emperor certain incriminating letters of Ardaburius (Jo. Ant., fr. 206).¹

If the murder and the revolt belong together in the same sequence of events—and it is evident from Priscus and Joannes that they are at no long interval—it is possible to see in this incident the start of far-reaching happenings for the Romans. It marks the occasion which brings the ambitious and frustrated Anagastes into open opposition towards the ruling faction,

¹ For these events cf. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, i. 319-20.

breaks the united front of Gothic military officers, and gives Zeno his opening.¹

Thus his intervention, which may commence with this murder, replaces the straightforward struggle for power between Goth and Isaurian by a three-cornered tussle between himself, Ardaburius, and Zeno, from which Zeno and the Isaurians emerge successful.

University College, Hull

A. F. NORMAN

¹ For the circumstances of the rise of Zeno, cf. Baynes, 'The *Vita S. Danielis Stylitae*' (*Eng. Hist. Rev.* xl (1925), pp. 397 ff.).

MARTIAL AGAIN

I WISH to reply to some of the objections raised by Mr. A. Hudson-Williams in *Class. Quart.*, vol. xlvi (1952), p. 27, to my notes on Martial in vol. xliv. In two places, on pp. 17 and 22, he corrects an error of mine, and in one or two other of his remarks he may well be right; but in many cases he does nothing more than repeat the traditional interpretation of a passage without commending it any more effectively than the editors do. I do not think there would be much profit in restating my view on all these passages, but there are some points I wish to make in reply.

9. 67. 4 (p. 27): Virg. *Aen.* 1. 2-3 surely cannot be cited as evidence that Martial could treat *que* as = 'or indeed'. H.-W. says 'see Conway's note'. I have done so, but it does not support H.-W. It is as follows: '*que* = *atque adeo*; cf. German *und zwar*; "Italy, and in particular the L. coast".' But in the passage of Martial *totas preces* and *prima verba* are inconsistent with one another; in the passage of Virgil *Italiam* and *Lavina litora* are not.

3. 50. 8 (p. 27): I do not agree that *aprum* is more 'natural' in this position than *aper*. H.-W. gives no parallels; I have given two the other way.

1. 109. 13 (p. 27): 'What', asks H.-W., 'is awkward about *deponi monet* and not awkward about *rogat levari*?' The answer is that the construction *monet deponi*, for *monet ut deponatur*, is not found, I think, at all in the Latin poets from Lucretius to Juvenal.¹ For *monet* (sc. *te*) *levarē*, on the other hand, cf. *Lucr.* 5. 1399, *Val. Flacc.* 4. 142; also *Gratt.* 1. 243 (*admonet*). Hence my view that we should accept the indirect evidence of C^A for *monet levarē* rather than the direct evidence of B^A for *monet deponi*.

As to *tantus* looking forward, H.-W. may be right; but I should be more easily convinced by parallels from Latin of less than three centuries earlier. *Hor. Sat.* 1. 1. 13 is no parallel at all: there *adeo sunt multa* is in parentheses.

2. 63. 3-4 (p. 28): My conditional clause—*sis dives*—is, I admit, very abrupt; but cf. Virg. *Aen.* 6. 31 'tu quoque magnam partem opere in tanto, sineret dolor, Icare, haberes'; *Stat. Theb.* 8. 560.

1. 34. 6 (p. 28): I meant, and I think it was clear from what I said, that *sub Memmi fornice*, 'under Memmius' arch', might imply to a man who knew his Rome much the same as 'in Memmius' brothel'. That *fornix* does, by Martial's time, often mean a brothel, is no proof that he could not have here used it, as he does at 12. 61. 8, in the sense of 'arch'. I am grateful to H.-W. for citing from Ps.-Cornutus the fact that there *was* once a brothel-keeper named Memmius, for it seems to support my suggestion that *Memmi* is genitive of *Memmius*, so that there is still less need than ever to invent an adjective *Sub-Memmi*, a quarter called *Submemmium* (Izaac) or even 'a manager . . . humorously given the name *Submemmius*' (H.-W.). I agree that the word *Summemmianus* has still to be accounted for.

2. 69. 8 (p. 29): I expressly excluded in my footnote instances like *ecce, audi*, 'here it is, listen', which is clearly not an adequate parallel to *ecce nega*. So I do

¹ The reason for this lies no doubt in the meaning of *moneo*. *Rogo*, meaning 'I ask leave to', can naturally be used with the infinitive; cf. *rogat ponere*, 'asks leave to lay aside' (12. 18. 25); *Stat. Theb.* 10. 591, *Silv.* 2. 1. 222; *Luc.* 9. 1102, *Val. Flacc.* 7. 379. L. and S. is particularly unhelpful in this matter; see especially s.v. *moneo* (I. 5).

not regard *ecce*, *adspice* as adequate either; still less *en adspice*, *en age*, *en incipe*, or *en* anything else.

2. 86. 9 (p. 29): H.-W. says that *habere nugas* means *facere* or *agere nugas*. As he refers us to *Thes. L.L.* 2441. 49, I have looked to see if anything parallel to *habere nugas* can be found there. I cannot there see anything other than familiar expressions like *habere orationem*, *verba*, etc., and *habere coetum*, *concilium*, *senatum*, *supplicationem*, *ludos*. (The compilers throw in, for full measure, *infantiam habere laboriosam*, and one or two other clear instances of *habere* with a predicate in the sense of 'to have').

5. 79. 5-6 (p. 29): H.-W. quotes from me 'enim cannot answer a question', but silently omits my qualification—'certainly not in the language of Martial'. As Martial does not use *enim*, a common word, in this way elsewhere,¹ I think that if there is another satisfactory way of taking the word, it may be right.

10. 11. 5-6 (p. 30): In support of the use by Martial of *ut multum* = 'at most', it seems to me unwise to cite *superlatives* like *ut minimum* (Heraeus) and *summum*. The only piece of anything like contemporary evidence that H.-W. offers us is Juv. 7. 187; and there Duff says it means 'and a great deal too', Ramsay 'and more than enough'. It seems bold therefore to say that this was 'an idiomatic expression' in the time of Martial.

11. 1. 3-4 (p. 31): If *certe* is right, the only translation which seems to me likely to be correct would be: 'you may go, of course—and return unopened' (i.e. 'if you like')—ironically.

11. 7. 13-14 (p. 31): It seems to me a strong objection to H.-W.'s interpretation of this couplet, that the words *quotiens placet* suggest that Martial is not thinking of the *past* but the *present* or *future*. That the truth should be truth about the *past* seems to me quite inappropriate here.

14. 30. 1-2 (p. 31): This poem accompanies a gift of hunting-spears. One would surely expect (the tone certainly suggests it) that the poem would be designed to commend the spears to their recipient. Would Martial then say 'These spears will *await* lions'? After all, you can *await* a lion with a tooth-pick. Stranger still is the insertion of this *mild* verb between two verbs which express the ideas of *intercepting* and *piercing*.

The fact that Isidore has *expectabunt* in his text certainly proves that the word is not a medieval corruption. But may it not have been corrupted *before* the time of Isidore?

Trinity College, Cambridge

ALAN KER

¹ The purely affirmative *enim* is not found in Martial either; and I should hesitate to regard evidence from Plautus and Terence as strong. At Pers. 1. 63, cited by H.-W., *enim* does not *answer* a question at all.

NOTES ON STATIUS (*continued*)

Theb. 1. 494-7

Sensit manifesto numine ductos
adfore, quos nexas ambagibus augur Apollo
portendi generos, vultu fallente ferarum,
ediderat.

This is the reading of the manuscripts with the punctuation given it in the Delphin, Loeb, and Teubner editions. But the future (*adfore*) does not give the sense required. Adrastus is gazing with horror at the two young men who have arrived on his doorstep, realizing that they are the lion and the boar of Apollo's oracle (cf. 395-7 'cui Phoebus generos . . . fato ducente canebat saetigerumque suem et fulvum adventare leonem'). The whole force of the blow lies in the fact that they have actually arrived. The Delphin editor solves the problem by saying that *adfore* means *adesse*, the Loeb by translating 'that they had come'. Gruter suggested *ac fore*, and Garrod accepted this, putting a comma after *ductos*. But I do not see how this helps. I suggest that the reading of the manuscripts is correct, provided that we take *adfore* with *quos . . . ediderat*; i.e. put a comma after *ductos* and supply *esse*. The presence of three verbs, *adfore*, *portendi*, and *ediderat*, may seem a little clumsy, but each has its point; and the future is now natural, depending upon *portendi*: 'he realized that the clear will of heaven had brought to his house the sons-in-law of whom Apollo had announced that their future arrival was destined by fate.'

I shall now deal with two passages in which I think that the reading of the manuscripts should be defended from alteration.

Theb. 5. 11-13 qualia trans pontum Phariis deprena serenis
rauca Paractonio decedunt agmina Nilo,
cum fera ponit hiems.

13 Vollmer alters *cum* to *quo*, *ponit* to *cogit*, and expects us to take *cogit* as if it were *coegit*; and he is followed by the Teubner and the O.C.T. editors. But *cum ponit* (ωS) simply means 'when the stormy weather¹ abates'. For this use of *pono*, fairly common of winds in Virgil, cf. *Silv.* 2. 2. 118.

Theb. 8. 40-41 nec iste meus, dirisque en pervius astris | inspicitur.

Garrod's *diris quin* seems unnecessary; and *quin* in Statius always means 'nay', 'nay more' (or 'why not?'). With *dirisque en* (MSS.) the meaning is 'but lo! the hateful stars have found their way to this world, and are looking in'.

Next I shall deal with some passages in the epics at which many of the editors seem to me to choose wrongly between two or more readings of the manuscripts, and which I mention because it is not merely, I think, a matter of taste. More than half these instances show how unwise it is to over-value the Puteaneus against the other manuscripts.

Theb. 2. 382-3 hinc praetervectus Nisum et te, mitis Eleusin, | laevus abit.
So P, and most of the modern editors. But DKHSQ¹ give *habet* (A *habit*); and at 1. 384 we find *laevus habens*. Must we not therefore accept *laevus*

¹ For *hiems* of wind cf. 8. 426.

habet here? It cannot mean 'leaving Eleusis on his left hand' (Loeb), *à gauche* (Nisard) (that would be *laevam habens*). It is a very strange hypallage, but surely it must mean that Tydeus was on Eleusis' left; i.e. he passed leaving it on his right.

Theb. 3. 583 *haerentesque situ gladios*. One assumes from the Oxford, Teubner, and Loeb editions that *haerentes* is the reading of all the manuscripts; but actually all the good manuscripts read *horrentes* (= *horridos*, 'rough'); and Gronovius was surely wrong to alter it.

Theb. 4. 653-4

ibi armiferos geminae iam sidera brumae
orgia ferre Getas (assueverat).

geminae brumae can admittedly mean 'of a pair of winters', cf. *Silv.* 3. 1. 101 (though why a *pair*?). But *sidera g. b.* cannot mean 'during the passage of a pair of winters'. If, however, we take the *sidera* of *ω* and the *gelidae* of *P*, and can stomach the fact that this is *lectio facilior*, we get sense and grammar—'in the cold season¹ of winter'.

Theb. 4. 818-21

nunc sordet aquis egestus ab imis
alveus; inde toros riparum et proruta turbant
gramina; iam crassus caenoque et pulvere torrens,
quamquam expleta sitis, bibitur tamen.

819 *P* has here been deserted by editors, without good reason. It has *tori*, *ω* has *toros*. *tori ri-* is the more likely to have been corrupted. Moreover, with *toros*, the sequence of the whole passage is strange: first the stream is fouled by the soldiers all jumping into it and stirring up its *imae aquae*; but they are also said to trample down and confound the banks and the *proruta gramina*. Such a reading would be possible only if we had *prorunt turbata gramina*. Finally the stream is stated to be still foul though they go on drinking it, in spite of the quenching of their thirst. But if we read *tori*, we get a more coherent statement: the stream is doubly fouled, first by the men jumping in, and then by the banks falling into it (*proruta* = 'tumbling forward') and confounding it (*turbant*, sc. *eum*²).

Theb. 5. 325 *maestam sine coniuge Lemnon*. This is the reading of *B²* (marg.) and *L* (*L² ap.* Klotz); but the rest have *culmine*: 'Lemnos without its head man'; cf. 3. 207 *cives, tot culmina patriae*.

Theb. 6. 177-85. Here the reading of the great majority of *ω* should be followed: *tu* (180) is Lycurgus, and *cui . . . honos* means 'who hast won honour by the child I gave thee'. If we follow *P* (as the O.C.T. does) we have to emend the text in 181, in 182 (to *exsequias* and *paranti*), and in 183 (to *nesciat*). There are also difficulties in *hoc saltē* (180) and *quia* (182). Nor should we remove line 184 simply because *P* omits it:³ *cui luget complexa suos?*, said by the distracted mother, is surely too good to be false. Moreover, l. 185 has been transposed in *P* to after l. 176, where it does not fit. Is it not wiser to accept the two perfectly coherent lines 184 and 185 as they stand in nearly all the other

¹ For this sense of *sidus* in *S.* cf. 5. 459.

² For this habit of supplying the object from some way back cf. 3. 447, 4. 783, 5.

480, 7. 487; *Ach.* 1. 141, 274, etc.

³ *P* evidently omitted lines 184 and 185 through the homoeoteleuton in 183 and 185.

manuscripts, namely, 'cui luget complexa suos?' sic fata repente | concidit, abruptisque obmutuit ore querelis'.¹

Theb. 8. 436-7

dilecta genis morientis oberrant
Taygeta et pugnae laudataque pectora matri.

P has *pectora*, the rest (and Lactantius) *verbera*. Perhaps the dying Spartan might think of the fact that his mother praised his breast or chest; but surely, with *pugnae*, *verbera* is far better, 'the fisticuffs and the lash' of the *flagellatio* which his Spartan mother would approve as part of his training. The oxymoron in *verbera* and *laudata matri* would seem nonsense to some scribes.

Theb. 9. 58 nil opus arma ultra temptare et perdere mortis.

Many of the modern editors reject *perdere* (ωS) for *pergere* (P), taking *mortis* as its subject. But *perdere* is clearly right. Polynices, shocked by the death of his dearest ally, Tydeus, cries in grief that he will now take the burden of the war upon himself alone, and bids his men leave the field: 'no need to make further trial of war and waste deaths'. There is a close parallel at 11. 174, where *vestris mortibus utar* means 'Am I to make use of your deaths?' And just below, Polynices repeats this figure of speech in *Tydea consumpsi* (60): 'I have used up Tydeus'.

I will now put forward some interpretations and emendations of passages in both epics in the order in which they occur in them.

Theb. 3. 470 ac prior Oeclides solitum prece numenam icat: | 'Uppiter' etc.

The word *amicat* is unique. It seems to bear no immediate relation to the rare verb attested by grammarians, inscriptions, and a few early Christian texts, in which *amicari* seems to mean something like *amicus esse*. Here *amicat* seems to be used in the sense of 'renders friendly'. Are we to suppose that Statius coined this use for this passage, or is it not more likely that he wrote *amica*, and that a copyist, missing a main verb, made it into one? Statius not uncommonly (and very frequently in this book) breaks into the direct speech of one of his characters without any verb to introduce it. In these cases the person addressed is usually in the dative. Here we should have the person addressed in the accusative (*solitum numen*), as though the verb to be supplied were *alloquitur* or *compellat*. I believe a parallel is to be found at 1. 648, where we have *illum² iterum Capaneus* (sc. *alloquitur*). *prece amica* = 'with pleasing prayer'; cf. Hor. *Od.* 4. 6. 41 *dis amicum . . . reddidi carmen*.

Theb. 4. 64-67 pars gaesa manu, pars robora flammis
indurata diu . . . habet, teretes pars vertere fundas
adsueti vacuoque diem praecingere gyro.

vertere (for *torquere*) *fundas*, is clearly wrong, and the O.C.T. gives us P's *vertice* (= 'whirling'), but this involves us in altering *teretes* to *-is* and *fundas* to *-ae*. I suggest that there may be an echo here of *Georg.* 1. 309 and that we should

¹ Klotz reports differently from Garrod on the readings here, but the differences are unimportant. Klotz regards ll. 184 and 185 as spurious, evidently because he assumes P is right.

² I do not think we need alter, with the young Lachmann, to *illi*; still less should we accept D's *ille* (O.C.T.).

read *verbere*, which, reduced to *vere*, might have been variously filled out, with *-ter*- and *-tic-*. The construction then is a mild hyperbaton¹ for *pars (habet) tereles fundas, adsueti verbere vacuoque gyro praecingere diem*, 'accustomed to gird the daylight with lash and empty circle'.

Theb. 4. 570-1 tristem nosco *Lycum dextramque in terga reflexum*
Aeoliden, umero iactantem funus onusto.

The spirit of Athamas is seen with the corpse of his son on his shoulder. But why *iactantem*? His right hand is behind his back. One does this not in order to throw a burden on one's back but to *carry* it (unless we are to imagine Athamas as continually hitching it up). The verb we require is surely not one that represents an act, like *iactare*, but one that represents a state. Therefore perhaps we should read *veclantem*.

Theb. 4. 726-9 non ora modo angustisque perusti
faucibus, interior sed vis quatit; aspera pulsu
corda, gelant venae, et siccis crux aeger adhaeret
visceribus.

The Argive army is overcome with thirst. In l. 727 can Statius have meant to say that their hearts were rough (or savage) with throbbing? Is it not more likely that *pulsu*, the throb of the blood at the heart, is to be taken (removing the semicolon) with *quatit*? This gives us a double epithet with *vis*, but *interior* is adverbial in sense, and *aspera* may even be said to go as closely with *quatit* as with *vis*.² *corda* will then be the object of *gelant*.

Theb. 5. 106-8 si taedet inanis
aeternum servare domos turpemque iuventae
flore situm et longis sterilis in luctibus annos.

Polyxo rouses the Lemnian women to anger at their husbands' desertion of them. But *servare* cannot easily be expected to do duty with *situm* and *annos* as well as *domos*: 'to preserve shameful inactivity in the flower of your youth' may certainly pass, after *preserving* homes, but to add the idea of *preserving* sterile years in lasting grief makes an uncomfortable zeugma. It may be that this is what Statius wrote, but is it not possible that for *flore* we should read *flere*: 'to weep for the shameful inactivity of your youth and for your sterile years in lasting grief'? *iumentae flore* is a cliché which might have made a scribe think he saw *flore* when he really saw *flere*.

Theb. 5. 389 abiunctis regemunt tabulata cavernis.

abiunctis cavernis cannot mean 'the gaping holes are torn' (Mozley). Nisard and Valpy evade the problem. *abiungere* means to 'disjoin' (elsewhere in S., once, to 'remove'). *cavernae* surely means the hold of the ship; and I suggest that the whole phrase means 'the deck answers (*re-*) with a groan to the broken hold'. It is just possible that *cavernae* may be used, technically, of the *fustes navium, quibus*, according to Servius (on *Aen.* 2. 19), *extrinsecus tabulata adfiguntur*. But it seems more likely that in epic poetry, even if Statius knew this sense of

¹ Cf. 4. 716, 6. 272, 375, 7. 418, 8. 547, 9. 135, 11. 407; *Ach.* 1. 31; *Silv.* 5. 1. 252. ² Cf. 8. 639-40 *dependet languida cervix exterior clipeo.*

cavernae, he would here have intended it, as Lucan evidently does (at 9. 110), in the sense of 'hold'.

Theb. 5. 599–604 and 7. 436–40

ac velut aligerae sedem fetusque parentis
cum piger umbrosa populatus in ilice serpens,
illa redit querulaque domus mirata quietem
stat super impendens advectosque horrida maesto
excutit ore cibos, cum solus in arbore paret
sanguis et errantes per capta cubilia plumae.

ac velut ignotum si quando armenta per amnem
pastor agit, stat triste pecus, procul altera tellus
omnibus et late medius timor; ast ubi ductor
taurus init fecitque vadum, tunc mollior unda,
tunc faciles saltus visaeque accedere ripae.

Both these two passages begin with *ac velut*, introducing a simile, but what is their construction? In the first we have neither a main sentence nor a return to Hypsipyle, both of which we have a right, after *ac*, to expect. In the second, too, there is no apodosis, nor do we return to the soldiers to whom the herd are being compared. In two other passages in the epics Statius introduces a simile with the same words: *Theb.* 1. 370 and 3. 22; but in each of these *talis* picks up *velut*, and the construction is complete. Here there is nothing of the kind. I am driven to the conclusion that Statius is here carrying to the limit of endurance his habit of omitting parts of the verb *sum*, and that we are to suppose, repugnant though it is, that he meant *alique <erat> velut*.

Theb. 6. 218–19 quater horrendum pepulere fragorem | arma.

Statius never uses *pello* except in the sense of 'drive' or 'drive away'. Apart from that, *pellere fragorem* seems too queer, even for Statius; queerer, I think, than Cicero's *longi sermonis initium pepulisti* (*Brut.* 87, § 297). Did not Statius write *peperere*, 'produced'; the verb being filled out wrongly after the loss of *-er*?

Theb. 7. 609–10 fugit exsertos Iocasta per hostes | iam non ausa preces.

Jocasta has been interceding with the Argives for peace, but meanwhile the meeting has heard of the treacherous Theban act of war. *ω* (and S) offer *externos*, which is not very suitable, especially in an internecine war. P has *exertos* (? = *exsertos*), but *exertos* would have to mean 'those who were revealed' as enemies'. Even if that can be wrung out of the Latin, the sense is not very good. I suggest that *exertos* may perhaps be a corruption of *exortos*; cf. 10. 455, *Silv.* 5. 2. 39, and Garrod's convincing emendation of 9. 700: 'the enemy who have appeared (before her)'.

Theb. 7. 624 tantus ab exiguo crudescit sanguine Mavors.

This is good sense, but P has *in ambiguo*, which surely suggests that Statius wrote *ab abiguo*, the loss of *ab* being variously filled—with *in amb-* or with *ab ex-*; cf. *Silv.* 5. 3. 125, where in M *pendet ab ambiguo* has become *pendet et ambiguo*.

* The verb is taken so at *Silv.* 5. 2. 39, but there *exerto* is only a conjecture for *exorto* (M) or *ex orto* (A).

'Doubtful bloodshed' means bloodshed of which the rights and wrongs are doubtful, as they are here: the Argives *assume* treachery in Eteocles (613), whereas the tigers' kill was really set off by Tisiphone (563 foll.); and cf. 12. 686 *ambiguo aestu curarum*.

Theb. 8. 285 *seque oneri negat esse parem cogique meretur.*

Thiodamas says he is not equal to the task of seer, and deserves to be compelled. No doubt a clergyman who cried *nolo episcopari* might, by showing the virtue of self-withdrawal, *deserve* to be compelled to undertake the office. But let us look at the simile which follows: 'he deserves to be compelled, just as a young Persian prince . . . fears to assume his father's throne.' Surely *veretur* in l. 291 calls for *veretur* in l. 285; cf. the confusion of the words at 2. 247, 10. 131.

Theb. 9. 84-85 *colloque iugum deforme remisso
parte trahit, partem lacrimans sustentat arator.*

'The bull [bereft of his mate] in part drags the disordered [because now lopsided] yoke with slackened neck, while part' [of the yoke] 'is held up by the mourning ploughman.' It is of course quite possible that, after *iugum*, we might be expected to supply *iugi* with *partem*; but it is a rather sudden change of construction for Statius; and I wonder if for *partem lac-* we should not read *parte in lac-*. *in* and *m* are often confused; and these two verbs have actually been confused at 3. 546, where P has *illacrimas*, while *ωS* have apparently omitted *in* after the *m* of *furtim* and give *lacrimas*.

Theb. 9. 277 *rapidus nodato gurgite vertex.*

The best attested reading here is *nudato*; but the above is that which is generally accepted, meaning 'entangled in a knot'. But this seems a strange verb to use of water, too impressionistic even for Statius. Other variants are *modato* and *notato*. Perhaps he wrote *motato*, 'with its moving whirlpool'. The verb is not found in Statius, but it is used by Virgil and Ovid.

Theb. 10. 26 *mors subitam †nigrit† stupet auguris umbram.*

The augur is Amphiaraus, who drove his chariot into hell, when the earth opened before it. *nigri* will not do, and a number of conjectures have been made. I suggest that a natural brief description might be got by reading *aurigae*, 'the charioteer seer', *aurigae* being used as an adjective like Juvenal's *mulio* at 8. 148.¹ The corruption might arise through *am(au)rigē*.

Theb. 10. 512-13 *profringunt inarata diu Pangaea iuvenci.*

This is the only instance of *profringunt* that I can find. D has *proscindunt* (superscript), evidently a conjecture; and Bentley approved this, no doubt as being the technical word for the first ploughing. But closer would be *perfringunt*, 'break up', a verb used by Statius with *costas* and *pectora*, and especially of breaking up the unwilling soil (*Silv.* 3. 1. 113).

Theb. 10. 686-9 *iamque iter ad muros cursu festinus anhelo
obtinet et miseros gaudet vitasse parentes,*

¹ Cf. 12. 59 *exsule umbra*, 'the exile ghost'.

cum genitor—steteruntque ambo et vox haesit utrique,
deictaeque genae.

Menoceus has determined to sacrifice himself, and here he is hurrying back to the walls, rejoicing to have avoided his parents, when his father —. There is no aposiopesis like this in Statius' epics. The instances of it are all instances in which either (1) the speaker interrupts himself, as at 3. 280, 4. 517, 7. 210, 8. 60, 514, 9. 799, 10. 730, 11. 167, 12. 301, *Ach.* 1. 47, 140, 157, 502, 657 (but see below); or (2) one character interrupts another, whether by words or by action, as at 3. 291, 4. 518, 12. 380, *Ach.* 2. 42; or (3) the author breaks off the speech of a character, as at 3. 87.¹ There is no instance in which the author interrupts himself. We must therefore either read *en* for *cum* (there are many examples of *iam* where the expected *cum* or *et* after it is omitted), or assume a lacuna after *genitor* which contained some line with the following sense: 'cum genitor <videt e muro atque occurrit eunti, stare iubens; > steterunt ambo', etc.

Theb. 12. 314-15 quamquam texta latent suffusaque sanguine maeret
purpura.

Argia is searching for her husband's body, and she recognizes his cloak, which she made herself. *maeret*, of the dark purple, might, in Statius' language, mean 'the purple cloak was in mourning', in the sense of 'looked like the garb of mourning', but that will not fit the passage. We want something parallel in sense to *latent*, 'although the garment was hidden, she recognized it'. I suggest *marcat* (through *macret*), 'although the purple was becoming faint [or] feeble, with the blood which it was soaked in'; cf. 8. 220, 4. 667, and *marcidus* at 4. 652, 8. 347, 12. 788.

Ach. 1. 656-60 quid gemis ingentis caelo paritura nepotes?
sed pater—ante igni ferroque excisa iacebit
Scyros et in tumidas ibunt haec versa procellas
moenia quam saevo mea tu connubia pendas
funere.

Achilles, under cover of his maiden's garb, has ravished Deidamia, and when she cries aloud, he tries to soothe her by revealing his divine birth. The aposiopesis at *sed pater* is the only one in Statius, of those in which a speaker interrupts himself, which is quite without dramatic force, or indeed any force at all. I think therefore there is ground for suspecting a lacuna in the text after *sed pater*. There is also internal evidence: the reference to Deidamia's death (659), as a punishment for her surrender, would be meaningless unless some reference had already been made to it. Is not *sed pater*, then, the beginning of a speech by Deidamia suggesting that her father will put her to death, and *ante igni*, etc., Achilles' rejoinder, or the latter part of it?

Ach. 1. 675-6 iamque per Aegaeos ibat Laertia flexus
puppis et innumerae mutabant Cyclades auras.

Ulysses comes to Scyros to search out Achilles. The editors go to great lengths

¹ I omit three passages which seem at first sight to be, but may not in fact be, cases of aposiopesis: at 1. 465 we should supply *sumus* with *egentes* (or read *egemus*); at 3. 312 we may punctuate *metus, quando . . . datur,* *cum*; and 9. 63-64 should perhaps be treated as an exclamation, like 8. 623-4. At 12. 385 I think *haec prior* means 'So spake Antigone before (Argia could intervene)'. (In 1. 384 read *pudet heu*.)

in finding a cure for *auras*; but all we need do is alter it to *oras*, cf. Lachmann on Lucre. 3. 405 and 835: 'the countless Cyclades were changing their shores'; i.e. to the sailors on board the ship these islands seemed to show a continually changing coast.

Trinity College, Cambridge

ALAN KER

SUPPLEMENTUM EPIGRAPHICUM GRAECUM

THE twelfth and subsequent volumes of *S.E.G.* will take the form of an annual review of Greek Epigraphy. As far as possible, it will give references to work done during each year on or relating to Greek inscriptions, and will reprint new or emended texts. The arrangement of the contents will be by geographical areas, on the general pattern of the early volumes of *S.E.G.* The editor and publishers are confident that this will be a service which epigraphists, and classical scholars generally, will appreciate and find helpful.

The editor would, therefore, be grateful if scholars who publish studies on Greek Epigraphy, or substantially using epigraphic material, would send him a notice (or if possible a reprint) of their work. Their co-operation in this way would be much appreciated, and would greatly aid him and the publishers in making *S.E.G.* as complete as possible.

All communications should be addressed to:

A. G. WOODHEAD, Esq.,
CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE,
ENGLAND.

Part II of volume xi, which was left unfinished at the death of the previous editor, Dr. J. J. E. Hondius, will be published as soon as possible.

Act
Alc
Ari
Bal
c
Bal
h
i
Blu
d
Bru
Chi
I
Cic
Da
a
Do
Eun
Go
n
Gre
Ha
c
Hal
His
s
Ke
—
Lid
(
Ma
No
1

Acl
Aca

Alc
Ari

Ari

INDEXES

GENERAL INDEX

Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* (416 ff.), 96.
 Alexander and his 'so-called' father, 151 ff.
 Aristophanes, *Wasps*, two notes on, 53 f.
Bailey, D. R. *Shackleton*, *num* in direct questions: a rule restated, 120 ff.
Baldson, J. P. V. D., some questions about historical writing in the second century B.C., 158 ff.
Bluck, R. S., the origin of the *Greater Alcibiades*, 46 ff.
Brunt, P. A., Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 2 (24), 62 ff.
Chalmers, W. R., the *νέα ἔκδοσις* of Eunapius' Histories, 165 ff.
 Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 2 (24), 62 ff.
Davison, J. A., Protagoras, Democritus, and Anaxagoras, 33 ff.
Dodds, E. R., notes on the *Oresteia*, 11 ff.
 Eunapius' Histories, the *νέα ἔκδοσις* of, 165 ff.
Gomme, A. W., the interpretation of *καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ* in Thucydides 4 (40. 2), 65 ff.
Greater Alcibiades, the origin of the, 46 ff.
Hamilton, J. R., Alexander and his 'so-called' father, 151 ff.
Handley, E. W., *XOPΟΥ* in the *Plutus*, 55 ff.
 Historical writing in the second century B.C., some questions about, 158 ff.
Ker, A., notes on Statius, 1 ff., 175 ff.
 —, Martial again, 173 f.
Lloyd-Jones, H., Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* (416 ff.), 96.
 Martial again, 173 f.
Norman, A. F., an identification in Suidas, 171 f.

Num in direct questions: a rule restated, 120 ff.
Oresteia, notes on the, 11 ff.
Owen, G. E. L., the place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's dialogues, 79 ff.
Page, D. L., Thucydides' description of the great plague at Athens, 97 ff.
Peck, A. L., Plato's *Parmenides*: some suggestions for its interpretation, 126 ff.
Platnauer, M., two notes on Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 53 f.
 Plato's dialogues, the place of the *Timaeus* in, 79 ff.
 Plato's *Parmenides*: some suggestions for its interpretation, 126 ff.
Plutus, *XΟΡΟΥ* in the, 55 ff.
 Protagoras, Democritus, and Anaxagoras, 33 ff.
Raven, J. E., Sun, Divided Line, and Cave, 22 ff.
 Status, notes on, 1 ff., 175 ff.
 Statius' *Silvae*, the manuscript tradition of, 69 ff.
 Suidas, an identification in, 171 f.
 Sun, Divided Line, and Cave, 22 ff.
Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (notice), 183.
 Thucydides 4 (40. 2), the interpretation of *καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ* in, 65 ff.
 Thucydides' description of the great plague at Athens, 97 ff.
Wasserstein, A., the manuscript tradition of Statius' *Silvae*, 69 ff.

INDEX LOCORUM

Adelian:
 V.H. 2 (8), 36.

Aeschylus:
Agam. (416-18), 96; (547), 11-12; (1141), 96; (1219), 12-13; (1472), 96.
Cho. (152-6), 13-15; (322), 15-16; (571-6), 16-18; (776), 12.
Eum. (119), 18-19; (246), 17; (332), 96; (690-5), 19-20; (988-91), 21.
Pers. (211), 18.
Suppl. (635), (681), 96; (918), 12.

Alciphron:
Epist. 4. 17 (8), 106.

Aristophanes:
Ecl. (629), 53.
Eq. (185), (225-8), 66; (734-40), 67.
Nub. (889), 58.
Plut. (passim), 55-61.
Ran. (626), 17; (718-37), 67; (1281), 53.
Thes. (922), 54.
Vesp. (564-6), 53-54; (769-73), 54.

Aristotle:
Eud. (fr. 46), 46.
Pol. 1293 (b39), 66.

Arrian:
Anab. 7 (14. 8), 156.

Aulus Gellius:
 5 (18. 7), 159.

Catullus:
 55 (17), 124.

Cicero:
Ad Att. 2 (20. 1), (22. 7), 63; (24), 62-64.
Brut. 87 (297), 179.
De Div. 1 (24), 125.
De Leg. 1 (6), 162.
De Orat. 2 (51), (53), 158.
Phil. 2 (31), 125.
Rep. 1 (17), 124.

Demosthenes:
 4 (20), 53.

Diogenes Laertius:
 9 (55), 35.

Diodorus Siculus:
 17 (113. 3), 152.
 18 (55. 1), 155.

Dionysius Halicarnassensis:
Arch. 10 (53), 101.
 1 (74. 3), 164.

Euripides:
Alc. (447), 96.
Andr. (1064), 18.
Hel. (185), 96; (805), 12.
Hipp. (656), (1331), 18.
Ion (971), 12.
Or. (688), 19.
Phoen. (791), 96; (924), 12.
Rheus (511), 18.
Suppl. (222), 20.

Galen (ed. Kühn):
5 (275), 100.
18 (1. 122), 102; (2. 286), 106.

Herodotus:
1 (30. 4), 66.
2 (154. 5), 54.
9 (38. 2), 20; (72), 68.

Hippocratica:
Acut. 20 (6), 104; 35 (6), 105; 42 (12), 102.
Aer. 4 (25), 102; 7 (24), 109.
Aff. (17), 106; (29), 105, 106.
Aph. 1 (8), 105; 3 (20), 107; 4 (11), 105; (33), 106; (48), 105; (54), 103; 6 (22), (39), 104; 7 (73), 105; (append.), 103.
Art. 67 (21), 106.
Coac. 1 (6), 101; (238), 107; (309), 105; (435), 107.
*Epid.*¹ (29), 14 (5), 103; 18 (6), 107.
*Epid.*² (1), 101.
*Epid.*³ 5 (4), 106; catast. 3 (6. 10), 101; catast. 8 (8. 61), 104.
*Epid.*⁵ (26), 108; (93), 107.
*Epid.*⁶ 5 (3), 109; 7 (1), 105.
*Epid.*⁷ (11), 102; (46), 106-7; (84), 102; (93), 108.
Flat. 12 (6), 104.
Fract. 10 (7), 102.
Hum. (7), (18), 106.
*Morb.*¹ (12), 108; (29), 105.
*Morb.*² (41), 105.
*Morb.*³ (9), 108.
Morb. Sacr. 8 (18), 107; 10 (9), 104; 13 (23), 107; (36), 109.
Nat. Puer. (30), 104.
Prog. (init.), 98; 1 (20), 108; 3 (23), 105; 11 (42), 104; 13 (4), 99; 15 (33), 103; 23 (31), 107.
Prorrh. 1 (70), 105.
*Vict.*¹ 28 (10), 107.
*Vict.*³ 73 (10), 104.
*Vict.*⁴ 89 (87), 107.
V.M. 3 (31), 105; 12 (4), 109; 14 (37), 107; 16 (43), 104.

Horace:
Od. 4 (6. 41), 177.
Sat. 1 (1. 13), 173; 2 (6. 53), 123.

Livy:
30 (26), 162-3.
32 (33), 164.

Lucretius:
3 (405), (835), 182.

Martial:
1 (34. 6), (109. 13), 173.
2 (63. 3-4), 173; (69. 8), 173-4; (86. 9), 174.
3 (50. 8), 173.
5 (79. 5-6), 174; (80. 7), 124.

9 (67. 4), 173.
10 (11. 5-6), 174.
11 (1. 3-4), (7. 13-14), 174.
14 (30. 1-2), 174.

Menander:
fr. (214), 18.
Menander Protector:
fr. (43), 171.

Ovid:
Am. 2 (8. 7), 3 (7. 27), 124.
Fast. 4 (801), 124.
Her. 8 (65), 124.
Tr. 3 (1. 41), 124; (9. 12), 7.

Parmenides:
(fr. 3), 127.
(fr. 8), 127, 135.

Plato:
Crat. 439 (d 8-9), 85.
Critias 107 (d), 109 (b-c), 92.
Leg. 711 (e)-712 (a), 93; 715 (c, d), 92; 739 (a-c), 93.
Meno 91 (e), 34.
Parm. (passim), 126-50; 132 (c 12)-133 (a 7), 82-83.
Phaedr. 246 (a), 82; 247 (c-e), 88; 250 (a), 253 (c), 254 (b), 82.
Phil. 15 (b)-17 (a), 84.
Pol. 277 (d)-278 (c), 84; 294 (a), 92; 93; 300 (c 2), 92.
Prot. 330 (d 8), 83.
Rep. 425 (e), 90; 454 (a-b), 88; 478 (c), 131; 507 (a 7)-517 (a 7), 22-32.
Theat. 176 (e 3-4), 84.
Tim. (passim), 79-95.
Alc. (133 b), 46.
Hipparch. (228 c), 67.

Plautus:
Amph. (620), (708), (753), (1072), 122.
Asin. (31), 121.
Aul. (241), (389), 121.
Bacch. (538), (667), 122.
Capt. (632), 123.
Cist. (658), 122.
Men. (412), (620), (890), 122.
Merc. (173), 121; (215), (369), 122.
Most. (999), 123; (1030), 122.
Poen. (257), 123; (975), 122.

Pliny:
Epist. 8 (17), 124.

Plutarch:
Alex. (28), 151-7.
De Aud. Poet. (2), 96.
Mor. 190 (c), 219 (b), 67; 234 (e), 68; 240 (c), 67.

Polybius:
1 (3. 1), 160; (3. 4), 159.
2 (56. 10), 158.
3 (20. 5), 158; (31. 12), 159.
4 (2. 3), 160.
9 (2. 4), 159.
12 (25 i 5), (25 n 8), 158; (27. 1, 4, 5), 5; (28 a 7), 160.
18 (1. 14), 163-4.
39 (1. 4), 161.

Priscus:
frs. (38), (39), 171.

Propertius:
1 (12. 9), 124.
2 (3. 23), 123; (28. 9), 124.

Propertius (*cont.*)
 3 (6, 3), 124.
 4 (3, 23), 124.
 Quintilian:
 1 (10, 47), 45.
 Sappho:
 fr. (2, 6 Lobel = 49 D.), 67.
 Seneca the Elder:
Suasoria 6 (ed. Bursian), 77.
 Seneca the Younger:
Ben. 2 (18, 3), 124.
Clem. 1 (14, 1), 125.
Tiv. (930), 124.
 [Seneca]:
Herc. Oet. (1723), 125.
 Servius Danielis:
 ad *Verg. Aen.* 1 (373), 162; 2 (19), 178.
 Sophocles:
Aias (1216), 11.
O.C. (123), 96.
O.T. (31), 54; (357), 12.
Philoec. (430-7), 68.
Trach. (441), 54.
 Statius:
Ach. 1 (61-63), 10; (656-60), 181; (675-6), 181-2.
Silv. 1 (1, 34), 76; (1, 37-39), (1, 45-46), 2; (1, 151), (1, 66-67), 76; (2, 239), 77; (4, 86), 72-74; (4, 94-97), 1-2; (4, 125-7), 2-3.
 2 (pref.), 77; (1, 19-21), (2, 101-3), (3, 16-17), 3.
 3 (1, 76-82), 3-4; (5, 18-28), 4; (5, 87), 5.
 5 (1, 6), 5; (2, 82-83), 1; (3, 125), 179; (3, 134-5), 5; (3, 222-4), (3, 292-3), (5, 43-45), (5, 68), 6.
Theb. 1 (87), 7; (395-7), 175; (465), 81; (494-7), 175; (668-71), 7.
 2 (382-3), 175-6.
 3 (207), 176; (312), 181; (470), 177; (546), 180; (583), 176; (648), 177.
 4 (64-67), 177-8; (642-4), 7; (653-

4), 176; (726-9), 178; (818-21), 176.
 5 (11-13), 175; (106-8), 178; (325), 176; (389), 178-9; (599-604), 179.
 6 (148-9), 8; (177-85), 176-7; (218-19), 179.
 7 (17-18), 8; (436-40), (609-10), 179; (624), 179-80.
 8 (40-41), 175; (285), 180; (436-7), 177; (509), 124; (532-5), (614-15), 8; (639-40), 178.
 9 (58), 177; (63-64), 181; (84-85), (277), 180; (365-7), 8; (700), 179.
 10 (26), (512-13), 180; (686-9), 180-1; (798-801), 9.
 11 (174), 177.
 12 (40-41), 9; (141-8), 9-10; (212-13), 10; (314-15), (385), 181; (686), 180.

Suidas:
 s.v. ὁμοράς, 171-2.


Terence:
Ad. (487), 122.
Andr. (477), 123; (591), (934), 122.
Eun. (272), 122; (286), 123; (947), 122.
Heaut. (517), 122.
Hec. (811), 123.

Thucydides:
 2 (48, 3), 99; (49), 97-119; (50), (51), 108-9.
 3 (39, 7), (45, 3), 53.
 4 (40, 2), 65-68.
 8 (47, 2), 66; (48, 6), 65.

Varro:
L.L. 5 (148), 76.

Virgil:
Aen. 6 (31), 173.
 10 (68), 125.

Xenophon:
Cyrop. 6 (2, 33), 11.
Hell. 5 (3, 9), 66.
Hiero 1 (14), 17.



The Classical Association

The objects of the Classical Association are to promote the development and maintain the well-being of classical studies, and in particular (a) to impress upon public opinion the claim of such studies to an eminent place in the national scheme of education; (b) to improve the practice of classical teaching; (c) to encourage investigation and call attention to new discoveries; (d) to create opportunities for intercourse among lovers of classical learning.

Membership of the Association is open to men and women alike. The annual subscription is 5s. (life composition, £5. 5s.). Members receive a copy of the annual *Proceedings* of the Association. They may also obtain the *Classical Review* and *Classical Quarterly* at reduced prices (*Review* 18s., *Quarterly* £1; combined subscription £1. 15s. od.), though the reduction cannot be guaranteed unless the subscription is paid before January 31st in each year. *Greece and Rome* may be obtained for an annual subscription of 14s.

Copies of the final issue of *The Year's Work in Classical Studies* (covering the years 1945-7) can still be obtained from Messrs. J. W. Arrowsmith, Quay Street, Bristol, for 10s. (for members of the Association, 6s.), and the volume for 1939-45 for 6s. from Professor L. J. D. Richardson, University College, Cardiff, who can also supply most of the pre-war back numbers at 2s. 6d. per volume, post free.

Applications for membership should be addressed to the Hon. Treasurer, Mr. J. S. Shields, Queen Mary's School, Basingstoke, Hants. Inquiries should be sent to either of the Hon. Secretaries of the Association (Professor L. J. D. Richardson, University College, Cardiff, and Mr. T. W. Melluish, Bec School, London, S.W. 17) or to the Hon. Secretary of any one of the District Branches—viz. Aberystwyth, Bedfordshire, Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, East Anglia, Hull, Kent, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, London, Manchester, Northampton, North Staffordshire, Northumberland and Durham, North Wales, Nottingham, Oxford, Reading, Sheffield, Shrewsbury, Southampton, South-Western, Swansea, Taunton and West Somerset.

BOOKS ON CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY AND BYZANTIUM

We gladly offer for books on these subjects, e.g.

Critical Editions, Indexes, Lexica of Greek and Latin Authors, including Ecclesiastical Authors; Standard Collections of Texts; Works of Reference, e.g. Liddell & Scott, Pauly, Roscher, Daremburg & Saglio, the Latin Thesaurus, Cambridge Ancient History, any volume; Works of Beazley, Bevan, Bury, Evans, Farnell, T. Frank, G. F. Hill, Rostovtzeff, Mattingly, Bouché-Leclercq, Cumont, Ch. Diehl, De Sanctis, Kern, Krumbacher, Leo, Norden, Seeck, Wilamowitz, &c., &c.

*Large or small collections bought; lists of books
for disposal always welcome. Catalogues gratis*

W. Heffer & Sons, Limited
PETTY CURY CAMBRIDGE

Telegrams: 'Heffer, Cambridge'

Telephone 58351

BLACKWELL'S

Now available

post free

GREEK & LATIN CLASSICS

Catalogue No. 595 (I)

1953

ARE YOU ON OUR
MAILING LIST?

BROAD
ST.



OXFORD

THE DRAMATIC FESTIVALS OF ATHENS

By SIR ARTHUR PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE
Illustrated. 50s. net

This is an account of the ritual and organization of the Dramatic Festivals of Ancient Athens, and of the dramatic contests, the actors, chorus, costumes, and audiences, and some kindred subjects, with a chapter on the 'Artists of Dionysus' down to the Imperial Epoch. It is based on a consideration of the evidence throughout and is fully illustrated. Together with the author's earlier work, *The Theatre of Dionysus* (1946) it should take the place of Haigh's *Attic Theatre* (third edition, 1907, out of print), much of which is now out of date; but this work is on a somewhat larger scale and covers wider ground.

By the same author:
THE THEATRE OF DIONYSUS IN ATHENS. Illustrated. 35s. net
DITHYRAMB, TRAGEDY, AND COMEDY. 25s. net

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

